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ABSTRACT 
Attitudes to large Victorian reservoir schemes range from being unnecessarily grandiose to 
being grateful for a wonderful legacy. The sizing of three Victorian reservoir schemes at 
Thirlmere for Manchester, Lake Vyrnwy for Liverpool, and Elan Valley for Birmingham, was 
strongly influenced by ambitious Corporations, and the Victorian engineers’ judgment of the 
demand forecast, respectively JF Bateman, Thomas Hawksley and James Mansergh.  In this 
research, the “risk averseness” of design size is used as a surrogate for uncertainty, and a 
novel lag-time method, which involves extraction of data from supply and demand balance 
diagrams, enables comparisons. The full Elan scheme design is found to be the least risk 
averse, and the original Thirlmere scheme design the most risk averse. In comparison with a 
contemporary large reservoir design, the tentative conclusion is reached that using the lag-
time model approach, the recent proposal by Thames Water Utilities for a 100 Mm3 design for 
an Upper Thames Reservoir, in terms of future supply and demand, is a more risky design 
size than any of the Victorian designs. Water resources planners would be interested in the 
analysis and comparison of risk averseness and efficiency of design for other types of 
historical and modern schemes.  
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
“Perhaps the heaviest responsibility resting on any local government is the establishment and 
maintenance of a proper supply of water for those under its care. How unpardonable a failure 
in this all important matter! Yet how vast the task” 
(This quote is the first paragraph of “The Future Water Supply of Birmingham”, 1891, by 
Thomas Barclay. He was a member of the Water Committee at Birmingham City Council). 
1.1 Why is this project being undertaken? 
The tone of Barclay’s words reminds us how far our society has developed over the past 
century. As today’s domestic customers of private water companies, a clean and constant 
water supply is taken for granted. An increasing proportion of us are paying for water by 
meter, and water is now becoming a commodity rather than an essential. The great majority 
of us that live in the UK have little idea about the vastness of the tasks that have been 
undertaken over a long period of time. It is the successful completion of these tasks by water 
engineers, and the maintenance of these assets, that enables us all to open a tap connected to 
the mains with unquestioned certainty in the quantity and quality of what appears. The 
particular focus for this thesis is an essential part of the front end of this process; that is, 
uncertainty in the planning for long term water resources. The scope of this project is limited 
to public water supply. 
There are still many examples in the UK, particularly in its cities, of Victorian infrastructure 
that are in use today. This observation leads to a question: how and why has this happened? 
With regard to large Victorian water schemes, they are a very valuable legacy that we enjoy 
today, and it would be interesting to know how they did it so that we might leave as good as, 
and if not a better legacy to future generations.  
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The Victorian infrastructure subject area chosen for this project is the planning and design of 
reservoirs in England and Wales that are remote from the cities they serve, and connected to 
them by gravity aqueducts. The particular uncertainty that has been researched is in the long 
term forecast of water supplies and demands made at the planning and design stage for these 
schemes.  
The importance of this work, the author believes, is that it has led to a robust yet simple way 
of comparing, in terms of supply and demand, the relative risk averseness of reservoir design, 
to enable comparison with the performance of historic schemes. A lag-time method is 
suggested that uses forecast and actual supplies and demands, and then judgements are made 
of the scale and timings for schemes that use the supply and demand balance diagram. By 
learning about how the Victorian engineers approached uncertainty, it is believed that this 
research will help to contribute to better and timelier decisions about future reservoir 
schemes. 
The reasons for selecting the type of reservoir scheme for research were:- 
1. Late Victorian reservoir and gravity aqueduct scheme designs were regarded by 
opponents at the time as grandiose and hugely damaging to the environment. More 
than a century later, many of these schemes are still operational, and have become a 
valuable legacy today providing clean, cheap and reliable water supplies. These 
schemes operate with a small carbon footprint, and they are expected to continue 
working long into the future.   
2. Huge lead times, sometimes measured in decades, have been needed to span the time 
of conception to the delivery of reservoir schemes. This fact magnifies the challenge 
of addressing uncertainty in making supply and demand forecasts. New long-term 
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uncertainties, like the impact of rising temperatures due to climate change, are adding 
to the challenge of planning and designing modern reservoir schemes.  
3. Critical analysis of reservoir schemes can be informed and improved through the use 
of the supply and demand balance model. 
The reasons for selecting the three Victorian schemes for research appear in Chapter 2, 
Literature Review. They are: 
• The Elan scheme for Birmingham appears in Section 2.1. 
• The Thirlmere scheme for Manchester, and Vyrnwy for Liverpool, are in Section 2.2.  
• The modern scheme chosen for research is Thames Water Utilities (TWU) proposed 
Upper Thames Reservoir (UTR) in Oxfordshire for securing supplies in London, 
which is covered in Section 2.3.  
The other two main types of water resources schemes are abstractions from groundwater and 
from rivers. They were considered with comparative research in mind, but the variety of 
forms and sizes of schemes made the selection process complex, and therefore were not 
considered further. 
A Glossary of Terms is provided in Appendix A. 
1.2 Setting the Scene: Victorian and modern water supply service 
Table 1.1 shows a summary of Victorian and modern scenes for ten categories in the 
provision of a water supply service. The comparisons are interesting and will be reflected 
upon within this thesis. For example, in the ownership category, the privately owned 
Victorian companies were taken over by the Corporations because of the variable service 
offered by the companies during and after drought, and greater investment was badly needed 
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to meet the drivers of rapidly increasing population and economic activity, and for improving 
public health.  
Then more than a century later, the companies were returned to the private sector in 1989 so 
they could raise funds through the stock market, or from new owners, for further huge 
programmes of investment that were primarily aimed at the sewerage and sewage treatment 
functions. With many polluted urban rivers, at that time, Britain had acquired the sobriquet of 
“the dirty man of Europe”.  
The scene also needs setting by knowing how the institutions of government, and the 
responsibility for water supply, have changed. Table 1.2 shows the change from late 
Victorian to modern times, and summarises the principal drivers for change. The main issues 
identified in Table 1.2 will be addressed in the body of the thesis. 
A peer reviewed paper about Victorian water demand forecasting was published in February 
2010. The paper is based on the research reported in Chapter 3, and is titled “A review of the 
1892 water demand forecast for Birmingham” by Bradford, Gaterell and Bridgeman. It was 
published in the ICE’s Journal of Engineering History and Heritage, Volume 163, EH1, and 
an offprint is included as Appendix G. 
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Table 1.1 – Victorian and Modern Scenes; water supply service 
Provision of WATER 
SUPPLY Service 
Setting the VICTORIAN scene Setting the MODERN scene 
Ownership and Responsibility 
 
Water supply was a political issue during and after drought. 
Many private water companies were purchased or transferred 
to Local Authorities over a 50 year period.  
Today’s 10 private Water and Sewerage Companies in England and 
Wales were created in 1989. 19 relatively small private water supply 
companies remained. Mergers mean there are now 14 “water only” 
companies.   
External Regulation Government persuasion of individual water undertakers to 
improve quantity and quality of supplies. 
Government Regulators: 
Financial – Ofwat. 
Environment and Abstraction Licensing – Environment Agency. 
Treated Water – DWI.  
Water Supply - Quantity Intermittent supplies to consumers slowly improved to 
become constant supplies. Homes with WCs started to grow 
rapidly.  
Constant supplies for all, and infrequent restrictions on customer 
hosepipe and sprinkler use in droughts. 
Water Supply - Quality River abstractions often poor and variable until storage and 
filtration introduced. Preference by industry and domestic 
users for soft water. 
Compliance required to high bacteriological and chemical World 
Health Organisation (WHO) and European Economic Community 
(EEC) standards. Aesthetics of taste and odour important. 
Investment decisions Made by Corporations. The powers to construct schemes were 
obtained by Acts of Parliament. 
Made by Water Companies for inclusion in their 5 yearly Business 
Plans submitted to Ofwat. 
Drivers for Water Resources 
and Supplies Investment 
Increasing population, 
Economic growth, 
Deteriorating raw water quality of existing sources, 
Better treated water quality, 
Better public health. 
Increasing population, 
Economic growth, 
Better treated water quality, 
Better security of supply, 
Improve the environment, 
Impacts of climate change. 
Finance Income from customer bills 
Long term loans from Government 
Sale of bonds to the public. 
Customer bills. 
Borrowing from banks. 
Investment from owners. 
Water Resources Planning 
Approach 
A “single track” approach, build a new reservoir. A “twin-track” approach of demand management and water resources 
schemes. 
Water Resources Planning 
Methodology 
Empirically based engineering judgement (see Chapter 4) Set by EA for Water Companies to produce their 5 yearly Water 
Resources Management Plans. 
Water Resources Planning 
Long Term Horizon 
Up to 63 years (in the case of Birmingham) 25 years (required by EA guideline) 
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Table 1.2 - Institutional comparison and drivers; late Victorians and today 
Institutions Victorians Victorian Drivers Today  Today’s Drivers 
Central Government Royal 
Commissions 
 
Cholera and typhoid outbreaks in 
London and other cities 
Improve ecology of water 
environments 
Green image.  
EU Directives. 
Climate Change. 
Public health not an issue. 
Local Government  Took responsibility 
for water supply by 
purchasing local  
private water 
companies 
Sustain population and economic 
growth, and  improve public and moral 
health 
Victorians remembered for the 
major contribution to civic 
pride. Water Authorities set in 
1974 and privatised in 1989. 
Central government wants the privatised water 
companies to deliver major investment 
programmes, and be successful businesses.  
Water Companies Supplied those who 
could afford to pay. 
Not interested 
investing for the 
long-term. 
Maximise income, minimise 
expenditure, and pay dividends to 
owners. 
Heavily regulated. Some water 
companies now wholly owned 
by foreign investors.  
Meeting regulatory targets at least cost. Maximize 
profit, and pay good dividends to shareholders. 
Build a reputation for good customer service and 
good value for charges. 
Consumers No formal 
representation. 
Philanthropists recognised poor health 
and affordability issues 
Consumer Council for Water 
now represents the interests of 
consumers. 
Government appointed, and independent of water 
companies and regulators.   
Economic Regulator  None None Economic regulator Ofwat 
created in 1989 
Government established Ofwat to set water charges 
that are fair, and to monitor water companies’ 
“contracts” with their customers. 
Environmental 
Regulator 
None None The EA sets guidelines and 
monitors water companies’ 25 
year plans. Controls water    
abstractions by a licensing 
system. The government 
champion for environmental 
improvement.   
  
The Government wants to act responsibly in the 
interest of businesses and households, and create 
sustainable water environments. Through Defra and 
the EA, the government wants to ensure that the 
water companies have appropriate, robust and 
affordable water resource plans in place.     
Drinking Water 
Quality Regulator 
(DWI) 
None No controls DWI monitors drinking water 
quality, and approves schemes 
for improvement. 
Reporting high compliance standards to 
government. Incident management.  
Chapter 1                                                                                                                        Introduction 
 
 
7 
 
1.3 Setting the Scene: Response to Drought 
In the modern age, until a serious summer drought in 1995, water companies’ investment in 
water resources and supplies had a low profile. The 1995 drought was followed by a dry 
winter, and this experience exposed significant deficiencies in the nation’s water resource 
availability and supply flexibility, particularly in the north of England, and deficiencies too in 
the process of making water resources plans. The latter issue was addressed by government’s 
“Agenda for Action” published in 1996, which is covered in some detail in Chapter 6.    
At present (March 2012), in the south and east of England, including London, after two dry 
winters, there is a developing drought, and a hosepipe ban for domestic consumers is planned 
to start on 5 April 2012. For many domestic consumers, this the second time in eight years 
that a ban has been imposed. This is more frequent than the water companies tell their 
domestic customers is their target level of service (see Chapter 6). How will Government, the 
regulators and water companies respond? In the short term, the major uncertainty is whether 
the drought of 2012 turns out to be, or not to be, worse than the previous worst in 1976. This 
will depend on the extent of the geographic variation of rainfall, and the water resource types 
that are particularly affected.  
When the capital faces a water shortage, and the rain falls copiously further west and north, a 
question often asked is why we do not have national water grid. The EA remains clear that the 
practicalities are enormous, the costs exceed the benefits, and local developments are better 
(EA, 2006). However, as will be discussed in this thesis, the Victorian water engineer had a 
greater influence on decisions than his modern counterpart.                     
Against this backdrop, the thesis starts with a Literature Review in Chapter 2. The 
identification of the knowledge gap, and the project aims and objectives to fill the gap are 
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presented in Chapter 3. The Victorian approach to uncertainty in the long-term planning and 
design of the chosen remote reservoirs is discussed in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, a novel lag 
time model is used to judge the risk averseness of the Victorian reservoir designs. The modern 
approach to long term water resources and supplies planning, and how uncertainty is 
addressed, appears in Chapter 6. In Chapter 7, the lag time model is applied to the proposed 
100 Mm3 storage Upper Thames Reservoir scheme. The Discussion of the findings is 
presented in chapter 8, and the Conclusions to this research appear in Chapter 9. 
 
 Chapter 2 Literature Review 
 
 
9 
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction to the Literature Review 
This Literature Review contains factual material, analysis and comment derived from the 
author’s engagement with historic and modern UK water supply and water demand literature.  
The structure of Chapter 2, Literature Review, appears in Section 2.1.1. The reasons why the 
particular Victorian schemes were chosen for analysis are outlined in Sections 2.1.2 (Elan) 
and 2.1.3 (Thirlmere and Vyrnwy). Section 2.1.4 explains why the proposed Upper Thames 
Reservoir (UTR) was chosen as the modern scheme for analysis. 
The literature review helps to identify a knowledge gap. The aims and objectives of this 
research that address the knowledge gap appear in Chapter 3.    
2.1.1 Structure of the Literature Review   
Section 2.2 provides historical context about the Victorian industrial cities of Birmingham, 
Manchester and Liverpool. As explained in Section 2.1.2, there was more contextual material 
found for Birmingham than for the other two cities.  
Section 2.3 contains further historical context about the Victorian water engineers themselves, 
who directly or indirectly made such a difference for their client Corporations, and for the 
improvement in public health. The methods and parameters they used for making forecasts of 
demand, and assessing reservoir yield, are introduced.    
Section 2.4 reviews the literature available about the three Victorian schemes. The critical 
analysis of historic water supply and demand forecasts that relate to the three Victorian 
schemes has been enabled by valuable data, information and reflection recorded by the 
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Victorian engineers. These have been found in published technical papers, and in the reports 
presented by Victorian water engineers to Local Authority and Government committees.  
There is a detailed Victorian chronology in Appendix B of events relevant to 19th century 
water supplies in Birmingham and London. This chronology is a reminder about the pace of 
change as social, economic, technical and political influences impacted on the planning and 
design of schemes.  
Section 2.5 contains modern context for how today’s planning and design of water resources 
and supplies infrastructure is undertaken by the water industry. The way that uncertainty is 
factored into the supply demand balance forecasts by the use of target headroom is 
introduced. The Government’s lead with a vision for a wide range of stakeholder interests in 
water is acknowledged.  
Section 2.6 is focussed on the literature associated with Thames Water Utilities proposed new 
reservoir, and in particular for the Public Inquiry in 2010. 
The Literature Review finishes in March 2011, when the Secretary of State officially 
informed Thames Water Utilities that all the recommendations of the Planning Inspector had 
been accepted. The major recommendation was the rejection of a pumped storage UTR of 100 
Mm3 in Oxfordshire, which was the company’s preferred solution to London’s long-term 
supply and demand problem. Other scheme options were put forward by the Inspector for 
further investigation, including a smaller UTR of 50 Mm3. The outcome from the Public 
Inquiry appears not to have satisfied either the promoters, or the objectors.   
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2.1.2 Selection of the Elan Reservoirs Scheme for analysis 
Research was proposed by the author for studying the late Victorian Elan scheme located in 
mid-Wales, which has supplied very nearly all of the water demand in Birmingham for the 
past 107 years. The choice of the Elan scheme was approved for funding by Dr John 
Bridgeman of the University of Birmingham, and by Professor Robert Sellin of University of 
Bristol, who was acting as a Trustee of the ICE’s Research and Enabling Fund.  
Professor Sellin asserted that “Birmingham appears to have got things right”. Reflection after 
the discussion with Professor Sellin prompted the question “Can we quantify how “right” or 
“wrong” Birmingham Corporation got it, and can we compare this with other Corporations 
that developed similar schemes?” This idea then led to a more specific question involving 
uncertainty: “When making this comparison, can we learn anything about the way Victorian 
water engineers’ approached the factoring of uncertainty into their supply and demand 
forecasts?” 
Elan was regarded as the major scheme for this project, and a great deal of local 
documentation and historic data was found in Birmingham about this highly controversial 
scheme. There is significantly more material and analysis presented in this thesis about the 
Elan scheme than for the other schemes chosen for analysis.  
2.1.3 Selection of Thirlmere and Vyrnwy Schemes for analysis 
For comparative analysis with Elan, the selection was made of the Thirlmere scheme and the 
Vyrnwy scheme as all three are of the same type and scale. They comprise of remote upland 
raw water storage that is naturally filled, and connected to their distant cities by gravity 
aqueducts. All were planned, designed and constructed in the late Victorian era for the supply 
to the three largest cities in England outside of London. All three schemes are still working 
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today at maximum capacity. Their locations relative to the industrial cities they serve are 
illustrated in Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1 - Location of the schemes, aqueducts and cities 
A high level factual summary of the sizes, dates, and the names of the principal Victorian 
engineers involved is shown in Table 2.1a. A similar summary is shown in Table 2.1b for two 
other major Victorian schemes in the UK that might have been included in this project; they 
are Loch Katrine (Glasgow) and the Derwent Valley Reservoirs (East Midlands).   
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Table 2.1a. Thirlmere, Vyrnwy, Elan: High level summary; Table 2.1 b. Other major Victorian schemes, 
Loch Katrine and Derwent Valley Reservoirs. 
a Victorian 
Reservoir Scheme 
Corporation Leading Water 
Engineers  
Final Scheme 
Capacity 
Date of 
Parliamentary 
powers 
Date of 
first flow 
 Thirlmere Manchester JF Bateman. 
(then GH Hill)  
37,000 Ml 1878 1894 
 Lake Vyrnwy Liverpool T. Hawksley  
(then G Deacon) 
59,000 Ml 1879 1893 
 Elan Reservoirs Birmingham J. Mansergh 99,000 Ml 1892 1904 
 
b Victorian 
Reservoir Scheme 
Corporation Leading Water 
Engineers  
Final Scheme 
Capacity 
Date of 
Parliamentary 
powers 
Date of 
first flow 
 Loch Katrine Glasgow JF Bateman. 
 
25,500 Ml 1855 1859 
 
Derwent Valley 
Reservoirs 
Sheffield, 
Nottingham, 
Derby, 
Leicester. 
Derwent Valley 
Water Board 
47,000 Ml 
(including 
Ladybower) 
1899 1916 
 
During the literature search, two papers were found that were presented to the same Institution 
of Civil Engineers (ICE) meeting in 1896 about the newly commissioned sources at Thirlmere 
and Vyrnwy (Hill, 1896; Deacon 1896). After these presentations had been made, the 
discussion was started by James Mansergh, who compared the physical characteristics of the 
two schemes with his Elan scheme, which at that time was under construction. Figure 2.2 is a 
cartoon that was used during the discussion by Mansergh.   
 Chapter 2 Literature Review 
 
 
14 
 
Figure 2.2 - Mansergh’s Three Catchments – ICE 14 April 1896 
This ICE discussion was an inspiration to the author for knowing that the same three schemes 
were selected for comparison 116 years ago. 
2.1.4 Selection of the proposed Upper Thames Reservoir for analysis 
For a modern scheme in the UK, the intention was to choose a strategic reservoir scheme that 
was at the planning stage, and then apply the new comparative method developed for the 
Victorian schemes. The largest scheme proposal in the UK that is at the planning stage is for a 
100 Mm3 pumped storage scheme Upper Thames Reservoir (called UTR or Abingdon). 
Thames Water (TW) has proposed the scheme, and it features in the company’s preferred plan 
(rDWRP, 2009). In the past different storage sizes that increase the long term security of 
supply to London have been suggested. The scheme works by being filled in winter by 
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abstractions from the nearby River Thames, and releasing water back into the same river 
during summer to travel to London, and then re-abstraction before treatment and supply. The 
extra deployable output is 185 Ml/d, and the average daily demand in London is about 2,000 
Ml/d. The fact that the UTR is filled in a different way to the Victorian schemes was judged to 
be not material for this project. 
A Public Inquiry was held in the summer of 2010 into the company’s revised Draft WRMP 
produced in September 2009. The documents presented by the company and by objectors (led 
by the EA) have provided useful material for this project. The most significant document was 
the Planning Inspector’s report that gave the reasons for rejecting the company’s preferred 
plan for a UTR 100 Mm3 scheme for completion in 2026.    
The arguments for and against the UTR scheme involves different drivers and planning 
uncertainties to those faced by the Victorians. Meeting the demands from a growing 
population and enabling future economic growth remain common drivers. However, the 
Victorian driver to improve public health is no longer an issue. It has been replaced by a drive 
for environmental improvement, and much of this improvement will depend on reducing and 
reallocating existing water abstractions for public supply back to the natural water 
environment. There are very significant uncertainties about the quantities involved.  
2.2 Historical Context, Victorian Cities 
2.2.1 Britain’s Victorian Cities 
In the Victorian railway age of the nineteenth century, Britain witnessed huge political social 
and economic changes with the emergence of its great industrial cities. Britain’s Industrial 
Revolution of urban growth had its economic foundation in a rapidly expanding population 
coupled with booming industrial development. However, this growth brought social problems 
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that impacted most adversely on the public health of the poor. The primary physical causes of 
poor health were bad and overcrowded housing, an inadequate water supply, polluted 
drinking water, and the lack of proper sanitation. Population growth was the most significant 
indicator of the scale of the challenge. 
Table 2.2 shows that the times of maximum population growth rate for the three cities did not 
coincide. Comparatively, Manchester witnessed the greatest growth rate in the first half of the 
19th century, Liverpool was greatest in the second half of the 19th century, and Birmingham 
grew the fastest in the first half of the 20th century.  
Table 2.2 – Resident Population Growth in Birmingham, Manchester and Liverpool 
Cities and 
rounded 
resident 
Population 
supplied.  
Year 1801 Year 1851 Growth  
1801 to 
1851 
 
Year 1901 Growth  
1851 to 
1901  
Year 
1951 
Growth  
1901 to 
1951 
Birmingham 75,000 230,000 x 3.1 520,000 x 2.3 1,110,000 x 2.1 
Manchester 90,000 350,000 x 4.4 660,000 x 1.9 700,000 x 1.1 
Liverpool 80,000 250,000 x 3.1 660,000 x 2.6 806,000 x 1.2 
 
A Victorian chronology for Birmingham and London of water supply related events, 
including reference sources, is given in Appendix B. Information contained in this chronology 
is used in Section 2.2.2 for London, Section 2.2.3 for Birmingham, and referred to in Section 
2.4 that describes the three Victorian reservoir schemes.    
2.2.2 London 
In London, the River Thames wastewater crisis developed in the first half of the 19th century, 
evidenced by the well documented outbreaks of cholera, and culminating in the Great Stink of 
1858. This event demonstrated that the public health of all classes was threatened, and raised 
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the political will sufficiently for Government to seek improvement (Hardy, 1984). Halliday’s 
“The Great Stink of London” celebrates Sir Joseph Bazalgette’s substantial and lasting 
contribution to better sanitation in London through his design and delivery in the 1860s and 
1870s of the intercepting sewers on either side of the River Thames (Halliday, 1999).  
The population of London was growing rapidly, and during the second half of the 19th 
century, proposals were made for new raw water storage west of the capital (Bailey Denton, 
1866). In 1869, a Royal Commission chaired by the Duke of Richmond into London’s future 
water supplies examined distant solutions, particularly from Wales (Walters, 1936). 
Richmond recommended increasing abstractions from the non-tidal River Thames upstream 
of London where river flows could be further exploited. To enable this to happen, the science 
of river water treatment was improved, and new bankside storage was constructed in west 
London. The debate about developing new storage remotely from London continues today 
some 140 years after Richmond. The proposed UTR is introduced in Section 2.6, and 
critically analysed in Sections 6.4 and 6.5. 
Also in the second half of the 19th century, there was growing demand for clean soft water to 
enable economic growth in Manchester, Liverpool, and Birmingham. Unlike London, these 
three cities are not located near to large non-tidal rivers. Deteriorating existing local surface 
and groundwater sources in both quantity and quality eventually stimulated water engineers 
and their client Corporations to search further afield (Hassan, 1998). Over a century later, all 
three cities now enjoy the legacy of a relatively cheap, clean and reliable water supply.  
2.2.3 Birmingham 
In the latter half of the 18th and early 19th centuries, Birmingham was developing its 
manufacturing base for small specialised items, and water for domestic and industrial use 
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came from wells. At the same time, a group of physicians, scientists, entrepreneurs and 
engineers known as the Lunar Society met regularly in Birmingham to discuss freely their 
thoughts on scientific experimentation and discovery which would be good for mankind, and 
good for business (Uglow, 2002). Thus Birmingham became a centre for innovative and non-
conformist thinking away from the institutionalised constraints of London. This gave 
Birmingham an integrity which did not depend on the capital, and also marked its difference 
from Manchester, Birmingham’s main rival manufacturing city to the north.  
By the 1850s and early 1860s, Birmingham had lost ground to other cities with a succession 
of councils making a virtue of spending little money on public amenities and thus public 
health (Briggs, 1968). Birmingham’s period of strongest economic growth at near 4% per year 
occurred in the latter part of the 19th century. 
The social, economic and political historian Asa Briggs (1968) suggests that the root of the 
public health problem in the early 1870s was the Corporation’s difficulty in reconciling 
economic individualism and common civic purpose. However, Ward (2005) identifies that the 
civic gospel had a religious foundation of caring for the poor, and was key to local 
government in Birmingham being described by others in the 1870s as “the best in the world”.  
Briggs emphasises the significance to Birmingham’s economic development of figures such 
as successful entrepreneur Matthew Boulton (a Lunar Society member), and revered politician 
Joseph Chamberlain, whereas local social historian Professor Carl Chinn (2003) stresses the 
substantial and sometimes undervalued contribution made by skilled and adaptable ordinary 
people. The two approaches are seen by Chinn as complimentary. 
 Chapter 2 Literature Review 
 
 
19 
2.2.4 Birmingham Institutions 
The story of Birmingham’s water supply planning is linked to developments in improved 
sanitation and drainage. In chronological order, the key institutions for the planning and 
delivery of water and wastewater services were: 
1) The Streets Commissioners; first appointed by Government in 1769 with a duty 
to cleanse and light streets. By the Improvement Act of 1812, the Streets 
Commissioners became the first public health authority for the town. 
2) The Birmingham Waterworks Company; created by act of Parliament in 1826, 
and the responsibility for supply remained in private hands until 1875. (Mathews, 
1886) 
3) The Committee of Public Works of the Birmingham Borough Council; 
appointed to implement the Birmingham Improvement Act of 1851, and thereafter 
took over the work of the Streets Commissioners. This committee took an interest 
in, but were not responsible for, water supplies. (Macmorran, 1973) 
4) The Water Committee of the Council; formed in 1875 on the takeover of the 
responsibilities and purchasing the assets of the Birmingham Waterworks 
Company. The Water Committee recommended building the Elan scheme to the 
City Council (CBWD, 1973). 
5) Severn Trent Water Authority took over the responsibilities and the assets from 
the City Council as part of the wider restructuring of Local Government in 1974. 
There was hostility towards the new Authority from Birmingham inhabitants who 
felt the Authority had stolen the Elan scheme, and at the same time, domestic 
water bills in Birmingham had risen significantly.  
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6) Severn Trent Water Ltd; the responsibilities and assets for water and waste were 
transferred back into private hands in 1989 after 114 years in local government. 
Estimates of the population served are not consistently reported in the literature. The city 
boundaries were substantially extended in 1891 and 1911, and the figures quoted by Dick 
(2005) are used. Population data for Birmingham is discussed in Section 4.3.5, and census 
data for the decades from 1801 to 1961 are shown in Figure 4.11.     
2.2.5 Birmingham Decision Makers 
There were six Victorian engineers who undertook water resources planning and design for 
Birmingham, and who were the most influential in the improvement of public health. 
John Pigott-Smith, highways engineer to the Streets Commissioners, who become Borough 
Surveyor reporting to the Council’s new Public Works Committee up to 1857. He had a 
passion for drainage, and achieved much during the period when Council spending was 
miserly. Pigott-Smith was aware of how poor drainage in the Black Country was a threat to 
the quality of the River Tame, which was a significant source of drinking water for 
Birmingham. Following a pollution event in the River Tame at Willenhall in 1854, he 
shocked the members of the Public Works committee when he took them to see what was 
normally being discharged into the river above the abstractions for Birmingham (Macmorran, 
1973). 
Robert Rawlinson, sanitary engineer, who advised the Streets Commissioners and then the 
Public Works Committee from 1848 up to at least 1871. He first came to prominence in 1849 
when he reported to the Government’s new Central Board of Health about the poor state of 
Birmingham’s public health. Rawlinson (1849, 1854, 1871) understood the link between 
clean water, proper drainage and public health, and his first report to the Council on water 
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resources in 1854, co-authored with Pigott-Smith, recommended alternative local surface 
sources to replace the River Tame. His paper on future water resources in 1871, for which the 
Council asked him to consult James Mansergh, brought Elan to the Council’s attention as the 
best site for a clean and plentiful gravity supply. Sir Robert Rawlinson’s role provided 
continuity in addressing Birmingham’s problems over a crucial period that lasted over 20 
years. 
Richard Hassard, civil engineer, who in 1870 was the first to propose to the Public Works 
Committee that Birmingham’s water supply should come by gravity from distant new storage 
to the west. His first recommendation was the River Teme (Herefordshire), and he proposed 
an aqueduct route that turned out to be very close to that eventually built for Elan. As well as 
the supply to Birmingham, a supply could be made available to the neighbouring South Staffs 
Waterworks Co. After Rawlinson’s paper of 1871, Hassard revised his recommendation to a 
new site on the River Ithon, which is close to Elan. In this latter paper, Hassard expressed his 
disappointment that Rawlinson had used many of his ideas without proper acknowledgement 
(Hassard, 1870, 1871).  
Thomas Hawksley, civil engineer, advised the Birmingham Waterworks Company on a 
River Blythe abstraction just east of Birmingham. Abstractions from the Blythe are made 
today for the supply to Nuneaton in north Warwickshire. Hawksley advocated the 
development of local groundwater sources for public supply. He was a lone but persuasive 
voice about the use of groundwater (Mathews 1886). 
J. W. Gray, the City Engineer, provided 50 year supply and demand projections from 1890 to 
1940, which were developed by Mansergh to justify the need for a scheme the size of Elan to 
the City Council. (Barclay, 1898) 
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James Mansergh, civil engineer; Mansergh strongly recommended the Elan site for reservoir 
development to the Council, first in support of Rawlinson’s paper of 1871, and then again in 
1891 for the land purchase. He had assessed the Elan and Claerwen valleys as far back as 
1862, possibly with a view to a future supply for London. Mansergh was in charge of 
construction of the Elan scheme starting in 1892 (Mansergh, 1894) up to its commissioning in 
1904. In 1862, Mansergh had the foresight to get rainfall records started at Elan. 
Of the many politicians over time who cared about improving public health in Birmingham, 
and for the City’s economic prosperity, there are three administrators who stand equal with 
the engineers in making the Elan scheme happen: 
Joseph Chamberlain was the charismatic Mayor and Cabinet Minister, who was responsible 
for taking over the gas and water companies for the citizens of Birmingham in 1874 and 1875 
respectively. He was the leader of the “civic gospel” which revolutionised the role of local 
government in Britain. Whilst at Westminster, he steered the Bill authorising the construction 
of the Elan scheme through both Houses in one sitting in 1892. His status in Birmingham 
could not have been higher (Ward 2003, 2005). 
Thomas Avery, businessman and Councillor, who from 1862 up to 1892 was a well 
respected and influential chair at various times of the Finance, Sewage, and Water 
Committees, as well as Mayor. It was Avery who in 1869 gave the Council the wake-up call 
about their responsibilities about public health (Avery, 1869). Soon after 1869, he 
successfully negotiated the financial detail for the Council to purchase the Birmingham 
Waterworks Company. Avery was steadfast in 1893 when an ageing Joseph Chamberlain 
warned the Council in 1893 that the Elan scheme might prove too much for the City’s 
finances. (Ward, 2005) 
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Thomas Martineau, was the chairman of the Council’s Water Committee in 1890 who 
successfully convinced the Council that James Mansergh’s scheme was the right one for 
securing Birmingham’s long term water supply (Barclay, 1898). 
2.2.6 Manchester water supplies prior to Thirlmere 
Manchester witnessed major growth similar to that of Birmingham, but half a century earlier. 
The chapter title in Briggs (1968) “Manchester; Symbol of a New Age” signifies that 
Manchester was in the vanguard of Britain’s Victorian urban industrialisation. Whilst there 
was no “civic gospel”, moral philanthropy existed like the founding in 1833 of the 
Manchester and Salford Provident Society “for the encouragement of frugality and 
forethought…and the occasional relief of sickness” 
The industrial picture was of large mills owned by wealthy men that employed lots of 
expendable people. This picture was in direct contrast to Birmingham’s mass of small works 
that employed skilled workers. 
A chronology of the water supply events in Manchester and Liverpool, given in Table 2.3, 
shows how similar the water supply history is of these two great urban developments situated 
in north-west England. 
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Table 2.3 - Chronology of Liverpool and Manchester Water Supply, 1847 to 1900 
Year Liverpool Manchester 
1847 Corporation acquires both local water 
companies. 
Corporation acquires local water company. 
1850 
   - 
1857 
Thomas Hawksley’s Rivington Pike reservoirs 
scheme built near Bolton (ultimate max 55 
Ml/d); first flow 1857. Liverpool demand 30 
Ml/d. 
Bateman’s Longdendale reservoirs scheme 
constructed east of the city (ultimate max 90 
Ml/d); first flow 1855. 
Manchester demand 36 Ml/d. 
1865 Liverpool demand 72 Ml/d. Drought, supplies 
down to 2hrs per day and intermittent 
thereafter.  
 
1868 In spite of house to house inspections, 
supplies remain intermittent until 1874 (shut-
offs normally for 9-12hrs per day). 
Manchester demand 60 Ml/d. Drought, 12 hour 
supply for 84 days. Then a return to constant 
supplies.  
1873 Liverpool demand and max water supply 80 
Ml/d. “Special operations for the prevention 
of waste” (Parry 1881) reduces losses, and 
constant supply returns in 1875. 
Demand increase to over 70 Ml/d was viewed as 
soon to exhaust Longdendale, and the next 
major source needed.  
1875 Liverpool demand managed down to 67 Ml/d. 
Constant supplies reinstated. Bateman 
proposes Ullswater. 
Manchester demand 80 Ml/d. Bateman makes 
30 year forecast of 4.5 Ml/d per year. 
1876  Manchester turns down joint development with 
Liverpool at Ullswater. Bateman proposes 
Thirlmere. 
1879 Hawksley and Bateman independently are of 
the opinion that Vyrnwy better than 
Haweswater.  
TDA challenge overcome and powers for 
Thirlmere obtained using Bateman’s 4.5 Ml/d 
per year forecast. 
1880 Powers for Vyrnwy obtained using 
Hawksley’s 36 year forecast of a doubling of 
population using 30 gallons/head/day by 
1916. Current supply population 703,000.   
Current supply population c.900,000. Larger 
than Liverpool as supply area included 
surrounding towns in Lancs. and Cheshire. 
1892 First flow from Vyrnwy scheme   
1894  First flow from Thirlmere scheme. Manchester 
Ship Canal opened. 
1898 Parry asked by Corporation to review the 
supply demand balance, and to cost a second 
Vyrnwy main. 
 
1900 Liverpool demand 124 Ml/d. Harwood report says current demand is 145 
Ml/d, and forecast demand would reach supply 
capability of 340 Ml/d in 1935. Second main 
required soon.   
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The first large scale example of a gravitation works in this country was at Longdendale, some 
18 miles east from Manchester (Hassan, 1998). This scheme formed, at the time, probably the 
largest system of artificial lakes in the world, and had a reliable yield of between 109 and 113 
Ml/d (24 and 25 Mgd). Undertaken by Bateman, the full scheme took over 20 years to 
develop because of the engineering problems caused by poor ground conditions. In spite of 
these difficulties, Bateman was trusted by Manchester Corporation. In the 1860s, Bateman 
had undertaken a project to source water 35 miles north at Loch Katrine for Glasgow (Binnie, 
1981). 
Before Longdendale, local groundwater sources and canals were used as sources. 
2.2.7 Liverpool supplies prior to Vyrnwy scheme 
Victorian Liverpool was a commercial town with merchants, and was rather different 
character to the industrial town of Manchester with its large mills.  
Pollution and overuse of groundwater sources lead to a pressure group of councillors called 
the Pikeists who wanted a new source on the edge of the Pennines at Rivington. The Pikeists 
prevailed, but only because of a projection of 100 Ml/d (22 Mgd) available from the scheme 
that was made by Thomas Hawksley (MWH, 2008). This assessment was subsequently found 
to be a significant over-estimate. Hawksley had used average rainfall for his analysis, and the 
drought yield of the Rivington sources was near 77 Ml/d (17 Mgd).  
The first flow from the Rivington scheme occurred in 1857, and constant supplies were 
started in 1858. During a drought in 1865, it was with dismay that intermittent supplies had to 
be reintroduced and to last for another seven years (Deacon, 1875). 
The long timescale to deliver a new water resource forced the Corporation to take the view 
that leakage and waste reduction was the only way forward in the short and medium term. 
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This situation was turned into an opportunity by the corporation’s engineer George Deacon, 
who invented a distribution meter that produced a chart, and interpretation helped prioritise 
leakage reduction efforts. Deacon’s innovative approach was successful in the areas where it 
was implemented, and formed the beginning of what is now called “active” leakage control. 
Poor public health remained an issue (Roberts, 2000), and after some unsuccessful attempts to 
develop new sources nearer to home, the civic leaders of Liverpool chose to develop a site in 
North Wales, 68 miles away at Lake Vyrnwy. It was completed in 1891 as the largest 
artificial dam in Britain at the time, and the first to have a high masonry embankment 
(Hassan, 1998). The success that Liverpool Corporation had with the Vyrnwy scheme helped 
to give Birmingham Corporation the confidence that upland reservoir storage and aqueduct 
schemes were achievable.     
2.3 Historical Context; Victorian Water Engineers and Methods Used 
2.3.1 Britain’s Victorian Water Engineers 
The vision and work of many of the water engineers engaged by the Corporations to propose 
and design new water schemes are described and celebrated by Binnie (1981). Binnie’s use of 
the word “early” in the title perhaps infers that they were not the water engineers of the mid to 
late Victorian era, but this is not the case. Binnie devotes detailed biographic chapters to two 
of the giants of water engineering in John Frederick Bateman FRS (1810-1889), who was 
responsible for planning the Thirlmere scheme to supply Manchester, and Thomas Hawksley 
FRS (1807-1893) for planning the Vyrnwy scheme to supply Liverpool. 
James Mansergh FRS (1834-1905), who proposed designed and constructed the Elan scheme 
for Birmingham, came later and is not covered by Binnie. Other documents have been found 
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that provide enough detail to gain an understanding of Mansergh and his work, in particular 
Thomas Barclay’s “The water supply of Birmingham” (1898). 
Bateman, Hawksley and Mansergh were all made FRS, and Presidents of ICE for the then 
normal two year tenure. Their Presidential Addresses provide insight to their character, and 
their obituaries published in the ICE proceedings provide helpful reflection on their careers.  
In his Presidential Address of 1900, James Mansergh reflected on what had been achieved by 
water engineers in the 19th century. Mansergh counted Simpson, Bateman and Hawksley, plus 
two other past presidents, Sir Joseph Bazalgette and Sir Robert Rawlinson, whom he felt had 
made exceptional contributions to water supply engineering. Table 2.4 summarises the key 
dates for the water engineers revered by Mansergh, and the summary for Mansergh himself.  
Table 2.4 - Seven Victorian water engineers who were past Presidents of ICE 
President of ICE, 
Water Engineer 
Years of 
Birth and 
Death 
Life Year of 
Presidential 
Address 
Age when 
President  
References 
(Binnie = “Early Victorian 
Engineers” by G. M. Binnie, 1981, 
London, Thomas Telford) 
James SIMPSON 1799 - 1869 70 1854 55 Binnie chapter 5 (1981), ICE obit  
Thomas 
HAWKSLEY 
1807 - 1893 86 1872 65 Binnie chapter 8 (1981), “Pure and 
Constant” (2008), ICE obit  
John Frederick 
BATEMAN 
1810 - 1889 79 1878 68 Binnie chapter 9 (1981), Smeaton 
Lecture (2011), ICE obit  
Sir Joseph 
BAZALGETTE 
1819 - 1891 72 1884 65 Halliday “The Great Stink” (1999), 
ICE obit  
Sir Robert 
RAWLINSON 
1810 - 1898 88 1895 85 Binnie chapter 10 (1981), ICE obit – 
not found 
James 
MANSERGH 
1834 - 1905 71 1901 67 Barclay, “The water supply of 
Birmingham” (1898), ICE obit  
Sir Alexander 
BINNIE 
1839 – 1917 78 1905 66 ICE Presidential Address and ICE 
Obit.  
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James Simpson pioneered the filtration process of water treatment, and thus enabled the 
continued and growing use of River Thames water to supply the Lambeth and Chelsea water 
companies in London. 
Thomas Hawksley specialised in designing many water supply and pumping schemes. MWH 
(2008) describes Thomas Hawksley’s legacy of schemes, some of which are operational 
today. His success in designing pumping systems led to Hawksley also becoming president of 
the Institution of Mechanical Engineers.  
John Frederick Bateman designed and constructed many earth filled dams, including the 
Longdendale reservoirs scheme in the valley of the River Etherow for Manchester 
Corporation. The Longdendale scheme was the largest of its type in the UK, and it preceded 
the Thirlmere scheme. Russell (1981) shows there are some 28 schemes that Bateman 
constructed in NW England, about half of the total in which he was involved. Russell’s talk to 
the Newcomen Society provides an excellent record of Bateman’s life and achievements. It 
was used and acknowledged by Professor Moffat from the University of Newcastle to inform 
his presentation for the ICE’s annual Smeaton lecture about Bateman (Moffat, 2010).    
Sir Joseph Bazalgette was knighted for his contribution to sanitary improvement in London. 
Halliday (1999) emphasised Bazalgette’s extraordinary patience and competence to deliver 
the re-sewering of London. Sir Joseph used his Presidential Address (1884) to benchmark 
London water supplies by comparing statistics gathered from cities across the world. 
Sir Robert Rawlinson invented the title “sanitary engineer” for himself. He primarily 
worked for the Government and was knighted for his substantial contribution to the 
improvement of military and public health. Sir Robert had a passion for improving the health 
of the poorest in society. He assumed the Presidency at the surprising age of 85. All the 
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Victorian water engineers mentioned reached at least 70 years old, which was comparatively 
long lived at that time.   
James Mansergh had not completed the Elan scheme for Birmingham Corporation at the 
time he became President of ICE at the turn of the century. Mansergh used his Presidential 
Address as an opportunity to expand Sir Joseph’s Bazalgette’s high level comparisons of 
world cities. Mansergh collected more detailed numbers about water supply from cities at 
home and abroad, and he published them in an Appendix to his Address. The data and 
information brought together by Mansergh is a snapshot of water supply at the end of the 19th 
century, and is a valuable legacy for analysts.    
Sir Alexander Binnie was a civil engineer, and has been included in Table 2.4 for his 
passionate interest in rainfall statistics. This led for the first time to a better understanding of 
their uncertainty. His contribution is discussed in Section 2.3.4. Sir Alexander was knighted 
for building the Blackwall road tunnel under the Thames. Another significant achievement 
was leading the team that ensured the Metropolitan Water Board came into being. Alexander 
Binnie and James Mansergh were known to each other from their younger days having 
worked on the same Welsh railway projects in the 1860s.  
There are significant contributions to the development of Victorian water engineering in the 
cities of interest to this project by four other engineers and a meteorologist. These are noted 
below: 
George Henry Hill was for many years Bateman’s assistant in Manchester. He was 
responsible for completing the Thirlmere project after Bateman’s death, and presented a paper 
to ICE about the scheme in 1896. The Manchester based dam building consultancy that bore 
his name remained in business until the 1980s.   
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George Deacon became Chief Engineer to Liverpool Corporation. Deacon completed the 
design and construction of the Vyrnwy dam after Hawksley refused to work on the scheme as 
an equal. Deacon presented a paper to ICE in 1896 about the Vyrnwy scheme at the same 
session that Hill presented the Thirlmere scheme. Deacon came to London to work in private 
practice with Sir Alexander Binnie.  
Joseph Parry was a water engineer who worked under George Deacon at Liverpool 
Corporation. He implemented Deacon’s leakage control project, and its success was due to 
Parry’s interest in analysing the data. After Deacon’s move to London, Parry was made Chief 
Engineer. In 1881, Parry published a useful and readable handbook “Water, its composition 
collection and distribution.”        
Dr William Pole was a mathematician, engineer and linguist who worked on his own. Such 
was his mathematical prowess that other water engineers asked him to confirm that their 
engineering calculations had been carried out correctly. As a water engineer who was 
disinterested in the technical solutions to London’s water supply problems, he was made the 
Technical Secretary to the Richmond Royal Commission in 1869 that heard Bateman 
advocated powerfully for supplying London from new storage in Wales.  Thereafter, Dr Pole 
gave objective and convincing evidence to Parliament in support of proposals for new remote 
reservoir schemes for other Corporations. 
GJ Symons FRS was the meteorologist who started the publication of British Rainfall 
statistics, and was a good friend of Sir Alexander Binnie. Symons standardized the process of 
rainfall data collection, and recruited several thousand volunteer observers. Symons’ 
contribution to rainfall science made Britain at that time the world leader in the collection of 
rainfall data. 
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2.3.2 Victorian estimates of demand 
As is described in Section 2.4, population forecasts, judgement of about how much per capita 
demand was due to grow, and linear trend extrapolation were the most commonly used ways 
of making a demand forecast.  
There was often little actual flow data other than a daily estimate of supply, and the “per 
capita demand” was usually calculated by dividing the estimate of the total supply by the 
estimate of the population served. A figure of 25 gallons per person per day was regarded as a 
reasonable figure to plan for in urban situations, and judgement was used to estimate how 
quickly water closets and hot water systems would penetrate the housing stock. This was an 
early attempt to do component forecasting, but without any of the data available today. 
When Sir Robert Rawlinson was engaged by Swansea Corporation for a reservoir design, he 
refused to make any demand forecast believing that the responsibility for creating the forecast 
must stay with the client (Binnie, 1981). 
The “Decremental ratio of Increase” method was used by Mansergh to construct a demand 
forecast for Birmingham in 1892 (Bradford et al, 2010). This began the move towards 
estimating the components of demand. Population forecasts were generally over-estimated, 
perhaps as a buffer against the many uncertainties. Appendix C contains the parameters used 
by Mansergh for his demand forecast, and the parameters used today. 
2.3.3 Victorian estimation of water supply reservoir yield 
Thomas Hawksley relied on the estimation of annual average rainfall alone to assess the yield 
available of 100 Ml/d (22 Mgd) from the Rivington Pike scheme for Liverpool’s water 
supply. The anticipated 22 (Mgd) turned out to be an overestimate, as in practice, the 
reservoirs were only able to produce 75 Ml/d (16.5 Mgd) during droughts in the mid 1860s 
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(MWH, 2008). Hawksley developed his empirical “three dry years” reservoir yield rule for an 
impounding reservoir for a water supply. Hawksley clarified his method in his evidence to the 
Richmond Commission in 1868 with the quote below, and reprised by Binnie (1981) page 
154. 
“The first thing to be done is to ascertain the average of the rainfall over a very large number 
of years. From that deduct one sixth, that being the quantity which will inevitably be lost over 
the waste weir…The next thing to do, from the residual quantity is to take off the amount of 
evaporation…..We find by the reservoirs of the great magnitude which I’m going to mention 
we can store and regulate (that is the thing wanted) the rainfall of three consecutive dry years, 
and we find (and it is a very curious fact again, but it comes in justification of what I have 
already said) that the average rainfall of the three consecutive dry years … is exactly one sixth 
less than the average of the whole.” 
Following a series of droughts in the 1880s, Hawksley’s rule was amended empirically in 
1892 by Alexander Binnie, who suggested that one fifth rather than one sixth should be 
removed from the annual average rainfall. G Binnie goes on to say on p156 that “the stage 
was reached of numerically estimating the yield from 80 per cent of the average rainfall, 
which became known as the “reliable yield”…..this rule was one that laymen could readily 
understand…The value is equivalent to the runoff in a hypothetical 80% rainfall year.”  
The storage required is then obtained from “the ordinary formula” below (Rippl, 1883). In the 
absence of flow data, the method depends on rainfall data.  Having estimated the Three Dry 
Years annual average rainfall (in millimetres), the number of days supply required, Z, 
determines the amount of storage required: 
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Equation 2-1 
The volume of water to be stored in one day, T, is: 
        
 Equation 2-2 
where B is the demand of the town, C is the compensation to the stream, V is the loss by 
evaporation, and D is the dry weather flow into the reservoir in million gallons per day. Rippl 
states that in England, Z is normally 100 to 250 days, that the formulae are suitable only for 
English conditions, and that C is regulated by law, being usually one third to one quarter of 
the available supply from the catchment. 
Rippl’s paper is helpful to our understanding of the developing science of estimating storage 
requirement. He describes another method of deriving storage capacity requirement based on 
the lowest calendar year of rainfall on record. He correctly criticises the method for not taking 
a longer period than a year, and for excluding the possibility that a mid-year start and end date 
may be more critical. Rippl then proposes a graphical simulation of storage method where the 
start and end dates, and the length of time considered are not constrained.  
In the Victorian era, the estimation of storage requirement method remained largely empirical, 
and there was a paucity of flow data on which to base such estimates. Thus as the surrogate, it 
was the estimation of rainfall that began to attract scientific attention, in part because it was 
cheaper to collect than flow.  
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2.3.4 Awareness emerges of Uncertainty in Rainfall data estimation 
Rippl asserted in 1883, without explanation, that at least 35 years of rainfall data is required to 
make a robust estimate of mean annual average rainfall. Nine years later in 1892, the issue 
about record length and possible error was addressed by A. R. Binnie (1892) in a paper to 
ICE. Binnie’s statistical analysis produced the results that are summarised in Table 2.5.  
These results show, for example, that the error band for a 15 year record, mean annual 
average rainfall is likely to be estimated within ± 5%, and for 35 years within ± 2%. Clearly a 
35 year record will have a smaller error band, but a ± 5% error might be sufficient as an 
assumption, depending on the application. 
Table 2.5 - Deviations around the Mean AAR for different rainfall record lengths (after Binnie, 1892) 
Years of Annual Average 
Rainfall Data Record  
Percentage Deviation Range 
from the estimate of the mean of 
AAR 
1 year + 51% to – 40% 
5 years ± 15% 
10 years ± 8.22% 
15 years ± 4.75% 
25 years ± 2.75% 
35 years ± 1.78% 
  
Sir Alexander Binnie’s passionate interest in rainfall estimation continued until his death in 
1914. His series of lectures in 1912 on Rainfall, Reservoirs, and Water Supply was an epitaph 
that captured his long experience as a water engineer. The preface to these lectures contained: 
“…..not a complete treatise on Waterworks Engineering, but merely an attempt to illustrate 
some of the salient points connected with one of the most difficult branches of Engineering; 
and if he (i.e. Binnie) succeeds in impressing upon the reader the difficulties of laying down 
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any exact stereotyped rules, and how dependent the Engineer is on meteorological, geological 
and chemical data, he will feel that his work has not been thrown away in the interests of 
sanitary science.”  
The “difficulties of laying down any exact stereotyped rules” suggests Binnie’s sensitivity to 
inherent uncertainty. Sir Alexander Binnie’s professional life lasted more than 50 years, and 
when these lectures were delivered at ICE in 1912, he was aged 73. Perhaps this was the point 
in time when the era of the 19th century Victorian water engineer drew to a close. 
  
2.4 The Three Victorian Reservoir Schemes; Description and Data Sources 
2.4.1 Summary Description of the Three Schemes 
As noted in Section 2.1.2, the three schemes were considered as a comparable group by 
Mansergh in the Discussion that took place after the papers by Deacon (1896) and Hill 
(1896). Mansergh compared their catchment areas, as shown in Figure 2.2, and rainfalls 
alongside that for the Elan scheme, which at that time was under construction. Mansergh 
pointed out that the catchment area for Elan was approximately double that of Vyrnwy, and 
four times the area draining into Thirlmere, whilst the average annual rainfall estimate for 
Thirlmere was approximately 25% higher than for the other two. The estimated populations 
served at the turn of the century were Manchester 1.10 million, Liverpool 0.97 million, and 
Birmingham 0.74 million.  
The physical data for the three Victorian schemes are shown in Table 2.6 (metric units) and 
Table 2.7 (imperial units). The sources in which they were found are presented in Table 2.8. 
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Table 2.6 - Physical data for the three Victorian schemes (metric units) 
Metric  
Measures 
Thirlmere 
Reservoir  
(One new dam  
raised existing 
lake level) 
Lake Vyrnwy 
(One new dam 
impounded the 
River Vyrnwy)  
Elan Reservoirs 
(Original design was 
for 6 new dams – see 
numbers below. For 
Stage 1, three new 
dams impounded the 
River Elan.) 
Elan 
(After 1952, for 
Stage 2, one new 
dam was added to 
impound the River 
Claerwen for Full 
Elan scheme) 
Catchment area 4,452 hectares 9,204 hectares 18,842 hectares  
Reservoir area 321 hectares 454 hectares 628 hectares  
Average Rainfall 2591 mm (1877) 
(later 2159 mm) 
1655 mm 1753 mm  
“3 Dry Years” 
Average Annual 
Rainfall 
2150 mm (1877) 
(later 1798 mm) 
1386 mm 1397 mm  
Storage 37,000 Ml 59,000 Ml 79,000 Ml  99,100 Ml 
Drought Yield to 
supply 
227 Ml/d (1877)  
(later 164 Ml/d) 
182 Ml/d 314 Ml/d 341 Ml/d 
Compensation 25 Ml/d 61 Ml/d 123 Ml/d 123 Ml/d 
Total Drought Yield 252 Ml/d (1877) 
(later 189 Ml/d) 
243 Ml/d 437 Ml/d 464 Ml/d 
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Table 2.7 - Physical data for the three Victorian schemes (Imperial) 
Imperial Measures Thirlmere 
Reservoir 
Vyrnwy 
Reservoir 
Elan Reservoirs 
(original design) 
Elan  
(after 1952) 
Catchment area 11,000 acres 22,742 acres 46,560 acres  
Reservoir area 793 acres 1,121 acres 1,552 acres  
Average Rainfall 85.7 inches 65.2 inches 69.5 inches  
3 Dry Years Rainfall 70.8 inches 54.6 inches 55.5 inches  
Storage 8,135 Mg 12,131 Mg 17,915 Mg  21,800 Mg 
Drought Yield to 
supply 
50 Mgd 
(later 36 Mgd)  
40 Mgd 69 Mgd 75 Mgd 
Compensation 5.5 Mgd 13.5 Mgd 27 Mgd 27 Mgd 
Total Drought Yield 55.5 Mgd (later 
41.5 Mgd) 
53.5 Mgd 96 Mgd 102 Mgd 
 
Table 2.8 -Physical data for the three Victorian schemes (Sources) 
References for 
physical data 
Thirlmere 
Reservoir 
Vyrnwy 
Reservoir 
Elan Reservoirs 
(original design) 
Elan  (after 
1952) 
Catchment area. GH Hill, 1896 
Mansergh, 1896  
Mansergh, 1896  
Discussion 
Mansergh, 1896  
Discussion. 
 
Reservoir area. GH Hill, 1896 Deacon, 1896 Mansergh, 1912   
Average Rainfall. Mansergh, 1901 Mansergh, 1901  Mansergh, 1896  
Discussion  
 
3 Dry Years Rainfall. GH Hill, 1896 
Mansergh, 1901 
Mansergh, 1901  Mansergh, 1896  
Discussion. 
Mansergh,, 1912  
 
Storage. GH Hill, 1896 Deacon, 1896 Mansergh, 1896 
and Discussion 
Birmingham 
Post, 23/10/52 
Drought Yield to 
supply. 
i) GH Hill, 1896   
ii) Walters, 1936 
Mansergh, 1901 Mansergh, 1896 
Birmingham 
Corporation, 1940 
Birmingham 
Corporation, 
1940 
Compensation. GH Hill, 1896.      Mansergh, 1896   Mansergh, 1896 
Discussion.  
Mansergh 1896   
Mansergh 1912  
Total Drought Yield. Yield + Comp Yield + Comp Yield + Comp Yield + Com 
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2.4.2 Description of the Elan Scheme for Birmingham  
In late Victorian Britain, Birmingham was developing into one of the nation’s foremost 
industrial cities and Birmingham Corporation was anxious not to let the lack of water threaten 
the city’s burgeoning economic growth. By 1892, growth in water demand was 3% per annum 
and the headroom of water supply availability over water demand in Birmingham was rapidly 
approaching zero. The average annual demand for public water supply was 73 Ml/d (16 Mgd) 
(Barclay, 1891) and a summer peak demand of 20% above average could add up to a further 
14 Ml/d (3 Mgd). The maximum output from local surface and groundwater sources was 87 
Ml/d (19 Mgd). More detail about supply and demand prior to the Elan scheme is given in 
Section 4.2.3. 
The opportunities perceived at the time for developing new local sources were limited, 
perhaps providing for no more than another 10 to 20 years; existing lowland sources were 
also experiencing an increasing risk of deteriorating raw water quality. The primary 
conditions identified by Birmingham Corporation were for a new gravity supply of 
exceptionally good quality, and “there must be a sufficiency for the district 50 years hence at 
least”. (Barclay, 1891) In the recent past, Manchester and Liverpool Corporations had built 
new remote gravity schemes, and similar proposals were being considered for meeting 
London’s growing water needs.   
Thus the Elan impounding reservoirs and aqueduct scheme located in the unspoiled 
mountains of Mid-Wales was proposed, designed, and constructed for Birmingham 
Corporation by the civil engineer James Mansergh. The scheme has since provided a plentiful, 
reliable, clean and inexpensive water supply. Today, whilst at many water abstraction sites in 
the UK there is debate about the level of environmentally sustainable abstraction, the Elan 
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scheme continues to operate at maximum capacity with its small operational carbon footprint 
and appears to be taken for granted by all. 
The Elan Scheme provides a gravity supply to Birmingham, the highest large city in the UK, 
and was built in stages to become one of the largest water resources and supply schemes in 
the country. The general location of the Welsh reservoirs is shown in Figure 2.3. A schematic 
diagram of the reservoir system is shown in Figure 2.4, and Figure 2.5 is a schematic 
illustration of the Elan Aqueduct, which links mid-Wales with Birmingham. Figures 2.6, 2.7 
and 2.8 are historic photographs of Craig Goch dam, pipeline construction and Frankley 
reservoir on the western edge of Birmingham. Tables 2.9 and 2.10 summarise the physical 
data and the stage dates. 
Table 2.9 - Summary of physical data for the Elan scheme: Welsh dams and reservoirs 
Dam and 
reservoir 
Dam 
height, 
m 
Dam 
length, 
m 
Reservoir 
capacity, 
Ml 
Reservoir 
area, ha 
Reservoir 
TWL, m 
AOD* 
Date 
completed 
Storage 
phase 
Caban Coch 37 186 33530 202 250.5 1904 1 
Pen-y-Garreg 37 161 6050 50 288.0 1904 1 
Craig Goch 36 156 9220 88 317.0 1904 1 
Claerwen 56 355 48300 263 368.8 1952 2 
  Total capacity, Ml 99100         
Notes:               
*TWL, top water level; AOD, above ordnance datum 
Mansergh's original plan for stage 2 was for three reservoirs in the Claerwen catchment 
The submerged dam at Garreg-Ddu is within Caban Coch reservoir 
Releases are made from Claerwen reservoir for transfer to Caban Coch.  These releases use the Dol-y-
Mynach tunnel, which was constructed as part of stage 1 
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Table 2.10 - Summary of physical data for the Elan scheme: Elan Aqueduct, 118 km from Mid-Wales to 
Birmingham 
Construction Length, 
km 
Size 
mm 
Capacity, 
Mld 
Gradients Date 
completed 
Supply 
phase 
Tunnels and cut-
and-cover 
59 ~2 m deep 
~2.5 m wide 
340 (design 
capacity) 
1 in 3000 
1 in 4000 
1904 1 
Siphon pipelines 
(2 no.) 
59 1050 mm 
dia. 
114 1 in 1570 
1 in 1760 
1904 1 
Reinforcement 
(1 no.) 
  1500 mm +136   1920-1939 2 
Reinforcement 
(1 no.) 
  1500 mm +114   1949-1961 3 
Total 118   364       
Notes: 
Mansergh’s original plan was for six pipelines of 1050 mm dia. 
Reinforcements were made using a cross-over system to enable incremental increases in capacity 
Total capacity is approximate, depending on aqueduct maintenance and operation 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 – Location of Elan 
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Figure 2.4 – Schematic of the Elan reservoirs 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5 – Schematic of the Elan aqueduct 
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Figure 2.6 – Craig Goch Dam in the early 1930s 
 
Figure 2.7 – Construction of Elan aqueduct 
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Figure 2.8 - Frankley reservoir under construction 
 
Figure 2.9 - Foel tower and the viaduct at Garreg-Ddu 
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Figure 2.10 - The submerged dam at Garreg-Ddu emerges in autumn 2003 
 
 
Figure 2.11 - Schematic of the submerged dam at Garreg-Ddu 
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The Elan scheme is capable of supporting a critical drought year water supply output to 
Birmingham of approximately 330 Ml/d, and also provides for compensation flows and river 
regulation support to the River Elan and River Wye. As shown in Table 2.10, the Elan 
Aqueduct can convey up to 364 Ml/d. Elan will continue to meet the demand from 
Birmingham’s 1.15 million inhabitants well into the twenty-first century, far beyond original 
expectations. 
The evidence presented in 1892 to the House of Commons Select Committee (HoCSC, 1892) 
to convince Parliament of the need for this controversially large scheme included the 63-year 
water demand forecast to 1955 formulated by Mansergh. This forecast turned out to be pivotal 
to the Corporation’s case for obtaining the powers to construct the full Elan scheme 
established in the Birmingham Corporation Water Act of 1892.   
As well as proposing a phased scheme, which spread the costs, Mansergh’s inclusion of a 
submerged dam within Caban Coch reservoir at Garreg-Ddu was also influential to obtaining 
the parliamentary powers. The dam, shown in Figures 2.10 and 2.11, ensures a division 
between an upper compartment, where a minimum head of 52m at Foel Tower (Figure 2.9) 
maintains the gravity flow in the aqueduct to Birmingham, and a lower compartment, where 
the water is available only for compensation and river regulation. The submerged dam was 
clearly visible in the drought of autumn 2003 (Figures 2.10 and 2.11) when storage at Elan 
was drawn down to near 30% full. By making the division observable when storage becomes 
depleted, Mansegh’s design gave the scheme credibility. 
Mansergh estimated in 1892 that his proposed full scheme and the first phase would be ready 
in 10 years time at a cost of nearly £4 million. Phase one, having cost £5.8 million, was 
formerly opened by King Edward VII in July 1904. It consisted of the elements shown in 
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Tables 2.9 and 2.10, the Foel Tower and primary filtration at Elan Filters. The first phase also 
included storage of 909 Ml and slow sand filters at Frankley, the storage being enhanced by 
another 2275 Ml in 1930 at nearby Bartley Reservoir. 
James Mansergh died in 1905, and it was left to his sons to record the engineering challenges 
and solutions for the Institution of Civil Engineers in 1912. (Mansergh EL, Mansergh WL, 
1912) 
A critical review of the history of the Elan scheme must consider the reasons why the choice 
was made to develop a water resource in Wales. At the time, the intention was to have water 
resources available which were sufficient to meet demands in Birmingham for the next 50 
years. A fruitful line of inquiry that exposed the reasons for the political tensions before and 
after the Elan scheme was constructed, was to address the issue of the scheme’s location, 
“Why Wales?” 
2.4.3 Why Wales? Support for the Elan scheme 
From the technical point of view, Rawlinson’s and Mansergh’s advice was pivotal to 
Birmingham Corporation’s decision a) to go to Wales, and b) specifically to the Elan and 
Claerwen valleys. This was the advice to the council in 1871, when water purity was the 
principal technical driver, and it was same again in 1890, when the council believed that it 
only had sufficient water to meet demands for the next ten years.   
Rawlinson expressed concerns in his paper of 1871, based on the BWCo’s experience of 
using the River Tame, about the medium and long term risks of deteriorating raw water 
quality of local rivers. He was also of the view that there was insufficient groundwater locally 
to meet demands for the next 50 years. He considered the River Derwent in Derbyshire and 
the River Severn, but discounted them both on the grounds of both purity and pumping 
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requirements. He also considered the Rivers Ithon and Teme suggested by Hassard, but 
thought that the local disruption would be significant. He concluded that within a one hundred 
mile radius, Elan and Claerwen fulfilled his criteria of quality, quantity (up to 182 Ml/d or 40 
Mgd) and elevation.  
Although he wrote little, Mansergh’s contribution in 1894 to Eustace Tickell’s book “The 
Vale of Nantgwilt” provides us with the evidence that it was the contraction of the Elan river 
valley at Caban Coch, the opening out of the valleys above it, and the impermeable bedrock, 
which made it “a comparatively easy problem for a water engineer” to recommend. Elan was 
judged by Mansergh as clearly the best site (and possibly the only practicable site) for an 
upland storage gravity scheme to supply Birmingham. 
 Rawlinson (but not Hassard) had been asked by the Corporation in 1871 to consult 
Mansergh, and again Mansergh was the consultant in 1890, so it was no surprise that Elan 
remained the scheme of choice. Mansergh was also clearly of the view that if Birmingham did 
not move to secure the Elan catchment, then London would step in.  
Mansergh’s assessment made in the early 1890s about the amount of water which could be 
made available to supply from Elan is very close to what it is believed today. A 20 year daily 
rainfall record at Nantgwilt was available to him, and showed an annual average rainfall of 
1830 mm/year, some three times the rainfall in Birmingham. He deduced that the 184 sq kms 
(71 square miles) of catchment could produce an average of 454 Ml/d (100 Mgd) over a three 
consecutive dry years period assuming 82,000 Ml (18,000 Mg) storage. He split this into 331 
Ml/d (73 Mgd) to supply, and 123 Ml/d (27 Mgd) for compensation to the River Wye.  
Barclay (1898) provided the definitive summary of the reasoning behind the selection of 
Wales to provide Birmingham’s water supply. Barclay was a member of the Water 
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Committee, and at least three editions of his book exist; the first being prior to the 
Birmingham Corporation Water Act of 1892, and the third dated 1898 some six years before 
opening. On the balance of supply and demand projections, Barclay describes how in 1890, 
the City Engineer, J. W. Gray, produced 25 and 50 year demand projections of 118 Ml/d (26 
Mgd) for  the year 1915 and 241 Ml/d (53 Mgd) for 1940. Average demand in 1890 was 68 
Ml/d (15 Mgd) and a peak day demand at 100 Ml/d (22 Mgd), with recent growth of 3% per 
annum. The supplies available were about 91 Ml/d (20 Mgd). The demand forecast was 
updated in 1892, and the new projection of “probable daily demand for water” for 
Birmingham showed 305 Ml/d (67 Mgd) for the year 1955, i.e. not far from Mansergh’s 
assessment of what the Elan scheme could support. Hence the city believed it had the 
justification for the full scheme. 
Mansergh not only saw the site for its utility, but also an opportunity to create something of 
beauty which enhanced the landscape. Its popularity as a place to visit has over time meant 
that the reservoirs (or lakes as they were first called) have become accepted locally and 
regionally as beneficial. 
Just before World War 2, a drought in 1937 gave the impetus to constructing the second 
tranche of storage in the Claerwen valley. Construction was due to start on Claerwen dam in 
1939, but because of WW2, the start was delayed until 1946. Claerwen Dam was completed 
in 1952 apparently without opposition. A supplement to the Birmingham Post issued on the 
opening day (Birmingham Post, 23 October 1952) celebrated the young Queen Elizabeth’s 
visit to officially open the dam, and carried articles extolling the foresight of Birmingham and 
Mansergh in creating such a wonderful asset for the city.  
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2.4.4 Opposition to the Elan scheme 
Double Service Water Committee (1892) advocated groundwater for domestic supplies, and 
local river water for street cleansing, and raised issues regarding the cost, asserting that their 
solution would cost only one tenth of the Welsh scheme (there are no workings in the paper). 
In addition, the document raised objections to the abandonment of the existing sources – 
especially the constant and mineral rich groundwater. It was believed that the fast rising water 
demand was in part created by the Water Department in declaring 4,600 private wells unfit to 
drink “at the very time Birmingham was considered one of the healthiest large towns in 
England”. Altogether, Double Service Water Committee (1892) raised 16 technical, economic 
and political reasons for opposing the Elan scheme, and the authors were unable to mount a 
successful challenge to the Corporation’s position. 
Popular opposition to the scheme was expressed through cartoons which appeared in 
Birmingham’s “Town Crier” magazine. Figure 2.12 “Wells not Wales” captures the mood of 
discontent over the cost, and also concern for water quality about the reaction of upland water 
on lead pipes. The face of the robed figure pointing to Wales bears a likeness to Mansergh. 
During the period of construction for stage 1, the local newspaper covering Rhayader (The 
Brecon and Radnor Gazette) displays remarkably little local opposition to the scheme. It was 
seen as a source of income, improved water supplies would be provided, and it was a matter 
of great local pride that King Edward VII was coming to perform the opening ceremony. 
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Figure 2.12 - Wells not Wales cartoon, from Birmingham's "Town Crier" magazine 1892 
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Figure 2.13 - Schematic of strategic links in North West England 
2.4.5 Description of the Thirlmere Scheme for Manchester  
The Manchester Corporation Waterworks Act of 1879, which provided the powers to 
construct Thirlmere was the first of the three schemes under review to be authorised by 
Parliament. The scheme differed significantly from the other two by being an enlargement of 
an existing natural lake in the Lake District of England; the reservoirs at Vyrnwy and Elan are 
bodies of water created by new dams in steep sided rural Welsh valleys. Thirlmere is located 
Thirlmere 
Manchester 
Aqueduct 
Vyrnwy 
Liverpool 
Aqueduct 
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in the upper half of the schematic Figure 2.13 near the centre of the Lake District, and is 
connected by a gravity aqueduct 154 kms long to Manchester.  
To raise the level of Thirlmere, Bateman designed a new masonry dam some 261m (857 feet) 
long located at the northern end of the existing lake, as shown in Figure 2.14 (b). The new 
dam raised the lake level by 15.2 metres (50 feet), and more than doubled the surface water 
area of Thirlmere from 133 hectares (328 acres) to 317 hectares (793 acres). The additional 
body of water of 37,000 Ml (8,135 Mg) between 162m (533 feet) and 178m (583 feet) above 
OD was made available for supply by a gravity aqueduct 154 kms (96 miles) long running 
south to Manchester. Five pipelines each with a capacity of 45 Ml/d (10 Mgd), and 227 Ml/d 
(50 Mgd) in total, were planned to be built in stages as required (Harwood, 1895). The 
castellated architecture of the draw off tower is shown in Figure 2.14a.  
To protect the existing lake, there was a condition in the Act of 1879 that no water was to be 
abstracted to cause Thirlmere to fall below its original level. In the early years of the scheme, 
whilst demand had yet to grow to exceed the first pipeline capacity of 45 Ml/d (10 Mgd), the 
lake level was raised by a maximum of 6 metres (20 feet).  
Two years after the scheme was opened, Hill (1896) recalls the intended scale of the scheme, 
and an important data issue:  
“In 1878, when the Bill was before Parliament, there were no records of the rainfall upon this 
drainage-area, it therefore had to be estimated by the examination of the returns in other parts 
of the Lake District. The quantity of water obtainable for the city was, after allowing 
5,500,000 gallons per day as compensation water to the river, assumed at about 50 million 
gallons per day.” 
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In the years that followed, the collection of local rainfall data showed that Bateman’s 
assumption of the drought yield to supply of 227 Ml/d (50 Mgd) was too high (Holme Lewis, 
1921).  Walters (1936) reported that the drought yield figure was revised to 164 Ml/d (36 
Mgd), but did not disclose who made the revision, and when. The uncertainty for the design 
of Thirlmere introduced by not having accurate rainfall data was significant, and the principal 
implication of this for Manchester Corporation was that another major water supply scheme 
(which turned out to be a similar scheme using a neighbouring lake at Haweswater) would be 
needed at an earlier date than planned.  
Bateman’s over-estimated drought yield number for Thirlmere was peer reviewed in the year 
that the scheme first went before Parliament. The discussion of the review at ICE was led by 
Mansergh (1878), who remarked under the heading of “Droughts”:-  
 “Without going further into figures, it is pretty clear that all the circumstances are very 
favourable for the collection of a large quantity of water:- 
 1st The rainfall is very great; 
 2nd The loss by evaporation and absorption is small; 
 3rd The droughts are short; 
 4th The storage capacity is large. 
We may safely concur with Bateman’s opinion that 50,000,000 gallons (227 Ml/d) may be 
taken to Manchester after making a fair provision for the discharge of compensation water to 
the river.” The four “very favourable” circumstances led to an opinion where there was little 
hard data to support the 227 Ml/d (50 Mgd) number.  
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The attempt made to estimate the average annual rainfall for the Thirlmere catchment is 
instructive. Using just 10 months data from a single rain-gauge in the catchment, Bateman’s 
estimate was made of the average annual rainfall at 2,590 mm (102 inches).    
The average rainfall figure used in this peer review started with an estimate for the year of 
1877 at 3,225 mm (127 inches). Then one fifth was deducted as 1877 was 20% wetter than 
the mean annual figure for rain-gauges “over a long series of years in this district” to provide 
a revised average annual estimate of 2,590 mm (102 inches).  
After 18 years with local rainfall data, Mansergh (1896) stated that the mean annual average 
rainfall figure for the Thirlmere catchment was now 2,160 mm (85 inches), and the three dry 
years experienced in the mid 1880s was 1,803 mm (71 inches). Similar numbers of 2,177 mm 
(85.7 inches) and 1,798 mm (70.8 inches) were reported again by Mansergh (1901).  By 
chance, a 30% difference between the 1878 annual average rainfall estimate of 2,590 mm, and 
the three dry years average in 1896 of 1,798 mm, is similar to the yield reduction from 227 
Ml/d (50 Mgd) to 164 Ml/d (36 Mgd) is 28%. 
Symons, from a meteorologist’s perspective, thought at the time that the lengths of droughts 
in the Lake District lasted a maximum of only two months. This view conveyed the idea that 
in upland areas, reservoirs will be more resilient to drought than those at lower elevations. We 
know now, but they did not know then, how to develop operating rules to cope with droughts 
of different lengths and intensities. 
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a).  
b).  
Figure 2.14 - a). Thirlmere draw-off tower and b). Thirlmere dam 
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2.4.6 The Thirlmere Defence Association 
Opposition to the Thirlmere scheme was organized by the Thirlmere Defence Association 
(TDA), which was one of the first examples in Britain of an environmental pressure group. In 
1877, one year before the Thirlmere Bill went before Parliament, the TDA identified that “the 
lake country belongs in a sense, and the widest and best sense, not to a few owners of 
mountain pasture, but to the people of England” (TDA, 1877.) Ritvo (2003) points to even 
wider interest from lovers of the Lake District from throughout the English speaking world 
who wished to resist, in the TDA’s words, “the industrialization” of  Thirlmere.   
The TDA (1877) argued that the proposal was unjustifiably large, and smaller alternative 
schemes nearer to Manchester were better matched to meet rising demands for the next 20 
years. There was no explanation as to why a horizon of 20 years was chosen. For a forecast, 
the TDA’s estimate of the current population supplied of around 800,000 would be assumed 
to grow at the current rate (about 2% per annum) to c.1,125,000 by 1897. The total demand 20 
years hence in 1897 would be 128 Ml/d (28.1 Mgd), which was arrived at by assuming a 
“maximum” per capita rate of 25 gallons per head per day. Since Bateman believed the 
Longdendale source to yield 25 Mgd, the TDA argued that the additional 50 Mgd from the 
proposed Thirlmere scheme “would be sufficient to supply the whole County of Lancaster” 
with a population of 3 million. The Corporation’s aspiration, the TDA rightly contended, was 
to sell water to new customers.  
There was criticism of Bateman’s approach to giving evidence to the House of Commons 
Select Committee. “He declines to be bound by a single statement in any previous reports, 
however solemnly made at the time, should such statement conflict with his present 
assertions. Human wisdom, it seems, so imperfect and uncertain 30 years ago, has now, in the 
very nick of time, attained perfection and certainty” (Credat Judeas, 1878). Bateman’s 
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dismissal of alternative schemes was “magisterial”, and “additional proof that sturdy semi-
sarcastic assertion is often more efficacious than argument”. Bateman’s standing as the 
leading water engineer of his generation, and the inability of the TDA to present substantive 
technical arguments, were pivotal to Manchester Corporation’s acquisition of the powers in 
1879 for the Thirlmere scheme.               
2.4.7 Description of the Vyrnwy Scheme for Liverpool 
Lake Vyrnwy is situated at the headwaters of the River Vyrnwy, which is a tributary of the 
River Severn. Physical data is given in Table 2.6, and pictures of the lake and draw-off tower 
are shown in Figures 2.15a and 2.15b. 
The potential of the Vyrnwy valley for a water resource was first identified by Bateman in the 
late 1860s. The exact position of the dam was chosen by Deacon as the most suitable ground 
conditions for watertightness, and Deacon’s 1896 paper presented to the ICE provides 
information about the construction of the whole scheme.  
Even though the need for a new water resources scheme was clear, the proposals were taken 
to Parliament because of concerns raised by the owners of the Bridgwater Canal for the 
planned arrangements for the aqueduct crossing under the canal. Once this issue had been 
resolved, the 1880 Vyrnwy Works Act authorised the construction of the dam and the 
aqueduct.  
The drought yield is 182 Ml/d (40 Mgd), and the piped sections of the 107 km aqueduct were 
designed to carry this flow in three pipes of equal discharge volumes. The first pipe could 
carry rather more than one third at 68 Ml/d (15 Mgd) (Parry, 1899), and was deliberately 
over-sized to accommodate problems of encrustation inside pipes. 
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a). 
 
b). 
Figure 2.15 - a). Lake Vyrnwy, and b). Vyrnwy draw-off tower 
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The compensation water arrangements were also a matter for debate. The provision of 
“freshets” on fixed dates from the reservoir during summer months was agreed for sustaining 
fisheries. Those with interests in the River Severn as far down as Gloucester were placated 
with monetary compensation. 
2.4.8 Liverpool; Intermittent Supplies 1865 to 1873 
Well before the Vyrnwy scheme, water supplies in Liverpool from 1865 to 1872 were 
intermittent, with many consumers having to cope with no running water for up to 10 hours a 
day. This level of service was due to the conjunction of insufficient water resources, growing 
demand, and a high level of leakage and waste. The challenge for the Corporation’s water 
engineers was clear; the next water resource would take a long time to deliver, and the city 
was losing business because of lack of water. The innovative answer was provided by Deacon 
to develop a method of reducing demand by targeting the Corporation’s resources to areas 
with the most leakage and waste.  
By comparison, consumers in late Victorian Manchester and Birmingham fared rather better 
than those in Liverpool. A reflection on what was called then “The Evils of an Intermittent 
Supply” (Parry, 1881) were generated by water standing in uncovered cisterns becoming 
badly polluted by dirt and refuse.  Also, the dust jacket of G. M. Binnie’s “Early Victorian 
Water Engineers” (Thomas Telford, 1981) says that the book tells “the story of the grudging 
acceptance of the need for constant unpolluted water supplies and the many problems, human 
and technical that had to be faced in meeting that need”. Intermittent water supplies were 
commonplace in early Victorian urban Britain, where the poorer districts were either not 
supplied at all or only intermittently from standpipes or water carts. 
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The questioning of the acceptability of intermittent supplies gained momentum with the 
Health of Towns Commission (1844). The Commission’s proceedings were dominated by Sir 
Edwin Chadwick, as he came to realise that “to provide drains and sewers was not enough; 
there must also be a constant water supply available in every tenement.” (Binnie, 1981).  
Binnie recounts conflicting evidence about the impact of intermittent supplies presented to the 
Health of Towns Commission. Thomas Wicksteed, Engineer of the East London Waterworks, 
argued against a constant supply at high pressure on the grounds of expense, in that larger 
diameter pipes would be needed to meet the increase in demand, and that lead piping in poor 
areas would soon disappear. This argument was countered by Thomas Hawksley from recent 
experience of constant supplies for domestic and fire-fighting purposes in Nottingham. He 
correctly contended that not all houses make their maximum demand for water at the same 
time, so large diameter pipes were not needed, and the lead pipes also remained in place.  
Hawksley’s view was that a pressurised water pipe acted as “a police on the pipe”. A year 
later in 1845, in a letter to Chadwick, Hawksley alleged that the London Water Companies 
delivered an intermittent supply as the only way they could manage with inadequate water 
resources (Binnie, 1981).       
In 1852, a scheme for Liverpool was designed by water engineer James Simpson to provide a 
high pressure system solely for fire-fighting; he was against extending the scheme into a 
constant supply for all purposes to all the inhabitants. Simpson had written that that it would 
be expensive and useless: “what dependence can we place on it? I answer, at once, little or 
none, because its thousands of pipes and cocks in private places are not susceptible of hourly 
and immediate inspection and control” (Binnie, 1981).  
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The concern expressed by Simpson was for the increase in the amount of waste and leakage 
rising to the point where the availability of water resources dictated that a constant supply was 
unsustainable. His concern turned out to be prophetic. As was noted in Section 2.2.7, 
Liverpool first received a constant supply service in 1858, but was forced to reinstate 
intermittent supplies from 1865 to 1872 (Parry, 1881). Parry followed Deacon to become 
Liverpool Corporation’s Water Engineer. The time had arrived for water engineers to follow 
Hawksley’s maxim that supplies should be “Pure and Constant”.   
2.5 Modern Context 
2.5.1 Government Vision 
The Government documents presented in Table 2.11 below are those which were consulted 
for this project. Three of these documents are particularly visionary. First, the 1963 Water 
Resources Act, which enabled national and local long term water resources planning, and 
brought together for the first time issues of river water quantity and quality (Tebbutt, 1971). 
Second, the plans for England and Wales developed and published by the Water Resources 
Board in 1973, which proposed a series of major water resources schemes and inter-basin 
transfers to meet projected demands in 2001. Third is Future Water (2008) that presents the 
Government’s aspiration of reducing domestic per capita demand by 20% in order to reduce 
abstractions, and thereby make a significant step towards the delivery of sustainable water 
environments. The emphasis on demand management in Future Water is in contrast to the 
strategic water resource scheme options suggested by the WRB, and refined in Nature’s 
Precious Resource report from the National Rivers Authority (NRA) in 1994. 
One year after the NRA report, the summer drought of 1995 occurred in England and Wales, 
which continued in some areas into the following winter. The Government response was an 
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“Agenda for Action” that was published in 1996 by the Department of the Environment. This 
report contained actions for all the major stakeholders in the planning and use of raw water. 
They are set out in Section 6.2. 
The next notable drought to cause anxiety was a series of dry winters in the early 2000s that 
affected South East England. Water levels in the chalk aquifers were low due to the lack of 
winter recharge, and consequently base river flows were low. Flows in the River Thames 
were adversely affected, and domestic customers in south-east England were banned from 
using hosepipes and sprinklers in the summer of 2006. 
There was a pivotal change in 2007 for the WRMP process (covered in more detail in Section 
2.5.3) with the mandatory introduction of a public consultation process for the Draft WRMP, 
followed by a statement of consultation responses report to Defra. If these responses were not 
acceptable, the Secretary of State has the powers to call a Public Inquiry. On 3 August 2009, 
Thames Water was informed on that there would be an Inquiry into their revised DWRP of 
September 2009, as shown in Table 2.11. 
Table 2.11 - Government documents consulted 
Date Source Title Comment 
1960 Ministry of 
Housing and 
Local Govt. 
River Severn Basin, Hydrological 
Survey. 
Set 727 Ml/d (160 Mgd) as the 
minimum flow of the River 
Severn at Bewdley to dilute 91 
Mld of sewage effluent from the 
Black Country joining the Severn 
at Stourport. Bradford (1980). 
1963 MHLG Water Resources Act 1963 Major legislation that created the 
Water Resources Board and River 
Authorities with powers to 
undertake long term planning.   
1973 Water Resources 
Board 
Water Resources Plans for England and 
Wales 
Proposals made with costs for 
major reservoir developments and 
inter basin transfers including the 
Craig Goch scheme for London. 
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Date Source Title Comment 
1994 National Rivers 
Authority 
Water, Nature’s Precious Resource Environmentally sustainable 
strategic water resources scheme 
options for E+W.  
1996 Department of 
the Environment 
Water Resources and Supply: Agenda 
for Action. 
Post 1995 drought actions for 
Govt, Regulators, water 
companies, consumers. 
2007 Government 
legislation 
Parliamentary WRMP and Drought 
plan Directions for water companies  
Water company plans are made 
statutory, including public 
consultation. 
2007 Environment 
Agency 
Water resources planning Guideline 
(and subsequent revisions)  
Guidance to water companies for 
WRMP. 
Feb 
2008 
Defra Future Water.  Government vision for the water 
environment and aspiration for 
reducing domestic use to 130 
litres per head per day by 2020. 
Mar 
2008 
EA Draft of Water for the people and the 
Environment 
Public consultation document 
June 
2008 
EA Climate change Adaption Strategy;   
2008 to 
2010 
EA module 
reports 
Water resources in E+W, current state 
and future pressures. Managing water 
in SE England.  
Climate change and river flows in the 
2050s. 
Planning ahead for an uncertain future; 
(i) in the 2050s; (ii) water in the 2100s. 
These reports were produced to 
explain EA thinking to other parts 
of Government, and to add to the 
WRMP Guidance for water 
companies. 
Mar 
2009 
EA Water for the People and the 
Environment, final report 
Areas of Water Scarcity, and 
Restoring Sustainable 
Abstractions action sites identified  
3 Aug 
2009 
Defra Letter to Thames Water Utilities (TW) 
to announce Public Inquiry into TW 
Draft WRMP  
Key documents to and from EA 
and Defra to TW are covered in 
Table 2.13.  
2009 EA River Basin Management Plans  Plan for the Thames catchment 
issued in December 2009. 
Dec 
2009 
Defra  Independent review of charging (the 
Anna Walker report) 
Charges to stay as per household, 
too difficult to charge per person. 
Mar 
2010 
EA EA strategy; water resources action 
plan for E+W 
 
Summer 
2010 
EA, Ofwat 
evidence  
Thames Water evidence. Public Inquiry held in Oxford: 
started June, ended August 2010. 
Dec Planning 
 
Recommendation to SoS to reject 
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Date Source Title Comment 
2010 Inspectorate TW’s revised Draft WRMP. 
1 Mar 
2011 
Defra Decision letter to TW that the SoS had 
accepted all 25 of the Planning 
Inspectors recommendations, and 
proposed further work on scheme 
options. 
TW Draft WRMP deemed not to 
meet Directions, and 100 million 
cubic metres storage for an Upper 
Thames Reservoir rejected. 
 
The documents that cover the engagement of Thames Water with government before and 
during the Public Inquiry appear in Table 2.15.      
2.5.2 Demand forecasting developments in the 20th century 
Since 1975, there has been huge technical development in the methodologies for making long 
term demand forecasts. Estimates of component water use based on measurement are now 
made for the individual components that make up demand (see Appendix C). The milestones 
when methods and data have improved are summarised in Table 2.10.  Birmingham is used as 
the example. 
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Table 2.12 - Milestones of water demand forecasting for Birmingham, 1890 to date 
Milestone  
Number, and  
dates 
Forecast made 
by:- 
Time Horizon 
of forecasts:- 
Evolving Demand Forecasting Approach 
(for different timescales as required, e.g. 
Average Year, Dry Year, Peak Week) :- 
1.  Early 1890s 
 
 
James Mansergh 
for Birmingham 
Corporation  
(Justifies the 
storage size of the 
Elan scheme) 
60 years 
(to 1955) 
Mansergh’s extrapolation of total demand 
trend uses “Decremental Ratio of Increase” 
(Barclay, 1898, and Section 4.3.6 for detail) 
Range of over-estimated population forecasts 
made by judgement.  
2.  Mid 1960s to 
early 1970s. 
 
 
Water Resources 
Board (WRB,1973) 
(National water 
resources plans for 
Government, see 
Table 2.11) 
30 years 
(to 2001) 
More systematic, but still over-estimated, 
population forecasts. Extrapolation of total 
demand, and separate forecasts made for 
metered and unmetered use. Leakage treated 
as part of unmetered demand, and also 
extrapolated. (Sharp, 1967) 
3. Mid 1970s to 
late 1980s 
 
 
 
Severn Trent Water 
Authority  
(Demand forecasts 
are made that are 
significantly lower 
than WRB 
forecasts) 
20 years 
(to 2001) 
New data from domestic water use studies in 
Malvern and Mansfield (Thackray, Cocker, 
Archibald, 1978). Metered use forecast for 
disaggregated industrial and commercial 
sectors (Thackray, Archibald, 1981: 
Archibald, 1983). STW’s Domestic 
Consumption Monitor (DCM) of households 
paying unmetered water bills started in 1984. 
First modern attempt at quantifying micro 
components for domestic use (National 
Water Council, 1982). Leakage estimated as 
a residual of total supply.  
4.  Mid and late 
1990s 
 
 
 
Severn Trent Water 
(National Rivers 
Authority 
disbanded; 
responsibilities 
passed to new EA) 
25 years 
(to 2021) 
Econometric modelling used for metered use 
forecast. Unmetered household water use 
trends derived from STW’s DCM data. 
Leakage data and information collected at 
district metered area level to enable “active” 
leakage control. (DoE, 1980) 
5.  After 2000 to 
the Present Day 
 
 
Severn Trent Water 
(All water 
companies required 
to use EA 
Guidelines; EA 
responsible to 
Defra for regional 
water planning)  
25 years 
(most recent is 
2010 to 2035) 
Micro-components used to produce 
unmetered domestic forecast. Another DCM 
of metered domestic consumers set up by 
STW allows further disaggregation in the 
forecast.   
Climate change impact on demand. Water 
efficiency savings modelled. 
Leakage forecast linked to asset renewal.   
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Three items in Table 2.12 are expanded below: 
1. At 60 years, the late Victorian demand forecast time horizon is double those used over 
the past 40 years. The confidence that James Mansergh had in Birmingham’s 
continued burgeoning economic development in the 20th century is reflected by the 60 
year horizon. There is critical analysis of Mansergh’s forecast in Chapter 4. 
2. A step change in water demand forecasting, both of a new component based 
methodology and the acquisition of data, was started at Severn Trent Water Authority 
in the mid 1970s. A step change in the forecasts themselves also occurred as Britain 
had entered a post-industrial age where water demand from traditional heavy 
industries was in rapid decline. Thus the new water demand forecasts were 
considerably lower than those produced by WRB, and led to the indefinite deferral of 
the proposed scheme to increase the storage of Craig Goch reservoir in the Elan 
system (Halcrow, 1973) for a to supply London via the River Severn and River 
Thames. This idea was first suggested in the 1860s, and the issue of water transfers 
from Wales to London was raised in Parliament in the early 1890s at the time when 
Birmingham Corporation was seeking the Parliamentary powers to construct the Elan 
scheme. Hansard (1892) records the discussion in which the issue of water from Wales 
should be treated first as a national question, whilst other objectors to the Birmingham 
scheme believed that the needs of the metropolis should come first. Sir Joseph Bailey 
(MP for Hereford) correctly identified a key institutional problem that “London is not 
allowed to make up its mind as there is no public body which is allowed to speak for 
London”.  The argument made by Joseph Chamberlain based on the urgency of 
Birmingham Corporation’s need ultimately prevailed following scrutiny by a Select 
Committee. 
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3. Present day water demand forecasts made by the water companies in their Water 
Resources Management Plans are expected to follow the EA Guideline (EA, 2008). 
Thames Water Utilities deviated from the Guideline, and at Public Inquiry in 2010 
(see Section 6.5), the company was judged to have failed to provide enough evidence 
to justify the deviation, which was an inclusion by the company of a “long term risk” 
factor of 100 Ml/d beyond 2035. Although not legally binding, in practice the EA 
Guideline now has an equivalent status. 
2.5.3 Deployable Output replaces Reservoir Yield 
A major improvement in the way water resources and supplies are accounted for took place in 
1997. This improvement formed part of the industry’s response to the Government’s “Agenda 
for Action”, which was triggered by the experience of drought in 1995 (see Section 6.2).     
The traditional reservoir yield figure in the 20th century represented the output that could be 
sustained with a probability of failure, usually of once in 50 or 100 years. It had served the 
industry well; however, with the greater interconnection of sources, reservoir yield had 
become a less fundamental statistic to water resources planners. Increasingly flexible water 
supply networks were constructed that enabled reservoir, river and groundwater sources to be 
operated conjunctively. There were other constraints on resource use that were not reflected in 
reservoir yield, and many water companies had computer based water resource and supply 
simulation models with long historic data sets that could test the impact of constraints. 
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Deployable Output became the new parameter, and it is defined by the EA in the glossary 
(Appendix A) as “The output of a commissioned source, or a group of sources….constrained 
(if applicable) by: 
• Abstraction licence (the terms and conditions thereof). 
• Pumping plant (capacity) and/or well/aquifer properties. 
• Raw water mains (capacity) and/or aquifers. 
• Transfer and/or output mains (capacity). 
• Treatment (capacity and capability) 
• Water quality (raw water quality, blending constraints)”. 
From the total Deployable Output for a Resource Zone (defined in the glossary as “The 
largest possible zone in which all resources, including external transfers, can be shared and 
hence the zone in which all customers experience the same risk of failure from a resource 
shortfall”), an estimate of Outage is subtracted, and the resulting figure is called Water 
Available For Use (WAFU). The supply and demand balance diagrams produced by water 
companies for their WRMP use the appropriate critical demand period for the Resource Zone 
(e.g. Dry Year, or Peak Week), and the corresponding WAFU. Table 2.13 summarises the key 
issues that add to the uncertainty of the future WAFU available of the three principal types of 
water resource.  
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Table 2.13 - Summary of water resources types that contribute to WAFU on the “supply” side of the 
Supply-Demand balance in a Resource Zone 
Water Resources 
Types 
Impounding Reservoirs River Abstractions Groundwater 
Abstractions 
 
 
 
Water resources and 
supplies planning 
issues 
Direct supply reservoirs (eg 
Elan for Birmingham). 
Reservoirs for river support 
(eg. Llyn Clywedog 
supporting low summer 
flows in the River Severn.) 
River intakes, often 
pumped into raw water 
storage prior to 
treatment (eg King 
George reservoirs filled 
from the River Thames 
for London)  
Boreholes and wells. 
(eg Chalk and 
Limestone in south and 
east of England, 
sandstone in parts of 
central and northern 
England.) 
Environment and 
Quality 
Many existing reservoirs 
have become important 
scientific and recreational 
sites. 
EU Water Framework 
Directive requires rivers 
to be of good ecological 
status. Full impact not 
yet known. 
EA’s “Restoring 
Sustainable 
Abstractions” policy, 
i.e. reducing existing 
abstractions 
Climate Change More wet winter refill, less 
inflow in dry summers. 
Simulation models used to 
vary inflows to assess the 
impact on Deployable 
Output. 
Flows reduced in dry 
summers. Especially at 
risk are rivers with 
already low base flows.  
Generally more 
drought resistant than 
surface sources. 
Possible higher winter 
recharge 
Long-term Outlook New reservoirs politically 
unpopular. Dry year output 
from existing reservoirs 
may become less reliable. 
Potentially the most 
significant reductions in 
the water available for 
public supply. 
Reductions in annual 
licensed quantities 
likely. Aquifer storage 
and recovery can 
increase output. Very 
site specific. 
 
2.5.4 Water Resources Management Plan (WRMP) and Resource Zones 
The WRMP is produced and updated by every water company at five-yearly intervals, in 
which the company presents and justifies its preferred plan at annual intervals for 25 years. 
The process for developing the plan is set down by the EA, and a simplified process diagram 
is shown in Figure 2.16.  
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Draft and Final WRMPs are cast by all water companies at Resource Zone level. Data tables 
are required by the EA that cover the detailed supply and demand components for each 
Resource Zone. 
Data acquisition for this project has been aided by Birmingham being a single resource zone 
in the Severn Trent Water WRMP, and likewise London is a single resource zone in Thames 
Water. United Utilities have cast Liverpool and Manchester into a single large resource zone 
which covers nearly all of the company’s supply area; Figure 2.13 shows a schematic. 
 
Figure 2.16 - Components of a Water Resources Management Plan (from EA Guideline April 2011) 
Water Resources
Options 
appraisal
Option 
Identification Deficit/Surplus
Supply Demand 
Balance
Demand Forecast Supply Forecast Headroom
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2.5.5 Uncertainty in Target Headroom 
The EA defines target headroom (shown as “Headroom” in Figure 2.16) as the buffer between 
supply and demand to cater for specified uncertainties. The optimum position in the plan for a 
Resource Zone is to have a least cost plan where the actual headroom equals the target 
headroom throughout the plan period. Figure 2.17 is an indicative example showing how 
actual headroom can be above, equal to, and below target headroom over the plan period. 
Figure 2.17 - Actual and Target Headroom: Indicative example 
In this indicative example in Figure 2.17, there is a forecast made in year 0 for supply (Water 
available for use, or WAFU) that shows two additions of about 10 Ml/d each in years 10 and 
15. There are two forecasts of demand, one with and one without the buffer to cover 
uncertainty.  When the target headroom is added to the demand forecast, for the first 20 years, 
the actual headroom is either greater than or equal to the target headroom, and the supply 
demand balance is acceptable. However for years 20 to 30, the Year 0 plan needs to address 
the increasing shortfall. 
0 10 20 305 15 25
80
60
40
20
0
70
50
30
10
Years
Demand Forecast in Year 0 
INCLUDING Target Headroom
Demand Forecast in Year 0 
EXCLUDING Target Headroom 
Supply and Demand: 
Ml/d
Water Available for Use 
Forecast
ACTUAL  > TARGET
ACTUAL = TARGET
ACTUAL < TARGET
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The modern probabilistic target headroom methodology (UKWIR, 2002) enables a link to be 
made between uncertainty (the amount of target headroom required) and risk to the 
company’s chosen level of service. This issue is returned to in Chapter 6.   
2.5.6 Today’s forecast supply and demand data and information 
The water companies are required by Ofwat and EA to complete a series of data tables with a 
substantial amount of detail about supply and demand to accompany their Draft and Final 
WRMPs. Now that water companies are legally obliged to consult publically, and to make the 
narrative and data tables available on the internet, there is a large amount of data and 
information available for research. The principal data table used in this project is from the 
Thames Water revised Draft WRMP (2009), with the reference of WRP-FP; Final Planning 
Supply and Demand Components for the Dry Year in the London Resource Zone, and using 
the company’s levels of service. The narrative contains the assumptions used by the company 
for the forecasts, and information on sizes, dates, and costs about the company’s preferred 
scheme options. 
2.6 Thames Water proposed UTR for London 
2.6.1 London and Levels of Service 
Thames Water Utilities is the largest water and sewerage company in the UK serving over 13 
million people in London and the Thames Valley. About 8 million are served in the 
company’s London Resource Zone, which is shown in Figure 2.18, and has a daily average 
total demand of near 2000 Ml/d.  
London’s principal source of water is the lower River Thames upstream of Teddington Weir. 
The Lower Thames Operating Agreement (LTOA) in combination with abstraction licences 
determines how much water can be abstracted from the Lower Thames, and informs the 
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introduction of water use restrictions in London during a drought. The drought of 2005 and 
2006 tested the effectiveness of the LTOA as a drought management tool. The results of a 
review of this Agreement will impact both on the WRMP and the Company’s Drought 
Management Plan. The most significant issue for supply is the ecological impact on the water 
environment of the Lower Thames abstractions, and for demand, the correct application of the 
most up-to-date assumptions on demand savings during drought periods.  
All companies now tell their customers the level of service for which the company plans. The 
levels of service set by Thames Water are given in Table 2.14, which shows the frequency 
with which the company believes it needs to impose from time to time for different types of 
water use restrictions during periods of water shortage. These levels of service are applicable 
to London, and as the severity of drought increases, so do the actions taken by the company 
that reduces the risk of future supply failure, and minimizes environmental damage.  
Table 2.14 -Thames Water; Levels of Service to customers in droughts (Source: Thames Water, revised 
Draft WRMP, September 2009) 
Level Action Frequency (drought severity) 
1 Media campaign, additional water efficiency campaign, 
enhanced activity and restrictions to reduce risk to 
water supply. 
One in five years 
2 Enhanced media campaign, customer choice / 
voluntary constraint, sprinkler ban. 
One in 10 years 
3 Hosepipe ban, Non essential use ban, Drought Orders One in 20 years 
4 Severe water rationing Never 
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Figure 2.18 - Thames Water Resource Zones (from Thames Water Resources Management Plan, 2009) 
2.6.2 The 2010 Public Inquiry 
By calling for a Public Inquiry into Thames Water’s revised Draft WRMP (September 2009), 
the Secretary of State started a process that demanded engagement between the EA and TW, 
and a great deal of preparation. 
Two issues of particular interest for the research reported in this thesis were: 
1. The approach taken by the company that introduced “long term risk” to cover 
particular uncertainties beyond the plan horizon year of 2035.  
Proposed 
Upper 
Thames 
Reservoir 
(Abingdon) 
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2. The reasons given by the Planning Inspector (Wendy Burden) to reject the Thames 
Water plan, and thereby company’s preferred scheme, which was for 100 Mm3 of 
new raw water storage near Abingdon, Oxfordshire (i.e. the UTR) in 2026. 
The EA led the case for the objectors. The Inquiry took place in Oxford during the summer of 
2010, and the Inspector’s report was published in December 2010. The decision letter from 
Defra to the company was dated 1 March 2011. An abridged list of the documents available, 
which has been limited to those that were of particular relevance to the arguments explored in 
this research, appears in Table 2.15. 
Table 2.15 - Chronology of reports associated with the Public Inquiry 
Date Government Thames Water Comment 
Feb 
2009 
 
Statement of Consultation 
Responses report to Defra. 
The company’s responses to 
issues raised by the public. 
May + 
June 
2009 
EA Advice reports to Defra 
about TW’s Statement of 
Consultation Responses  
 
EA believes TW has not 
adequately addressed issues 
raised by the consultation.  
3 Aug 
2009 
Defra letter to TW announces 
that a Public Inquiry has been 
called. 
  
Sep 
2009 
EA letter to TW identifies 21 
“Outstanding Issues” 
 
Letter in response to a TW 
asking for clarification about 
EA Advice to Defra 
Sep 
2009 
 
TW releases “revised” Draft 
WRMP that contains 100 Ml/d 
of “long term risk” after 2035. 
Greater demand reductions 
were shown than in previous 
DWRMP. 
Jan 
2010 
 
TW and EA agree a 
“Statement of common 
ground” 
Register of 49 issues, 10 of 
which are unlikely to be 
agreed before Inquiry 
Feb 
2010 
 
TW publishes “Statement of 
Case” 
Many of the 49 issues now 
resolved. 
March 
2010 
 
TW and Ofwat agree a 
Statement of common ground 
 
April 
2010 
Parliamentary briefing 
organised by GARD, the 
largest NGO opposing 
 
GARD water engineers are 
John Lawson (ex Halcrow) 
and Chris Binnie (consultant) 
15 June EA Proofs of Evidence and TW Proofs of Evidence and CEO Richard Aylard: Levels 
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Date Government Thames Water Comment 
to 18 
Aug 
2010 
rebuttals, primarily:  
Ms Pauline Smith and Ms 
Vicky Carpenter 
rebuttals, primarily:  
Dr Chris Lambert and  
Dr Yvette de Garis  
of  Service.  
Chris Lambert: Supply and 
Demand planning. 
Yvette de Garis: 
Environmental issues. 
13 Dec 
2010 
Planning Inspector’s report.  TW not fully compliant with 
Directions, insufficient 
evidence to sustain “long 
term risk” of 100 Ml/d, 100 
Mm3 UTR scheme rejected. 
1 Mar 
2011 
Decision letter from Defra to 
TW, Secretary of State accepts 
all of the Inspectors 
conclusions and 
recommendations 
 
A further letter of 13 May 
contained a programme of 
work that met all 25 of the 
recommendations. 
 
Thesis ends March 2011: later 
entries for information: 
  
Dec 
2011 
 
New Draft Final WRMP 
issued for public consultation 
No UTR. 
Jan 
2012 
EA and Ofwat publish reports 
“The case for change” on 
future water availability and 
reform of abstraction 
management. 
 
Support information for 
Defra White Paper “Water for 
Life” 
 
Argument about the significant issues raised at the Public Inquiry, which refer to the 
documents listed in Table 2.15, appears in Chapter 6. 
2.7 Summary of the Literature Review 
This section summarises the key elements of the Literature Review to take forward into this 
thesis:- 
Introduction to the Literature Review: The scope of the project is the planning for raw 
water reservoir schemes that have been built for public supply.  
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The naturally filled Elan Valley Reservoirs storage (99,000 Ml) and gravity aqueduct scheme 
is located in uplands of mid-Wales where there is high rainfall, and was chosen for study 
because it has provided the water for public supplies in Birmingham for over a century. The 
first flow from the Elan scheme to Birmingham occurred in 1904. 
For comparisons to be drawn with Elan about uncertainty, the Thirlmere reservoir (37,000 
Ml) and gravity aqueduct scheme located in the English Lake District, and the Lake Vyrnwy 
reservoir (59,000 Ml) and aqueduct scheme located in Mid-Wales were chosen for study. 
These schemes serve Manchester (first flow 1894) and Liverpool (first flow 1892) 
respectively. Both schemes are of a similar type to Elan, and were constructed at the end of 
the 19th century. Many reports and papers were found containing data and information about 
the Elan scheme. 
Thames Water’s proposed pumped storage and river regulation scheme called Upper Thames 
Reservoir (100,000 Ml) was chosen as a modern scheme to compare with the Victorian 
schemes because of its strategic significance in long term plans for the supply of London. 
Thames Water’s revised Draft Water Resources Management Plan published in September 
2009, and a recent Public Inquiry generated a substantial amount of useful literature. 
Historical context: Victorian Cities: The Industrial Revolution generated rapid population 
growth and burgeoning economic development in the UK’s industrial cities. Greater 
investment in new assets for water supply and drainage was needed. Private water companies 
were bought by the ambitious Corporations to deliver the investment that supported economic 
growth, and the improvement of public health. Good references were found that explained the 
political, social and economic background for the three cities under review.  
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Historical context; Victorian engineers and methods: Bateman and Thomas Hawksley 
were well respected late Victorian water engineers involved with the designs of Thirlmere and 
Vyrnwy respectively. Insufficient rainfall data was used to calculate the yield of reservoirs, 
and mistakes were made that led to over estimated source yields. Mansergh had good rainfall 
data, and correctly estimated the yield of Elan. Uncertainty in the estimation of average 
annual rainfall began to be understood at the end of the 19th century, but little information was 
uncovered about the Victorian engineers approach to other uncertainties. From material found 
about the engineers themselves, and their forecasting methods, it appears that Victorian 
engineers were expected to recommend solutions with uncertainty implicit in their empirically 
based judgements. 
Description of the three Victorian reservoir schemes and data sources: More data and 
information was found for Elan and Birmingham than for the other two schemes. The 
researcher has had a paper published about the 1892 water demand forecast for Birmingham 
based on work done for the thesis (Appendix E). Liverpool suffered intermittent supplies until 
innovative leakage and waste control was introduced. Mansergh asserted to a House of 
Commons Select Committee in 1892 that “there was no preventable waste in Birmingham” 
and was believed. Manchester Corporation’s proposals for Thirlmere were objected to by the 
Thirlmere Defence Association, the first example of an environmental organisation. The 
verbatim reports from the Parliamentary Select Committees have allowed greater insight to 
the way the Victorian engineers did their work. 
Modern context: Government and regulators play an influential role. Water resources 
planning undertaken by UK water companies to guidelines set by the Environment Agency. 
Significant technical development in supply and demand forecasting has been made; rather 
than reservoir yield, a water resources and supply system now has a Deployable Output, and 
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demand is disaggregated. Uncertainty in the supply and demand forecast is accounted for in 
probabilistic target headroom of supply over demand based on level of service. There is a 
great deal of literature produced by Government, Regulators and water companies. 
Thames Water proposal of an Upper Thames Reservoir: In their revised Draft Water 
Resources Management Plan of September 2009, Thames Water proposes a 100 Mm3 
pumped storage reservoir near Oxford. Raw water would be released back into the River 
Thames in summer to support abstractions for supplies in London. The Planning Inspector for 
a Public Inquiry held in 2010 into Thames Water’s proposals rejected the notion of a “long 
term risk” argument put forward by the company. However, compared with the independent 
Victorian Parliamentary committee system, the freedom of decision making in today’s Public 
Inquiry system has become significantly more constrained by the change in the socio-
economic background over the past century, and by the development of a regulatory 
framework.     
The Literature Review has revealed descriptive material that compares the three Victorian 
reservoir schemes of Elan, Thirlmere and Vyrnwy. Sufficient actual and forecast supply and 
demand data for the three industrial cities of Birmingham, Manchester and Liverpool has been 
found to construct historic supply and demand balance diagrams. There is a wealth of material 
about supply and demand for Thames Water’s proposed UTR (or Abingdon) reservoir, and 
future supplies to London. No material has been located that attempts to evaluate and compare 
uncertainty at the planning stage for the sizing of schemes. This finding informs the 
specification of the knowledge gap for this project, the statement of the project aim, and the 
setting of the objectives, which appear in Chapter 3. 
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CHAPTER 3 KNOWLEDGE GAP, AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
3.1 Knowledge Gap 
A. The Victorian water engineers and their client Corporations are generally admired for 
their technical ability and vision, but is this admiration founded on fact, or does it reflect 
today’s growing nostalgia for Victorian civic achievement? There is knowledge of the 
physical detail of individual Victorian reservoir and gravity aqueduct schemes, and some of 
the empirically based judgements made by those engineers.  However, for long term reservoir 
schemes, no analysis has been found, in terms of supply and demand, that considers how 
well, or how badly, these schemes have actually performed. 
B There has been no retrospective attempt in the past to compare either empirically or 
systematically the relative supply and demand performances of different Victorian reservoir 
schemes. Could analysis of data, which can be derived from supply and demand diagrams, 
produce a method that would allow sensible comparisons to be made, and not be confounded 
by uncertainty? 
C. An assessment of the supply and demand risk averseness of modern scheme designs 
has never been attempted. Could the same model used to address B above be able to compare 
the relative risk averseness (resource lasts beyond date expected), or the inefficiency of 
design (resource does not reach date expected) of modern and Victorian schemes? 
Comment on actions required for A:- To provide an informed view, critical analysis is 
needed, which is based on the comparison of actual demand data with the original demand 
forecasted to justify the scheme. By getting to know the character of the Victorian engineers, 
an appreciation can be formed of how uncertainty in the demand forecast was approached.  
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Comment on actions required for B: A novel method has been developed that uses ratios of 
flows, and the years when intersections occur of the planned supply with the actual demand  
in the supply and demand balance diagrams. From these variables, the relative “risk-
averseness” of the original scheme designs can be assessed. The more risk averse, the safer 
the original scheme design turned out to be, but perhaps the design was larger than necessary.  
Comment on actions required for C: There is a conceptual difficulty, which is that no 
demand history exists for a modern scheme. As an alternative, in its Water Resources 
Management Plan (WRMP), Thames Water shows a range of demand forecast scenarios to 
2035. Using extrapolated supply and demand beyond 2035, “what if” demand scenarios can 
be tested. Comparison of these results with the Victorian results provides an understanding of 
the degree of risk averseness that is being planned for.  London’s supply and demand balance 
diagrams have relatively flat supply and demand projections compared with the Victorian 
examples, and therefore the results for London will be less accurate. 
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3.2 Aim and Objectives 
Aim: 
The aim of the research reported in this thesis is to determine whether Victorian approaches 
to uncertainty in water resources and supply planning offer any lessons for planning water 
resources and supply schemes today. 
Objectives: 
The over-arching aim is underpinned by a set of carefully constructed objectives as shown in 
Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 – Project objectives, and key elements of work 
Objectives Key Elements of work: these also reflect how the  
Knowledge Gap has been addressed. 
1. To undertake a detailed examination of the 
historical development of the Elan water resources 
and supply scheme for Birmingham UK to 
understand the technological, social, economic, 
environmental and political context within which 
they were provided. 
Much of the Victorian water infrastructure is still in 
use today more than a century since its construction. 
A literature search has been undertaken, and historic 
supply and demand data analysed for the Elan 
Reservoirs and aqueduct scheme, and research into 
Birmingham’s water supply history.   
2. To elucidate the philosophy and quantify the 
Victorian approach to understanding issues of 
uncertainty in the forecasting of water demand by 
comparing the approaches used by Birmingham 
with Manchester and Liverpool for the planning and 
design of remote upland large reservoir schemes. 
Why did Victorian engineers build what they did? 
Did they plan for uncertainty and longevity, and if 
so how did they quantify these issues? The demand 
forecasts were researched and analysed that justified 
the proposed size of the Elan scheme, and for two 
similar schemes, at Thirlmere for Manchester, and  
at Vyrnwy for Liverpool. The work done for Elan 
and Birmingham has been published. Using forecast 
and actual supply and demand, the comparative risk 
averseness of the original designs is evaluated. This 
uses a novel lag-time model approach, which has 
been developed in this project for this purpose.  
3. To consider whether historical approaches to 
dealing with uncertainty continue to inform current 
infrastructure design and planning and to determine 
the consequences for providing effective and 
sustainable infrastructure. 
Using the Thames Water Upper Thames Reservoir 
as an exemplar, and the information from the recent 
Public Inquiry, to consider how we currently plan 
and size reservoir schemes, and how our modern 
approaches compare to those of the Victorians. 
4. To critically appraise the influence of Victorian 
infrastructure on the development of the water 
supply system, and to determine how this legacy 
could continue to influence this fundamental area of 
engineering and public health. 
Given that future supply and demand profiles are 
very uncertain, are there lessons we can learn from 
historical approaches to planning and designing for 
uncertainty that ensures the infrastructure we 
construct now remains useful in the future? 
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CHAPTER 4 VICTORIAN APPROACH 
Chapter 4 addresses the first objective in Table 3.1, and Knowledge Gap A, which is the 
detailed examination of the historical development of the Elan scheme. Part of the second 
objective, and Knowledge Gap B are addressed, which is the widening of the examination to 
the Thirlmere and Vyrnwy schemes.  
4.1 Introduction to the Victorian Approach  
The purpose of this chapter is:  
1. To show and analyse Victorian water supply and demand data for the years that 
predate the time when the decisions were made to build the three Victorian schemes. 
The reasons for the choice of schemes are given in Sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3. 
2. To explain the three different demand forecast approaches taken that justified the need 
for the three schemes.  
3. To compare observed supply and demand data with the original forecasts. 
4. To synthesise the analysis of 1, 2 and 3 and thus draw conclusions regarding the 
Victorian approach to addressing supply and demand issues. 
The value of this work is to gain an understanding of the information that was available at the 
time to the Victorian water engineers; how these data were used as the basis for the demand 
forecasts; and to find out how accurate, or otherwise, the forecasts turned out to be.  
A summary chronology of event dates leading up to the planning and design, and then the 
construction and commissioning of the three schemes, is shown below in Table 4.1. 
Descriptions of the three schemes can be found in Section 2.4. 
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Table 4.1 - Chronology for the three schemes from 1847 to 1904, including reprise of Table 2.3. 
Years Thirlmere for Manchester 
Corporation 
Lake Vyrnwy for Liverpool 
Corporation 
Elan Valley for Birmingham 
Corporation 
1847 Takeover of private water 
company; water supplies 
were from wells and canals. 
Takeover of private water 
companies; water supplies were 
from springs and wells 
Birmingham Water Company 
supply since 1830 had been 
from River Tame abstractions. 
1850 to 
1857 
1855: first flow from 
Bateman’s Longdendale 
scheme, at the time the 
largest reservoir scheme of 
its type in the UK.  
1857: first flow from Hawksley’s 
Rivington reservoir scheme near 
Chorley. 
1851: powers obtained to 
purchase water company; but 
not used until 1875. 
1854: Rawlinson first suggests 
using River Blythe for supply. 
1865 to 
1874 
1868: drought supplies of 12 
hours per day for 84 days, 
then constant supplies 
resumed. 
1873: Bateman said 
Longdendale will become 
exhausted in 10 years and 
next scheme needed. Yield of 
wells reducing and becoming 
polluted. 
1865: drought supplies down to 
2 hours per day. Supplies 
remained intermittent, with shut 
offs normally 9 to 12 hours per 
day. 
1873: Introduction of “special 
operations for the prevention of 
waste”. 
1874: Waste reduction 
successful and constant supplies 
gradually introduced.  Yield of 
wells reducing and becoming 
polluted.  
1862: Mansergh first sees Elan 
as potential reservoir site. 
1864: Hawksley proposes use of 
better quality local groundwater 
instead of increasingly polluted 
Tame. 
1865: Bateman proposes large 
reservoirs schemes in Mid-
Wales to supply London. 
1872: River Tame abstraction 
ceased, replaced by supplies 
from new wells. 
1875 to 
1883 
1875: Bateman proposes 
Ullswater scheme for 
Manchester + Liverpool. 
1876: Bateman proposes 
Thirlmere for Manchester. 
1879: Thirlmere Defence 
Association object, but 
Thirlmere powers obtained  
1876: Ullswater scheme rejected 
by both Corporations. 
1879: Lake Vyrnwy a better 
scheme than Haweswater 
independently agreed by 
Hawksley and Bateman. 
1880: Powers obtained to 
construct Lake Vyrnwy.   
1875: Birmingham Water 
Company purchased by 
Birmingham Corporation. 
1883: New treatment works 
opened at Whitacre supported by 
bankside storage filled from the 
Rivers Bourne and Blythe.  
1892 to 
1904 
1894: First flow from the 
Thirlmere scheme in the 
same year that the 
Manchester Ship Canal is 
opened. 
1892: First flow from the Lake 
Vyrnwy scheme. At the time, the 
largest masonry dam in the 
world.  
1892: Powers obtained to 
construct the Elan scheme. 
1904: First flow from the first 
stage of the Elan scheme.  
 
Table 4.1 shows that the lengths of time from the acquisition of Parliamentary powers to 
commissioning were similar for the three schemes. Thirlmere took 15 years, from 1879 to 
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1894, Vyrnwy took 12 years from 1880 to 1892, and Elan took 12 years from 1892 to 1904. 
At the outset, Vyrnwy was expected to take six years, and Elan seven years.  
Noted in Table 4.1 under Elan for 1865 is Bateman’s contribution to the Royal Commission 
chaired by the Duke of Richmond which advocated new storage in the upper River Severn 
catchment in Mid-Wales to serve London. Bateman paid for the investigations himself, and 
his proposals were well received. Whilst not recommended at the time for London, the 
discussion raised awareness that developing remote upland reservoirs could be the right 
approach for other conurbations  
In 1876, Table 4.1 records that Bateman proposed Ullswater in the Lake District as a source 
that could supply both Manchester and Liverpool. Liverpool Corporation’s need was more 
urgent, and being unsure of the commitment Manchester Corporation had to the scheme, 
Bateman’s proposal was dropped. Manchester’s next proposals for an upland development 
remained in the Lake District, whilst Liverpool turned towards the development of catchments 
in Wales. 
The Manchester and Liverpool experiences are presented before Birmingham throughout 
Chapter 4, as the planning for the Thirlmere and Vyrnwy schemes occurred over a decade 
earlier than for Elan. The supply and demand history is presented for each Corporation in 
Section 4.2. This analysis provided the basis for the approaches taken to produce long-term 
demand forecasts for the future described in Section 4.3. In the mid to late 1870s, Bateman 
and Hawksley are shown to have used trend-based approaches, whilst in 1892, James 
Mansergh for the Birmingham demand forecast 63 years ahead, used a method called the 
Decremental Ratio of Increase (DRoI). The DRoI approach is explained in Section 4.3. 
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With the three schemes in place, comparisons of forecast and outturn demands for the three 
Corporations are covered in Section 4.3. The well matched forecast and outturn for 
Birmingham provided the impetus to report this work in a peer reviewed paper (Bradford et 
al., 2010): an offprint is located in Appendix G. 
4.2 Historic Supply and Demand data prior to Reservoir Schemes 
Historical water supply and demand information is shown in Figures 4.1 (Manchester), 4.2. 
(Liverpool), and 4.3 (Birmingham). 
4.2.1 Longdendale and Manchester 
The demand data which John Frederick Bateman presented to Manchester Corporation in 
February 1875 formed the technical basis for the justification of a new water resource. These 
data appear in Harwood (1895). The data for Figure 4.1 is an example; the comments on the 
diagram have been added by the author.  
Figure 4.1 – Manchester Supply Area, Annual Average Demand, 1855 to 1874 (Bateman Feb 1875) 
Bateman was responsible for the design for the Longdendale scheme, which is a series of 
reservoirs in the valley of the River Etherow immediately to the east of the city, the first of 
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which was opened in 1855. Bateman did comment on an important “Extraordinary drought” 
feature in 1868, when he records that water was shut off for 12 hours a day for nearly three 
months, which was insignificant to the years of intermittent supplies endured at this time in 
Liverpool.  Another set of data that Bateman showed was the monthly data shown in Figure 
4.2 for the four years 1871 to 1874. These data were shown by Bateman to demonstrate 
seasonal demand effects. Bateman was an advocate of designing schemes that maintained 
supplies during peak demand periods. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 – Manchester Supply Area, Monthly Water Demands, Jan 1871 to Dec 1874 (Bateman Feb 
1875) 
The wet and dry year descriptions are Bateman’s, based on local annual rainfall statistics. The 
summer monthly peak at near 85 Ml/d was further amplified by Bateman in the text by 
quoting the peak summer demand week ending 22 June 1874 at 89 Ml/d. An even higher peak 
week of 95 Ml/d had occurred in frosty weather in the week ending 11 January 1875. The 
annual average water demand met by Manchester Corporation from 1855 to 1879 shows 
demand doubling from 40 to 80 Ml/d, as shown in Figure 4.3. There appears to be no 
evidence of Bateman factoring peak demands into his demand forecast in 1875. 
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Figure 4.3 – Manchester, Annual Average Resource and Demand, 1855 to 1879 
The existing resource availability was estimated by Bateman to be no more than 114 Ml/d.  
Demand growth was fastest in the latter half of this period at near 4% per annum, and on the 
evidence of growth in the last two years of this period, Bateman advised the Corporation that 
growth of 4.5 Ml/d per year (1 Mgd per year) should be used as a planning forecast. Thus he 
concluded that the available supply would shrink to zero in eight years. 
The starting year of 1855 in Figure 4.3 marks the date of the first flow from the Corporation’s 
new scheme at Longdendale. Although Longdendale was a staged scheme that Bateman 
finally finished in 1877, Figure 4.3 shows for simplicity just the final drought yield. Binnie 
(1981) reports that the drought yield to supply of the Longdendale scheme was estimated by 
Bateman at between 106 and 114 Ml/d.  
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The finishing year in Figure 4.3 is 1879, when the powers to develop Thirlmere were 
obtained. Construction of the Thirlmere scheme started some time later in 1884. 
4.2.2 Rivington and Liverpool  
The picture for Liverpool Corporation is rather different, as presented in Figure 4.4.  
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Figure 4.4 – Liverpool, Annual Average Resources and Demand, 1857 to 1880 
Between 1857 and 1864, Figure 4.4 shows there was strong demand growth from 30 to 70 
Ml/d, which is over 10% per annum. After 1864, demand slowly rose up to the year 1873, and 
then fell so that in 1880, demand had returned to 70 Ml/d, the same level as it was 16 years 
earlier. Over the 23 year period from 1857 to 1880, growth averages three percent per annum. 
Changes over time in the numbers population served can occasionally explain movements in 
demand, but not for Liverpool in the 1870s. At the time water demand was falling, the 
population served rose from 614,000 in 1873 (Beloe, 1875) to 703,000 in 1880 (Parry, 1881). 
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As has been alluded to in Sections 2.2.7 and 2.4.8, the falling demand was due to the 
successful implementation of innovative leakage detection. The most common approach taken 
by 19th century water undertakings to limit demand was the introduction of intermittent 
supplies.  
The perilous supply demand balance position for Liverpool is made clear in Figure 4.4. Table 
4.2 shows that the estimated drought resource for Liverpool had to be revised by a downward 
27 Ml/d, or some 44% of the total. 
Table 4.2 – Drought Yield of Sources supplying Liverpool, 1857 and 1865 
Row 
References 
Resources Drought Yield in 
1857 
Drought Yield in 
1865 
Change 
A Rivington Supply and 
Compensation 
100.0 Ml/d 72.7 Ml/d - 27.3 Ml/d 
B Rivington Compensation 37.7 37.7 0 
C = A - B Rivington Supply to 
Liverpool 
62.3  35.0  - 27.3  
D Local Wells 27.2 27.2 0 
E = C + D Liverpool Supply  
 (shown in Fig 4.4) 
89.5 62.2 - 27.3 
 
Hawksley’s estimate of the Rivington drought yield (including compensation) was 100 Ml/d 
(22 Mgd) (Binnie, 1981), which is shown in row A in Table 4.2. After subtracting the 
compensation flow (line B) of 37.7 Ml/d (8.3 Mgd), the drought year supply from Rivington 
to Liverpool was 62.3 Ml/d (row C). Another 27.2 Ml/d (6 Mgd) (Duncan, 1853) was deemed 
as obtainable from local wells (row D), thus the total drought year supply figure for Liverpool 
in 1857 shown in line E was 89.5 Ml/d (19.7 Mgd).  
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After experiencing more serious droughts than Hawksley had imagined at the planning stage 
of the scheme, the overall drought yield from Rivington was reduced by 27.3 Ml/d  from 100 
Ml/d to 72.7 Ml/d (Binnie, 1981), as shown in row A of Table 4.2. With the amount of 
compensation staying the same at 37.7 Ml/d, the drought supply available from Rivington to 
Liverpool was cut from 62.3 Ml/d to 35.0 Ml/d (7.7 Mgd).  
The amount of supply headroom over demand that Liverpool Corporation thought it had 
shows a dramatic change in a short space of time. In 1857, there appeared to be 60 Ml/d of 
headroom, which was double the current demand of 30 Ml/d. Eight years later, Figure 4.4 
shows that the headroom had become negative, and explains why the Corporation’s 
intermittent supply policy lasted so long. 
4.2.3 Local Sources for Birmingham 
The chronology of key water supply events in the 19th century for Birmingham and London 
appears in Appendix B.  
Up to the early 19th century, all water supplies in Birmingham were drawn from privately 
owned local wells. Piped water supplies began in 1831, and at the same time, the newly 
formed Birmingham Waterworks Company (BWCo) started abstractions from the River Tame 
just to the north of the town. The abstracted water was settled in a reservoir at Aston at a site 
now covered by the junction of the M6 motorway and the A38.  
In 1854, a pollution incident on the Tame upstream of Aston at Willenhall showed the 
vulnerability of this supply, and prompted the Council to examine alternatives, even though it 
had no direct responsibility for water supply. Public health was the Council’s responsibility, 
and a report by sanitary engineer, Robert Rawlinson, recommended abstraction from the 
River Blythe at Whitacre, some 12 miles east of Birmingham (Rawlinson, 1854).  
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To replace the polluted River Tame abstractions, the engineer Thomas Hawksley advised 
BWCo in the 1860s that groundwater stored in the Triassic Sandstones underlying much of 
Birmingham was a suitable alternative. Whilst there were some failures in trying to liberate 
the groundwater, successful wells provided constant and good quality supplies. A small 
number of spring sources with comparatively low output were also used. In 1871, abstractions 
from the River Tame for domestic supply had to cease by statute, and before then, some 32 
Ml/d of varying quality was being supplied, but only to those who could afford it. 
In the early 1870s, the Council was becoming concerned about rising demand, continuing 
public health problems, and that the Birmingham Water Company BWCo was not investing 
sufficiently in new water supplies for the future. As Mayor of Birmingham, Joseph 
Chamberlain acquired the responsibility for water supply in 1875 by purchasing the BWCo. 
Chamberlain also took over the responsibility for gas supplies, and after his death in 1902, the 
grateful citizens of Birmingham expressed their gratitude in a citation that stands today on his 
memorial in Chamberlain Square. 
Most of the abstracted and treated water from the local Birmingham sources was pumped to 
Aston, and then pumped again, either to a service reservoir west of the town centre at 
Monument Lane, or directly into distribution. In 1883, some 80% of properties connected 
within the supply area used 54 Ml/d of mains water (Mathews, 1886).  
Table 4.3 shows the total yield of the sources, estimated at that time by Mathews and Barclay, 
was 82 Ml/d. If treated water storage was also factored in, a further 12 Ml/d could be added to 
make the water supply available total 94 Ml/d. Whilst preparing the Parliamentary evidence 
for the Elan scheme, Mansergh reduced the total from 94 Ml/d to 87 Ml/d on the grounds that 
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there was insufficient pumping capacity to deploy all of the well water. The latter figure has 
been quoted for use in supply calculations (Bradford et al, 2010). 
Table 4.3 – Estimated Yields of Birmingham Local Sources in 1891 
Groundwater Sources: Wells Mathews (1886) and 
Barclay (1891), Ml/d  
Million Gallons per 
Day 
Aston Well 13.6 3.0 
Witton Well 11.4 2.5 
Kings Vale 1.1 0.25 
Perry Well 9.1 2.0 
Selly Oak Well 5.7 1.25 
(Anticipated output from new Longbridge Well) 7.0 1.5 
Wells Total 47.9 10.5 
Surface Water Sources: 
Streams 
  
Plants Brook 9.1 2.0 
Perry + Witton Streams 4.5 1.0 
Rivers Bourne and Blythe 20.5 4.5 
Surface Water Total 34.1 7.5 
Total Output from Wells and Streams 82 Ml/d 18.0 Mgd 
Additional From Storage (Barclay) 12 Ml/d 2.75 Mgd 
Theoretical Maximum Output 94 Ml/d 20.75 Mgd 
With Mansergh’s downward adjustment of 7 
Ml/d made in 1891 
87 Ml/d 19.25 Mgd 
 
In 1886, with the recent introduction of abstractions from the Rivers Bourne and Blythe for 
treatment and pumping at Whitacre, Mathews (1886) concluded optimistically that “It would 
appear, therefore, that we need have no anxiety for the future”. This optimism quickly 
evaporated, as by 1890, demand reached 70 Ml/d, and a growth rate of three percent per 
annum. Peak demands were assumed to be up to 20% higher, which would require an output 
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capability from all the Birmingham sources of 84 Ml/d. Average annual demand data for 
Birmigham is given in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4 – Birmingham annual average demands from 1876 to 1891 
Year Annual Average Ml/d Annual 
Average Mgd 
Comment 
1876 37.4 8.30 Corporation acquired the Undertaking 
1877 37.9 8.33  
1878 40.6 8.93  
1879 44.7 9.84  
1880 44.7 9.84  
1881 51.9 11.42  
1882 49.5 10.88  
1883 52.3 11.51  
1884 54.7 12.04  
1885 53.7 11.82  
1886 57.7 12.70  
1887 63.9 14.05 Dry summer 
1888 63.6 13.98  
1889 64.9 14.28 Mansergh uses 1883 to 1889 data for 3% per 
annum growth trend in forecast 
1890/91 76.5 16.82 Winter high demand – subsequently written 
down to 70.4 Ml/d (15.5 Mgd)   
 
Table 4.4 shows that from 1876 to 1890, demand in Birmingham had doubled in 15 years. For 
1891, matching the supply in Table 4.3 with demand in Table 4.4, it can seen that the average 
demand of 76.5 Ml/d was 5.5 Ml/d below total output of sources. 
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The 1890/91 demand was significantly enhanced by extra leakage and wastage caused by a 
particularly bad winter. For trend analysis, the demand figure was written down to 70 Ml/d 
(15.5 Mgd). The explanation for assuming the figure of 70 Ml/d has not been found. 
For Birmingham Corporation, the demand profile is shown in Figure 4.5. It is similar to   
Manchester.  
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Figure 4.5 – Birmingham, Annual Average Resources and Demands, 1877 to 1891 
The starting year of 1877 is two years after the Corporation took over the responsibilities for 
water supply from the Birmingham Water Company. The yield of the local sources available 
to Birmingham was shown by Mathews (1886) as 75 Ml/d (16.5 Mgd). Mathews figure was 
derived from 41 Ml/d (9 Mgd) from 5 deep wells, and 34 Ml/d (7.5 Mgd) from four surface 
streams.  
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In 1883, 2000 Ml of new pump filled raw water storage became available at Shustoke for 
treatment at Whitacre works on the eastern boundary of Birmingham. At the time, Mathews 
suggested that the new storage at Shustoke added another 45 Ml/d (5 Mgd) to 91 Ml/d (10 
Mgd) to the yield, but later Mansergh was sceptical (again) of this claim as the extra yield 
could not be deployed throughout the whole of the supply area. Figure 4.5 shows 75 Ml/d, 
which is the yield figure used by Mansergh in 1892 for the presentation of the case for Elan. 
In 1891, with a rapidly closing supply and demand balance, the chairman of the Council’s 
Water Committee, Thomas Martineau, asked the City Engineer J. W. Gray to produce 
projections for Birmingham’s water demand 25 and 50 years hence. Gray reported that by 
1900, demand would outstrip the supply provided by the existing water resources. Martineau 
turned to Mansergh for his advice, which was unequivocal. Mansergh’s recommendation for a 
new remote reservoir storage and gravity aqueduct scheme at Elan some 120 kilometres 
distant in Mid-Wales was accepted by the Council (Barclay, 1898). 
4.3 Approaches used and Forecasts produced  
The historic supply and demand data prior to the decisions taken by the three Corporations to 
develop the Thirlmere Vyrnwy and Elan schemes were presented in Section 4.2.  This section 
focuses on how the three water engineers arrived at their demand forecasts that justified these 
schemes. A summary of the three methods are: 
Bateman for Manchester – extrapolate recent trend of demand for 40 years. 
Hawksley for Liverpool – extrapolate recent trend of population growth and multiply by 30 
gallons per head per day for the next 36 years. 
Mansergh for Birmingham – A model called the Decremental Rate of Increase is used in 
1892 to forecast demand 63 years ahead to 1955. 
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Comparisons are made of the forecasts and actual demands in Section 4.4. Bateman for 
Manchester: 
There are three water demand forecasts of note for Manchester made by Bateman. In 
summary, with comments about forecast accuracy, these are:- 
1. 1847: Demand was near 30 Ml/d, and growth in demand was 2 Ml/d per year. 
Bateman forecast in 1847 that demand 20 years hence in 1867 would be between 55 
and 68 Ml/d, and Bateman used this forecast as evidence of the need for the 
Longdendale scheme. Actual demand in 1867 was 60 Ml/d, and the accuracy of his 
1847 forecast was pointed out with some pride by Bateman to the Waterworks 
Committee in October 1868 (Bateman, 1868).  
2. 1868: In October 1868, Bateman forecast that demand would increase by 4.5 Ml/d per 
year, and reach the water resource drought yield capacity of Longdendale of c.110 
Ml/d “in about 8 or 9 years”. Also, there had been a drought in the summer of 1868 
when there was a temporary intermittent supply (for 12 hours a day for 84 days), and 
was evidence to support the urgent need for a new scheme. Actual growth remained 
near 2 Ml/d per year, and the forecast demand was only reached 22 years later. 
3. 1875: Bateman forecast growth of 4.5 Ml/d per year, and that demand of 182 Ml/d (40 
Mgd) or 227 Ml/d (50 Mgd) “or even more” would occur in the next 20 or 30 years. 
The basis for this forecast was a linear projection based on the most recent past two 
years where there had been growth in total demand of 5 Ml/d per year. Bateman 
presented his forecast as evidence to Parliament for the need for a remote storage 
scheme in the Lake District. 30 years later in 1905, actual demand reached 155 Ml/d. 
Bateman encouraged investment in water resources for the long term, and at the same 
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time was an advocate for building capacity to meet summer and winter peak demands. 
An extrapolated forecast beyond 30 years using 4.5 Ml/d per year is shown in Figure 
4.6 starting in 1879 when the Bill with the powers to construct Thirlmere was 
obtained. This shows that the gradient of his forecast matched the gradient of actual 
demand up to the end of World War 1, some 40 years later. In the presentation of the 
series of diagrams that follow, the actual annual average demand data is split to 
accentuate the relatively short data sets that the Victorians had on which to base their 
long term demand forecasts.   
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Figure 4.6 – Manchester, Annual Average Demands from 1855 to 1936, and forecast to 1930 made in 1879 
4.3.1 Thirlmere; Parliamentary Debate 1878 
The HoCSC Select Committee for the second reading (the first reading collapsed because of 
administrative errors) of the Manchester Water Bill, were instructed on Friday 15 February 
1878 thus:- 
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1. That they have the power to inquire into and report upon the present sufficiency of the 
water supply of Manchester, and its neighbourhood, and of any other sources available 
for such supply. 
2. To consider whether permission should be given to make use of any of the 
Westmoreland and Cumberland lakes for the purpose; and if so, how far, and what 
conditions. 
3. To consider the prospective requirements of the populations situated between the Lake 
District and Manchester. 
4. To inquire and report whether any, and if so which, provisions should be made in 
limitation of proposals for the exclusive use of the water of any of the said Lakes. 
The Committee reported: 
1. The population within the statutory area of supply is estimated at “nearly a million”. 
The available supply from Longdendale “will not be far from 25 Mgd (114 Ml/d) or 
about 25 gallons per head of the population within the area”. 
2. “Your Committee assume that 25 gallons per head form a fair supply for a district, and 
hence Manchester has at present a sufficient quantity of water for the city and its 
statutory area of supply”. 
3. “But the population is rapidly increasing. The houses within the inner district, supplied 
with water in detail, increase in number 5,300 annually, and the outer district supplied 
in bulk, by 2,200”. 
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4. “Calculating 5 people to a house, in 10 years more, there may be a population of 
1,337,000 with a water supply sufficient for 1,000,000. Considering that that a period 
of 10 years is not a very long time to bring a new system of water supply to a large 
district into efficient operation, your Committee came to the conclusion that 
Manchester is justified in seeking additional sources of supply”. 
5. “The question still remained whether it could not obtain this supply in its own vicinity, 
without going to the Lake District of Cumberland”. 
The following summarises the key points that arose during the hearing. 
Regarding rainfall records in Thirlmere catchment, Bateman disclosed that he had used 17 
years of data in a neighbouring catchment at Seathwaite to work out the inflow to Thirlmere. 
As noted in Section 2.2.6, the lack of adequate local rainfall data turned out to be major 
weakness, as the drought yield to supply from Thirlmere was reduced about 25 years later, 
from 227 Ml/d (50 Mgd) to 164 Ml/d (36 Mgd) (Walters,1936).  
The key piece of evidence about the demand forecast from Bateman read: “What I estimate is 
that at least 1,000,000 gallons a day (increase per year) will be required to meet the demand 
upon the Manchester Corporation for water”.  
Bateman’s view of the Thirlmere scheme was given: with a scheme for 227 Ml/d (50 Mgd) in 
mind, “there is no fear of the water supply failing the wants of Manchester for a very long 
period; the time will come if Manchester goes on prospering, and after our time, when more 
water will be required than even Thirlmere will give, but that will be a long time hence”. 
Dr William Pole gave evidence in support of Thirlmere. Regarding an estimate of total 
demand by Bateman, Dr. Pole remarked “I think, all things considered, Mr Bateman’s 
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calculation of 30 gallons is not out of the way, considering one third of it is intended for trade, 
and only 20 gallons for domestic supply…..taking the year where there has been greatest 
consumption, and allowing for the probability of the increase in demand (baths and water 
closets) it is not an excessive quantity to provide for”. 
The Select Committee accepted 7,500 new houses per year growth and an occupancy rate of 5 
persons per household. Thus the annual growth is of 37,500 people, and using a range of 
demand for total demand of 25 to 30 gallons per head per day: 
1. At 25 gallons/head/day, growth is 937,500 gallons/day/year. 
2. At 30 gallons/head/day, growth is 1,125,000 gallons/day/year. 
The growth forecast is very dependent on the assumed occupancy rate as, for example, an 
assumption of 4 persons per household and 30 gallons per head, the growth rate is 900,000 
gallons per day per year. 
4.3.2 Hawksley for Liverpool 
The only demand forecast considered in this project is that made in 1880 in support of 
Liverpool Corporation’s successful attempt to secure the powers to build the world’s largest 
masonry dam in the valley of the River Vyrnwy in North Wales.   
A discontinuous dataset of annual average demands for the Liverpool Corporation supply area 
has been constructed from 1857 to 1946. Figure 4.7 below shows these data with the 36 year 
demand forecast presented by Thomas Hawksley in 1880 to evidence the need for the Vyrnwy 
scheme. The 36 year horizon for this forecast was set by first assuming six years to construct 
Vyrnwy, and then adding 30 years as the period of time this asset was intended to last. The 
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data set  in 1880, which was significantly influenced by waste reduction, effectively ruled out 
demand based trend analysis for the forecast. 
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Figure 4.7 - Liverpool Corporation, Annual Average Demands, 1857 to 1946 
The data for 1857 and 1873 come from Beloe (1875), for 1864 to 1880 from Parry (1881), for 
1894 to 1880 from Parry (1899), for 1899 to 1900 from Liverpool Council proceedings, and 
the data for 1946 are derived from Liverpool Corporation’s “Red Book”. 
There are fewer actual demand data for Liverpool than for Manchester as there was poorer 
documentation of summary annual demand data at the Liverpool Records Office. 
The 1880 demand forecast was produced by making a forecast of population growth based on 
the recent growth trend (Figure 4.8), and multiplying the population forecast by a forecast of 
per capita demand (Figure 4.9), which includes all water use. 
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The population forecast of 1.5 million people for 1916 is shown in Figure 4.8, and by 1916, 
the diagram shows that the forecast was a substantial over-estimate of around 50%. 
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Figure 4.8 – Liverpool, Water Supply Population, Actual 1871 to 1946, and Forecast for 1916 in 1880 
The data source for the population forecast is Hawksley’s evidence given in 1880 to the Select 
Committee for the Liverpool Corporation Waterworks Bill (HoCSC, 1880) 
Expressing demand in a standardised gallons per head per day allowed the Victorians to make 
comparisons in respect of year on year change, and for showing the rank of  the water supply 
undertaking against others. The latter use was made both by Liverpool and Birmingham to 
demonstrate to their respective Select Committees that consumption was relatively low.  
In 1880, with Liverpool demand at 22.5 gallons per head per day, Hawksley argued that 30 
gallons was a fair forecast as London was already at 32.5 gallons (Parry, 1881). Parry also 
noted that the Manchester number was at the time only 20 gallons, but the Select Committee 
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was given the explanation that Liverpool was asserted to be a “water closet city”, whereas 
Manchester was not (Parry, 1881).  
Demand of 30 gallons per head per day had already been observed in 1864, and occurred 
again in the late 1890s, as shown in Figure 4.9.  
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Figure 4.9 - Liverpool Corporation, Actual Annual Average Demand expressed as Gallons per Head per 
Day from 1864 to 1946, and Forecast to 1916 from 1880 
Some new demand analysis which has been undertaken during this project, which is reported 
in Appendix E, has established that the two sets of Parry’s data are consistent, and that  the 30 
gallons per head per day demand figure in 1864 is confirmed as the result of high losses rather 
that high consumption. The year on year changes observed from 1865 to 1873 are likely to be 
due to data inaccuracy during this period when the Corporation could only offer an 
intermittent supply. The 1875 figure of 22.5 gallons per head per day is confirmed by the new 
analysis to be a significant reduction in waste. 
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The comparison of the 1880 demand forecast for Liverpool with those observed is shown in 
Figure 4.10. The gradient of the actual demands is shallower than the gradient of the.forecast.  
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Figure 4.10 – Liverpool, Annual Average Demand and Forecast, 1857 to 1946 
4.3.3 Vyrnwy; Parliamentary Debate 1890 
The case for Liverpool Corporation, which proposed the construction of the Vyrnwy dam and 
aqueduct scheme in North Wales, was made to a HoCSC in June 1880. Some comments that 
are relevant to supply and demand are summarised below.  
The present population supplied was 720,000, and assuming a demand of 25 gallons per 
person per day, a supply of at least 82 Ml/d (18 Mgd) was needed now. However, Counsel for 
the Corporation said “...no large town is satisfied with 25 gallons – it will do in moderately 
wet years, but not in dry years.”  The requirement of a new scheme was made clear: “...any 
supply which could not give us water for 30 years after we commenced impounding would 
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not be sufficiently large,…and it would be wise not to calculate on less than 30 gallons per 
head per day for all uses.”  
A projection of 6 years was made by both Hawksley and Bateman for the Vyrnwy scheme to 
come into operation, and thus the time for which the scheme was intended to meet growing 
demand was 6 + 30 years = 36 years. The current date was 1880, so the planned date for 
which the Vyrnwy should last was 1880 + 36 = 1916.  
Arriving at the population forecast for 1916 of 1,600,000 was described thus: “We have taken 
it from the number of consumers at the present moment, with additions at the average rate of 
increase over a period of 5 years, and in that way we should very nearly reach about 
1,600,000. 1,500,000 would be under the mark, and about 218 Ml/d (48 Mgd) for an adequate 
supply of water.” 
Hawksley himself provided assurance to the Select Committee; “I have no doubt that the 
population, plus the increments of the use of water for their own domestic purposes, will 
bring about the results that are contemplated by this Bill, namely the use of 218 Ml/d (48 
Mgd) within the districts supplied by Liverpool.”  
Many of the objectors to the scheme were given financial compensation in the Act after 
amendments. These included interests along the River Severn, as the River Vyrnwy is a major 
tributary. 
4.3.4  Population data for the Birmingham supply area 
A reliable estimate of current population in the supply area is always important for 
establishing the base for a demand forecast. In 1892, Birmingham Corporation produced 
estimates based on census data and house counts back to 1871, and as summarized in Table 
4.5.  
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Table 4.5 – Birmingham Corporation water supply population and housing estimates for 1871, 1881 and 
1891 
Year Supply Area: 
Inhabited Houses 
Supply Area: 
Population 
1871 89,457 449,384 
1881 109,813 561,537 
1891 129,188 647,972 
 
In 1891, Inhabited Houses (the term used by the Corporation) and Supply Area Population 
were both 45% higher than in 1871.  After 1891, boundary changes to the city (in 1909 and 
1911) increased the number of inhabitants by about 200,000, but the population in the area 
supplied remained substantially unchanged. The two data sets are plotted in Figure 4.11.  
 
Figure 4.11 – Population of Birmingham, 1801 to 1961 
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Figure 4.11 shows that the resident population estimates for the supply area from 1911 up to 
the 1930s were similar to the census figures for the city. In the 1940s and 50s, population 
grew faster in the dormitory towns such as Solihull, which were within the supply area, but 
not within the city. The 1801 – 1961 census data for the City of Birmingham is listed by Dick 
(2005), and the supply area population data appear in the annual accounts of the City of 
Birmingham Water Department (CBWD). There was no 1941 Census; the missing data in 
Figure 4.11 are interpolated. 
4.3.5 Mansergh for Birmingham 
In 1891, Mansergh assumed the responsibility for producing the 25 and 50-year total water 
demand forecasts for Birmingham. His method was to establish a base position of total 
demand, and then make an extrapolation. Rather than fit a straight line, or use a single 
percentage rate of increase, Mansergh started the extrapolation for years 1 to 10 with a 
compound rate of increase of 3% per annum (the current growth rate), and then reduced the 
rate by 0.25% in each succeeding decade, using a model that Mansergh termed the 
Decremental Rate of Increase (DRoI). Table 4.4 contains the profile of the DRoI parameters 
chosen by Mansergh, but it is not known exactly how Mansergh translated his forecast of 
measured and unmeasured demand into his choice of DRoI parameters. It is considered that 
judgement must have played a significant part. 
 
 
 
 
 Chapter 4 Victorian Approach 
 
 
109 
Table 4.6 – Mansergh’s annual growth factors for the Decremental Rate of Increase (Barclay, 1898) 
10 yrs @ 3.00% compound from 1890/91 to 1899/00 
10 yrs @ 2.75% compound from 1900/01 to 1909/10 
10 yrs @ 2.50% compound from 1910/11 to 1919/20 
10 yrs @ 2.25% compound from 1920/21 to 1929/30 
10 yrs @ 2.00% compound from 1930/31 to 1939/40 
10 yrs @ 1.75% compound from 1940/41 to 1949/50 
5 yrs @ 1.50% compound from 1950/51 to 1954/55 
 
Figure 4.12 shows the comparison of Mansergh’s DRoI based demand forecast made in 1892 
using the percentages in Table 4.2. The forecast is continued beyond 1955 up to 1985 using 
the reductions of 0.25% in 10 year intervals to reach a percentage growth rate of 0.75% in the 
1980s. The impression given by Figure 4.11 is that there was a remarkably similar rate of 
forecast and actual growth for over half a century.  
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Figure 4.12 – Birmingham Demands from 1877 to 1985; Mansergh’s 1892 Demand Forecast extrapolated 
to 1985 
It is interesting and constructive to consider the downward step applied by Mansergh to the 
growth factor in the “Decremental Ratio of Increase” forecasting model. For example, an 
arbitrary 0.5% step produces a lower forecast profile than for 0.25%. Both are shown in 
Figure 4.13 together with the straight-line projection based on the 15 years of actual data from 
1876 to 1891. 
A comparison of the three projections in Figure 4.13 for the first 20 years to 1912 shows that 
there is little difference between them. Thereafter, an increasing gap develops between the 
0.25% and 0.5% profiles, especially after 1942 when the 0.5% profile flattens as it approaches 
its maximum at 190 Ml/d. The 0.25% profile at this time is growing at its maximum rate of 
near 5 Ml/d per annum, which is the same as the growth rate of actual demand through to 
1955. 
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Figure 4.13 – Decremental rate of increase – comparison of 0.25% and 0.5% growth rate reductions at 10 
year intervals 
There was no challenge by the HoCSC to Mansergh’s assumption of 0.25% steps or the 10 
year intervals.  The first phase of Elan storage was worth 205 Ml/d (45 Mgd) as a drought 
year water supply, and had Mansergh adopted the 0.5% profile showing a maximum demand 
of 190 Ml/d, the case for developing the second phase of storage at Claerwen could not have 
been made. The linear extrapolation in Figure 4.13 is close to the 0.5% profile up to the late 
1930s, and by 1955 is very close to actual demand. This result is a coincidence, and not 
indicative that this straight line forecast should have been used. Conceptually, a demand 
forecast derived by using the DRoI method is more attractive than an infinitely long straight 
line as it can produce an upper limit of growth. This appears to have been tacitly accepted by 
the Corporation although there is no solid evidence for this.   
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Mansergh at first provided the HoCSC a 50 year forecast for the year 1940 of 237 Ml/d (52 
Mgd). However, he advised the HoCSC that his time horizon for the full scheme could be 60 
or 70 years as “the end of the world is not to come in 1940”. This comment was made to 
emphasise that if the Corporation was to make provision for at least 50 years, the need was for 
the full Elan scheme. From then on, the HoCSC considered Mansergh’s annual average 
demand forecast for 1955 of 305 Ml/d (67 Mgd). Using Mansergh’s population forecast of 
1.62m for 1955, his implicit daily average total per capita demand forecast was 188 litres per 
head (equivalent to 41 gallons per head).     
Mansergh approached his forecast by producing a trend of observed average annual supply. 
He selected the most recent data from 1883 to 1889, which gave him a growth factor of three 
percent per annum, and the starting growth figure shown in Table 4.1. Data prior to 1883 
existed, but he explained that in the late 1870s and early 1880s, public water supplies grew 
abnormally quickly at more than 4% per annum. At this time, the Corporation condemned 
many polluted private wells, and replaced these supplies with mains water. This high rate 
replacement had already diminished, and he dropped these data from his analysis. For within-
year weather related demand effects, Mansergh referred to the City Engineer, J. W. Gray‘s 
experience that a dry summer could add another 20 to 25% to demand, and that this level of 
demand would very shortly be unsupportable by the existing water sources and storage. 
Birmingham’s situation was in such trouble that Mansergh told the HoCSC that it was 
“palpable that some works must be done at once”. 
Mansergh argued that water demand in Birmingham was relatively low compared with 
London and Glasgow. He assessed the average daily domestic demand per head for 
Birmingham at 77 litres (17 gallons); his calculation took the total average daily supply of 
117 litres per head (25.75 gallons per head), and then subtracted 40 litres per head (8.75 
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gallons per head) for trade use, public sanitary purposes, sand washing, fountains, fires, 
flushing mains and street watering. However in more affluent London, the average daily 
domestic demand had been recently estimated to be 112 litres per head (24.75 gallons per 
head). The 77 litres (17 gallons) domestic per capita figure for Birmingham was described by 
Mansergh as “a very reasonable amount, and in future will be considerably increased. 
Nowadays, baths and hot water apparatus are being put into houses of much smaller rental 
than they used to be”. Mansergh estimated that domestic demand in towns with no water 
closets was 59 to 65 litres per head per day (13 to 14 gallons per head per day).  
Glasgow’s total average daily supply of 214 to 227 litres per head (47 to 50 gallons per head) 
was much higher than in Birmingham, which Glasgow city engineer James Gale said was due 
to the influx of new industries attracted by the introduction of soft water supply from Loch 
Katrine; industrial demand had trebled reaching 77 litres per head per day. This evidence 
fortified the belief that soft water from Wales would have the same effect in Birmingham; 
starting from a higher base than Glasgow, Mansergh assumed 91 litres per head per day for 
the Birmingham forecast. The social and economic reasons for the greater potential for 
industrial growth in late Victorian Birmingham compared with Manchester has been 
highlighted by Briggs (1968) as being the great diversity of occupations, a skilled workforce 
and small workshops rather than large factories. 
Although it is not clear how he used these figures to develop his forecast, Mansergh 
confirmed that in his experience, his demand assumptions were “reasonable” and the way he 
used them in his evidence demonstrated that he understood their significance. However, he 
did not present an accurate view of losses. He asserted, “I am quite certain that there is no 
preventable waste (in Birmingham) at all”. The success of the waste control initiatives that 
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were introduced during the construction period for Elan contradicts Mansergh’s view. Clearly 
a statement like this would not go unchallenged today.   
The usual response by a water undertaker at that time to the prospect of growth outstripping 
supply was to develop new supplies, but there were few suitable local opportunities in 
Birmingham. A substantial waste minimisation programme was started in the 1890s, and 
continued after the first phase of the Elan scheme was commissioned in 1904.  Section 4.4 
concludes that without the waste minimization programme before World War I, the surge in 
demand to meet the war effort would have presented an even more serious supply problem.   
4.3.6 Elan; Parliamentary Debate 1892  
Even though requested to do so by the HoCSC Select Committee, Mansergh refused at an 
early stage of the hearing to give a population forecast for Birmingham in 1955 on the 
grounds that he had not explicitly used a population forecast to develop his demand forecast. 
However, some speculative population forecasts for 1955 were offered to the HoCSC by 
Howard Smith, (an internal auditor appearing for the Corporation), of between 1.35 million 
and 2 million. When pressed later by the House of Lords, Mansergh reluctantly suggested a 
figure of 1.62m (a compound increase of 1.5% per annum) as “not unreasonable”. As we now 
know, these estimates all turned out high, but they were compensated in the forecast by under-
estimates of per capita demand growth. Figure 4.11 shows the supply area population peaked 
and flattened in the 1950s at 1.25 million and since then, the population stabilised. 
With regard to rainfall estimates, Mansergh recognized that in the past “great mistakes have 
been made by overestimating the quantity of rainfall” and that “I am not more careful than my 
experience leads me to be.” On several occasions when giving evidence, and under cross 
examination, Mansergh used the first person “I” to confirm that the opinion and experience 
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was his, and the word “safe” to imply that his approach was balanced. Mansergh admitted that 
his judgment might, in the fullness of time, prove to be wrong. 
Potential uncertainty in the under-estimation of the 3 dry years rainfall on the Elan catchment 
was raised in cross-examination of Mansergh. After clarifying that a minimum quantity of 
450 Ml/d was assumed as the 3 dry years runoff figure from the Elan and Claerwen 
catchments, Moon (Counsel for the opposition) asked Mansergh that if he subsequently found 
out that “Mr Lloyd’s water gauges (i.e. rain gauges) have led you astray, and that more water 
falls on that area than you expect, what might be the under-calculation? A little perhaps?” The 
dialogue (HoCSC, 1892) continued thus: 
Moon – “545 Ml/d (120 Mgd)?” 
Mansergh - “Certainly not.” 
Moon – “500 Ml/d (110 Mgd)?” 
Mansergh – “Certainly not.” 
Moon – 477 Ml/d (105 Mgd)? 
Mansergh – “I might go to 477 Ml/d (105 Mgd)” 
Mansergh was confident in the knowledge that 20 years of rainfall records was a huge 
advantage to narrow the range of error. His judgment at the time, based on the short dialogue 
above, was that an under-measurement of 6% was possible. It is interesting to note that in 
Binnie’s estimation of annual average rainfall paper to ICE in 1892, the range of error with 20 
years of record is given as ± 3%. Assuming that the percentage rainfall error approximates to 
the runoff error, Mansergh could have justified an upper range of 464 Ml/d (102 Mgd). 
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However, Binnie’s paper was presented on 22 March 1892, just 9 days before the start of 
Select Committee’s hearing on 31 March. 
Mr Pember, the Counsel for opponents London County Council, argued that a decision about 
Birmingham’s scheme should be deferred for a year until the latest Royal Commission had 
reported about the much larger issue of London’s future water supply.  Pember asked 
Mansergh that if Birmingham was allowed to develop the Elan scheme, how many people 
could be served from potential reservoirs elsewhere in Wales. Mansergh’s response was “Oh 
dear, about 200 million.” Summarizing his argument recommending that Parliament should 
pause, Pember’s primary objections were: 
1. The Elan scheme is too large for Birmingham; 
2. There are other places that need water;  
3. Birmingham is safe for the next 10 years.               
Pember suggested Mansergh’s demand forecast of 67 Mgd for 1955 was too high, and that a 
more realistic forecast range was from 30 Mgd minimum to 40 Mgd maximum. Pember’s 
view was based on a population forecast assumption of 1.6 million people, which had been 
tacitly accepted by Mansergh as possible. There was an inferred range of 19 to 23 gallons per 
head per day of per capita demand, which were comparatively low. 
The range of uncertainty in the demand forecast for 1955 can be assessed using the data and 
information presented by witnesses to the Select Committee. The matrix in Table 4.7 assumes 
a range for the population forecast from 1.3 to 2.0 million, and a range for Non-Domestic use 
between 8.75 and 20.25 gallons per head per day. Average domestic demand is assumed to be 
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25 gallons per head per day, and +20% of average domestic demand to produce a peak 
demand. 
Table 4.7 – Matrix showing the range of alternative demand forecasts for Birmingham that could have 
been made in 1892 for 1955 
 
 
 
 
Non-Domestic 
Scenarios: 
1955 Pop Forecast: 2.0 
x  0.65 (1891) 
1.3 m (+10k /year) 
 
Demand Forecast 
Average  (Peak) 
1955 Pop Forecast: 2.5 
x 0.65  
1.6 m (Mansergh) 
 
Demand Forecast 
Average  (Peak) 
1955 Pop Forecast: 3 x 
0.65 
2.0 m (H Smith) 
 
Demand Forecast 
Average  (Peak) 
1.  1891 existing: 
8.75 g/head/day 
44 Mgd    (50) 54 Mgd    (62) 67 Mgd    (77) 
2.   2 x 1891  
17.5 g/head/day 
55 Mgd    (61) 68 Mgd     (76) 85 Mgd    (95) 
3.   1891 plus Gale 
20.25 g/head/day 
 Or 91 litres/head/day 
58 Mgd    (64) 72 Mgd     (80) 90 Mgd    (100) 
 
The matrix in Table 4.7 shows the minimum average demand forecast is 44 Mgd, and the 
maximum is 90 Mgd. This range is clearly above Pember’s estimate for 1955 of 30 to 40 
Mgd. Mansergh’s figure of 67 Mgd is mid-range.  
4.4 Supply and Demand Outcomes  
In Section 4.3, the Victorian engineers’ long-term demand forecasting approaches were 
researched, and the accuracy of their forecasts was examined. The planned and the actual 
water resource availability are now brought together with the forecast and the actual demands. 
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4.4.1 Thirlmere and Manchester – Supply and Demand Balance 1855 to 1936  
Whilst the powers to develop the Thirlmere scheme were obtained in 1879, the Corporation 
did not start construction until 1884. There was a summer drought that year, and Bateman 
warned the Corporation that the Longdendale reservoirs may not refill over the following 
winter. Bateman’s report triggered the Corporation into action. 
The actual construction period over-ran the planned period by five years. This is shown in 
Figure 4.14 by the five year difference of the planned (1889) and actual (1894) years for 
Thirlmere to come on stream. For the total water resource in Figure 4.14, Bateman’s planned 
drought yield of 227 Ml/d for the Thirlmere scheme has been added to 111 Ml/d for 
Longdendale, and the total plotted as 339 Ml/d. The Thirlmere scheme had a “planned life” of 
55 years from 1879 until 1934, the latter year being when the extrapolated demand forecast 
meets the planned drought availability. 
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Figure 4.14 – Thirlmere and Manchester, Resources and Demands, 1855 to 1936 
The reduction of the Thirlmere drought yield from 227 Ml/d to 164 Ml/d (Walters, 1936) 
reduces the planned life to 42 years, as it lasts from 1879 to 1921. It has been shown 
indicatively in Figure 4.14 as occurring in 1910. No formal announcement about the reduction 
has been found. 
4.4.2 Vyrnwy and Liverpool – Supply and Demand 1857 to 1946 
The drought yield figure from 1894 onwards is plotted in Figure 4.15 as 232 Ml/d. The three 
components are Rivington 35 Ml/d (7.7 Mgd), Vyrnwy 182 Ml/d (40 Mgd), and local wells 
15 Ml/d (3.3 Mgd) (Mansergh 1901). 
 Chapter 4 Victorian Approach 
 
 
120 
0.0
50.0
100.0
150.0
200.0
250.0
300.0
350.0
18
57
18
62
18
67
18
72
18
77
18
82
18
87
18
92
18
97
19
02
19
07
19
12
19
17
19
22
19
27
19
32
19
37
19
42
Years
Re
so
u
rc
es
 
an
d 
Av
er
ag
e 
An
n
u
al
 
De
m
an
d 
M
l/D
Demand pre 1880 Demand post 1880 Infill data pre 1880
Infill data post 1880 Demand Forecast Planned Riv + Vyrnwy 
Actual Riv + Vyrnwy
 
Figure 4.15 – Liverpool Vyrnwy, Resources and Demands, 1857 to 1946 
Figure 4.15 shows how critical the Vyrnwy scheme was to Liverpool Corporation. The 
intersection of the demand forecast and the enhanced water resources occurs in 1925, which is 
31 years after the first flow from Vyrnwy. The Corporation wanted a scheme to last for a 
minimum of 30 years, and this objective was met.         
4.4.3 Elan and Birmingham – Supply and Demand 1877 to 1984 
A similarity of Elan with the two other Victorian schemes is the over-running construction 
phase. In 1892, Mansergh believed that the first stage of the Elan scheme could be constructed 
in 8 to10 years, and in fact it took 12 years to reach the first flow to Birmingham in 1904. 
From 1904 onwards, the drought yield figure plotted in Figure 4.16 contains only the Elan 
yield. All the local sources operating before 1904 are assumed to be decommissioned, 
mothballed, or available only in emergency.    
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Figure 4.16 – Birmingham Elan, Resources and Demands, 1877 to 1985 
The second stage of reservoir development saw one large reservoir at Claerwen that exceeded 
the original storage provision, and provided more drought resource. The schematic in Figure 
2.4 shows the full scheme including Claerwen.   
4.4.4 Birmingham; Disaggregated Supply and Demand 1897 to 1955 
For this comparison, the 63-year period of the forecast and observed demands were divided 
into 6 sub-periods, as shown in Figure 4.17, and summarized in Table 4.8. 
 Chapter 4 Victorian Approach 
 
 
122 
 
Figure 4.17 – Birmingham Water Demands: Mansergh’s 1892 forecast and actual demands from 1876 to 
1955 
Table 4.8 – Summary of six periods for comparison shown in Figure 4.17 
Period No of Years Key Features 
1.  1891 - 1903 12 yrs Demand flat, growth held by demand management 
2.  1904 – 1913 10 yrs Actual growth = Forecast growth 
3.  1914 – 1922 9 yrs Peak in 1917/18 during WW1, then fall. 
4.  1923 – 1937 15 yrs Actual growth = Forecast growth 
5.  1938 – 1944 7 yrs Peak in 1942/43 during WW2, then fall   
6.  1945 – 1954 10 yrs Actual growth = Forecast growth 
1891/2 – 1954/5 63 years Actual growth 180 Ml/d; Forecast growth 240 Ml/d 
 
The datasets used to construct Figure 4.17 come from the annual reports produced by the City 
of Birmingham Water Department (CBWD). The annual total water supplied and the annual 
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measured demands are derived from meter readings. The average annual unmeasured water 
demand (mostly household water use, some trade and industry, and waste) is the residual from 
the subtraction of the measured demand from the total water supplied. Their movements over 
these six periods help to explain how Birmingham developed in the first half of the twentieth 
century. 
Period 1: 1891 to 1903 - From 1891 up to 1903 before Elan first came on stream, measured 
demand was steady. Unmeasured demands grew more slowly than might have been expected 
given that population growth at this time was approximately 20,000 per annum, or 3% per 
year. The explanation for this lies in the response made by Birmingham Corporation when 
faced with an increasing risk of running out of water during the Elan construction period. The 
Water Committee had two strategic options; either to invest in the enhancement of output 
from local sources, or attempt to control demand. Barclay describes how the Water 
Committee felt at that time that something should be done to increase supply. After the failure 
of trial borings, “it is feared that there are no other sources of supply on which the 
Corporation can draw, and the Water Department will find it very difficult to keep the 
population fully supplied”.  
The introduction of demand management was more successful. In 1893, the Water Committee 
instructed that all 155,000 properties in the supply area should be inspected to prevent as 
much waste as possible. This serious undertaking was, as reported by Barclay in 1898 as 
“abundantly justified by the result” since it had quickly provided an annual saving of 6 Ml/d 
(500 million gallons per year), and also saved the Corporation pumping costs. The annual 
statement of accounts for 1898 from the CBWD shows that the new team of waste inspectors 
found 14,000 cases of waste from faulty fittings per year. By 1904, the figure had reached 
31,000 cases per year. The throughput at an existing testing facility for water fittings was 
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increased – some 57,000 were tested in 1898 rising to 160,000 in 1904. By 1904, these 
activities had the desired effect of constraining total demand growth by up to 14 Ml/d.  
Period 2: 1904 to 1913 - Elan water was first introduced in 1904, and the growth in this 
period was primarily unmeasured demand. The population continued to grow at 3% per year, 
and waste prevention continued at the pre-Elan rates, but measured demand remained steady 
for the 10 years until the onset of World War 1. This could be considered unexpected as one 
of Mansergh’s arguments for the Welsh scheme was that new industry would be attracted by 
the soft water, it being preferable for use in boilers.  
Period 3: 1914 to 1922 - With the onset of World War I, dramatic rises occurred in both 
measured and unmeasured demand. The increase in total demand (5% per year) was the 
fastest since the Corporation took over the Birmingham Waterworks Company in 1875. 
Birmingham had the companies, skills and the workforce to manufacture the needs for war. 
Furthermore, waste inspections were curtailed, the CBWD accounts showing in 1916 that 
only 11,000 cases of faulty fittings causing waste were found. In May 1916, total demand was 
120 Ml/d and rising, the maximum capacity of the twin piped aqueduct was surpassed, and 
full use was being made of standby sources. In his Annual Report for 1915/16, Antony Lees, 
the Secretary to the Water Committee stated:  
“It is now realised that the consequence of the increase in consumption of water being more 
rapid than anticipated, exceeding in fact the rate of increase for revenue, the third main on the 
aqueduct will be required earlier than was expected…. as regards the immediate future, it is 
clear that in view of the war conditions, the provision of the third main must be indefinitely 
postponed…..the increased consumption entails the cost of additional pumping from old 
sources….a considerable expenditure at Plants Brook (an old local surface source) will have 
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to be faced to render that station again available for use. On the above grounds, it seems to me 
impossible to make a forecast which will be of any practical value”. 
Mansergh’s original plan was for the third main to be available by this time, but the Water 
Committee had been overtaken by events, and total annual average demand peaked in 
1917/18 at 134 Ml/d. Following the war, both measured and unmeasured demands were in 
sharp decline until 1922/23, when demand returned to the 1914/15 level. 
Period 4: 1923 to 1937 - The inter-war period witnessed population growth of near 1% per 
annum; in 1929/30, the number of people supplied by the Corporation was estimated to have 
reached 1 million. In spite of the Great Depression, the total demand growth rate returned to 
that forecast by Mansergh, and the actual demand increase over the period of 80 Ml/d being 
equally split between measured and unmeasured demand. The third main was completed, and 
after a summer drought in 1937, the Corporation begun the preparation for the second phase 
of raw water storage provision for the single reservoir at Claerwen. Mansergh’s original plan 
had been for three small reservoirs. 
Period 5: 1938 to 1944 - The outbreak of World War II caused the construction of Claerwen 
to be deferred. A spike in demand occurred again, peaking this time at 200 Ml/d in 1942/43, 
followed by another fall.  
Period 6: 1945 to 1955 - The period from 1945 to 1955 saw total demand growth returning to 
the Mansergh forecast rate. Nearly all of the growth of 50 Ml/d was measured demand, and it 
was the fastest sustained growth outside of wartime at any time since 1892. Unmeasured 
demand growth became flat as the supply area population levelled off. 
In summary, over the 63 years from Mansergh’s forecast in 1892 to the end of the forecast 
period in 1955, population supplied doubled from 600,000 to 1.2 million. Unmeasured 
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demand more than doubled from 60 Ml/d to 135 Ml/d, and measured demand increased by a 
factor of 7 from 13 Ml/d to 105 Ml/d. The proportion of unmeasured to measured demand in 
1892 was approximately 85%:15%, and by 1954/55, it was approaching 50%:50%, thus 
showing how significant industrial and commercial growth has been to the development of 
Birmingham’s economy. Total demand increased by a factor of 3.5 from 70 Ml/d to 239 Ml/d, 
whereas the forecast was near 4.5 times higher at 305 Ml/d. In 1955 this represents a positive 
gap of 28%, which is shown in Table 4.9. 
Table 4.9 – Annual average actual and forecast PCC for Birmingham in 1955 
 Actual in 1955 Actual PCC 
Litres per 
head per day 
Mansergh 
Forecast for 
1955 
Implied 
Forecast 
Litres per 
head per day 
Per Cent 
Difference; 
Forecast vs. 
Actual 
Population 1.23 million  1.62 million  + 32% 
Total Supply 239 Ml/d  305 Ml/d  +28% 
Total as PCC  194  188 - 3% 
Unmeasured  101  97 - 4% 
Measured  93  91 - 2% 
 
There may be evidence that Mansergh’s implied PCC forecasts for 1955 were well judged. In 
row 3 in Table 4.7, the measured forecast PCC of 91 litres was Mansergh’s estimate. The 
unmeasured forecast of 97 litres is the subtraction of 91 from 188 litres. However, the close 
match of PCC figures is only possible using Mansergh’s overestimated population forecast. 
Looking at sensitivity, to produce a similar match using the actual population figure implies a 
much higher total supply PCC value of 248 litres. Or, using the 1955 actual supply figure with 
Mansergh’s population forecast implies an improbably low PCC of 148 litres. Without 
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experience, using judgement to produce a joint PCC and population forecast carried a high 
risk of getting the long-term final year average annual demand seriously wrong. 
The profiles of forecast and actual growth from 1904 to 1955 become closer with the removal 
of the observed demand management effects prior to the commissioning of Elan. This is 
shown in Figure 4.18 where Mansergh’s forecast has been translated from an 1892 start to 
begin in 1904. 
 
Figure 4.18 – 1892 forecast translated to 1904 start compared with actual demands 
The gap between forecast and actual demand in 1955 is then reduced to only 7%, which is 
remarkably close and a testimony to Mansergh’s judgement. 
4.4.5 Modern critical review of the Elan scheme 
Coopey (2000) and Roberts (2000, 2006, 2007) provide a contemporary Welsh reflection on 
English dam developments, particularly in North Wales. A key theme is the importance of the 
English perception of Welsh water purity. Along with Liverpool, Birmingham Corporation 
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marketed the notion of the purity of Welsh water to convince a sceptical public of the need for 
an expensive scheme, and that the resultant cleansing would be moral as well as physical. 
Roberts remarks that even today, bottled water from Wales is branded as coming from a 
desolate rural place with its consumption leading to better health.    
Far from the unchallenged admiration of the Birmingham engineers by many earlier writers, 
Coopey sees the Elan scheme as a “reflection of the power of the political-engineering nexus 
in Birmingham between 1870 and 1890 and its ambitions and ideologies.” The picture 
Coopey presents is of the Corporation exhibiting imperialism and determination. The 
Corporation defeated the local opposition by presenting the science and engineering data, and 
the demographic projections, as certainties which could not be resisted. Today, with much 
better organised and resourced interest groups, an understanding of the uncertainties of supply 
and demand projections are pivotal to the arguments supporting and opposing new water 
resource schemes.  
Coopey describes how objectors on the River Wye were pacified by Mansergh’s “pre-emptive 
engineering” of the Carreg-Ddu dam design, which ensured that the storage in lower Caban 
was for compensation to the Wye, and not for supply to Birmingham. Whilst agreeing that 
Mansergh was a clever engineer, Coopey does not express admiration.  
Coopey gives us his insight to the self-interested motives of the civic politicians and 
engineers, but he does not pass judgement on whether the Elan scheme was worthwhile. He 
does, however, assert that Hassard’s alternative Ithon and Teme scheme was “cheaper, less 
risky, more useable water, and less disruptive of local communities.” This is not referenced, 
and so remains an assertion. Perhaps his motive was to place doubt in the reader’s mind about 
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Birmingham’s competence to choose the most economic and least environmentally damaging 
scheme.    
Roberts’s recent papers argue that the commemoration of waterworks was for the display of 
civic unity, and that 19th century dam building was an exercise in modernisation and the 
progress of mankind. This was at a time when Welsh nationalism was focussed more on 
playing a part in the government of the British Empire than opposing the English Victorians 
notion of modernity.  
Roberts notes an inter-war ideological shift when the nationalists showed a clear anti-modern 
anti-urban streak. Nationalist opposition in the 1950s and early 60s to Liverpool’s reservoir at 
Llyn Celyn produced a defining moment at the opening ceremony. The nationalists sabotaged 
the microphones, and the event only lasted three minutes. As a reflection of our now more 
enlightened environmental age, Liverpool issued an apology in 2005 for forcing this scheme 
through. It is believed that in recent times, the issue of an apology from Birmingham for Elan 
has not been raised. 
4.5 Summary of the Victorian Approach 
The analysis presented in this chapter has provided the pictures of supply and demand before 
and after the three Victorian reservoir schemes were built. There is a focus on the analysis of 
the demand forecasts made, and the approaches used by the Victorian engineers. Bateman 
used extrapolation from historic supply data for Manchester’s demand forecast. For 
Liverpool, Hawksley used the population growth trend, and Mansergh used a novel method 
for Birmingham called the Decremental Ratio of Increase. The growth profiles of forecast and 
actual demand for Birmingham are surprisingly good. 
 Chapter 4 Victorian Approach 
 
 
130 
A conclusion is emerging that the Victorian engineers did not explicitly quantify and factor in 
risk and uncertainty into their demand forecasts. They recognised that there were risks, but 
their approaches were pragmatic and necessarily deterministic because alternative statistical 
approaches were only in their infancy.  
For this project, a method is required for expressing quantitatively the risk and uncertainty of 
a reservoir design size. A novel “lag-time” approach is developed that uses the actual and 
forecast supply and demand balance. The approach is explained and applied to the three 
Victorian reservoir schemes in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 5 LAG-TIME MODEL 
Chapter 5 develops an approach that enables comparisons to be made of the relative risk 
averseness of the Victorian schemes design storage sizes. The method is based on data 
abstracted from supply and demand graphs, and is novel. This new lag-time model approach 
has been developed for this project to address Knowledge Gap B, and to meet the quantitative 
elements of the second project objective. 
5.1 Introduction  
In order to quantify the relative effectiveness of a scheme design, a mechanism that involves 
extracting data from the supply and demand diagrams has been devised by the author. A lag-
time model, which requires the evaluation of a novel “planned life” and “lag-time” for each 
scheme, is developed in Section 5.2. 
The planned life is defined as the period of time which starts in the year when the powers to 
construct a scheme are obtained, and finishes in the year when the intersection occurs between 
supply and demand plus target headroom. The lag time is defined as the period of time that 
starts in the year when the planned life ends, and ends when actual supply and demand lines 
intersect. The actual life of a scheme is the sum of the planned life and the lag time.    
To help explain the new terminology, an indicative supply and demand diagram is given in 
Figure 5.1. The planned life of scheme A is 14 years (from year 1 to 15 on the x-axis), and the 
lag-time of scheme A is 15 years (from year 15 to year 30). The actual life of scheme A is 29 
years, which is the addition of planned life and lag-time. This interpretation of the supply 
demand balance is new, and makes use of a model that is used widely to portray forecast and 
observed water supply and water demand data.  
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Figure 5.1 - Indicative Supply and Demand Diagram showing how the Planned Life and Lag-Time for 
Scheme A are estimated. 
Simplified annotated diagrams are shown in Sections 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 that identify the start 
and finishing times for estimating the planned life and lag-time for each of the three Victorian 
schemes of Thirlmere Vyrnwy and Elan schemes. The more detailed supply and demand 
diagrams from Section 4.4 are reprised below each annotated diagram to assist the analysis.   
To enable comparisons of scheme effectiveness, two new expressions of normalised “Time 
Ratios” and “Flow Ratios” are derived in Section 5.6 for each scheme, and the results are 
analysed and discussed in Section 5.7.  
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5.2 Planned Life and Lag-Time 
5.2.1 Planned Life 
The planned life of a scheme could start at any time over a range of years. For comparing the 
planned lives of schemes, the starting year needs to be selected in a systematic way. The 
starting points that were considered are:  
1) The time when the Corporation chose to develop the scheme. 
2) When the scheme was first taken to Parliament. 
3) When the Bill that authorised the scheme received Royal Assent. 
4) When construction started. 
5) When the first flow occurred. 
6) When the scheme was fully commissioned. 
Number 3 was chosen as it has a specific date, and the Bill will include any special conditions 
required by Parliament. The reasons for rejecting the other 5 options were as follows: 
Number 1 is interesting for comparing the lead times of schemes, but can be difficult to define 
accurately enough from historic documents.  
Numbers 2 and 3 are similar, but Number 2 would miss the occasions when there were 
failures at the Parliamentary stage.  
Number 4; defining the time when construction started begs the question of which element of 
the scheme was started.  
Number 5 was next best, as the time is specific. However, the time is not linked to the time 
during which the planning and design stages were undertaken.  
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Number 6 is similarly removed from the planning and design, and has the added uncertainty 
of being unable to find a date which formally commissions some or all of the water resources 
elements of the scheme. 
The end of the planned life of a scheme occurs when the drought output from a scheme was 
forecast to be fully utilised. This is at the intersection in the supply and demand diagram of 
the projected additional drought yield of the scheme with the demand forecast. The demand 
forecast includes the target headroom calculated when the scheme gained parliamentary 
approval. The target headroom in Figure 5.1 for scheme A is shown as the distance from Point 
F2 to Point F1. 
To obtain the intersection that marks the end date for the planned life, the horizons of the 
demand forecasts need to be extended. The forecasts for Manchester and Liverpool were 
linearly extrapolated beyond their 40 and 36 year horizons up to 50 years. For Birmingham, 
using Mansergh’s parameters in his Declining Ratio of Increase forecasting method, the 
forecast was extended by 10 years from 63 years to 73 years. Whilst these extrapolations 
appear reasonable, more uncertainty is introduced to the accurate estimation of the end-date. 
Summarising, the end date of the planned life is the same as the start date of the lag-time.    
The length of the planned life provides an indicator of boldness and confidence in a scheme. 
The longer the planned life, the greater the uncertainty as to when the planned life will 
actually end. The length of time it takes to deliver such long-term infrastructure investments, 
and estimating how long they will last, was a judgment call by the Victorian engineers. They 
were not to know, and factor in, the timing and impact on water demand of wars, and of 
economic boom and bust. For all three schemes, there was ultimately a margin of safety. This 
margin is the Lag-Time of a scheme. 
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5.2.2   Lag-Time 
The lag-time is the period of time from when the planned life ends to when the actual full 
utilisation of the scheme occurs. Therefore lag-time can only be calculated in retrospect, and 
is an indicator of how well, or how badly, the design and the outcome are matched. The end-
date of the lag-time occurs when the drought year water resource capability of the scheme 
under review intersects with actual demand in the supply demand diagram.  
Actual demands in most years will be near normal, but the effect of prolonged hot weather, or 
thawing after winter frosts, normally lead to demands that are well above normal. During 
abnormally warm weather and with an intermittent supply, there is uncertainty about what the 
true unconstrained demand might have been. Peak week summer demands in Birmingham, 
where there was a constant supply, were reported to be over 20% greater than average during 
the late 1880s. Analysis of Bateman’s monthly demand data from Manchester shows that it is 
reasonable to add up to a further 5% to the annual average demand in a dry year.  
5.3 Application of LTM to the Three Victorian Schemes 
5.3.1 Thirlmere: Application of Lag-Time Model 
Two scenarios of water resource availability are modelled. Scenario A uses the Thirlmere 
output of 227 Ml/d (50 Mgd) assumed by Bateman in his original design. Scenario B is for the 
revised output of 164 Ml/d (36 Mgd). This revision is shown in the reprised Figure 4.14 as 
occurring at an arbitrary time of 1910, but the choice of the date is immaterial to the 
estimation of planned life and lag-time shown below.    
From Figure 5.2, the planned life of scenario A is 54 years (from 1879 to 1934), which is 
from the year when the parliamentary powers were obtained, up to the year where the 
horizontal supply line intersects Bateman’s extrapolated demand forecast at Point A1. 
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The planned life of scenario B is shorter at 40 years (1879 to 1919), which again assumes the 
scheme start date of 1879, but this time there is an intersection with the extrapolated demand 
forecast that occurs at Point B1. 
The lag-time of A starts at 1933, but the end date cannot be estimated as actual supply and 
actual demand fail to intersect. The lag-time for B is 10 years, which is shown in Figure 5.2 
from the planned intersection at Point B1 in 1919, along to the actual “lagged” intersection at 
Point B2 in 1929.           
Figure 5.2 - Thirlmere: Planned life and Lag-Time 
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Figure 5.3 - Thirlmere reprise of 4.14 
The lag-time for Bateman’s planned scheme is likely to be more than 50 years, and so the 
actual life would be at least 100 years. With the revised lower Thirlmere drought output 
capability, the lag-time is about 10 years from the early 1920s to the early 1930s, and the 
actual life working out at near 50 years.  
5.3.2 Vyrnwy: Application of Lag-Time Model 
The Vyrnwy Works Act was passed in 1880, and a 12 year construction period followed. The 
planned construction period was 6 years, and this difference is shown in Figures 5.3 and 5.4.  
An extrapolated linear demand forecast is required to calculate the planned life of Vyrnwy at 
45 years (from 1880 to 1925). The lag-time is 15 to 20 years (from 1925 to the early 1940s); a 
figure of 18 years is used in later calculations. The actual life becomes 63 years. A refinement 
of this range could be achieved with more actual demand data in the 1920s and 1930s. 
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Figure 5.4 - Vyrnwy Planned Life and Lag-Time 
 
Figure 5.5 - Vyrnwy reprise of 4.15 
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5.3.3 Elan: Application of Lag-Time Model 
As described in Chapter 2, there were originally six dams in Mansergh’s design for Elan. The 
first three dams had a drought yield of 205 Ml/d (45 Mgd), and are referred to here and in 
Figure 5.6 as Stage 1.  
Using Figure 5.6, the planned life for Stage 1 (labelled A in Figure 5.6) of Mansergh’s design 
was 40 years (from 1892 to 1932 shown as Point A1 in Figure 5.6. There is a lag-time of 10 
years from 1932 to 1942 (Point A1 to Point A2 in Figure 5.6.), making the actual life of 50 
years.  
Stage 1 plus Stage 2 (labelled B in Figure 5.6) of Mansergh’s original design was for a 
drought yield of 314 Ml/d. The planned life is 65 years (from 1892 to 1956/1957), and the 
lag-time 10 years (from 1956/57 to 1966/67), which makes the actual life 75 years.  
For the actual full Elan scheme, the planned life is 70 years. This figure assumes the 
continuation of Mansergh’s demand forecast using the Decremental Rate of Increase.  
The lag-time for the actual full scheme is about 10 years from the early 1960s to the early 
1970s, and therefore the actual life of the actual full Elan scheme is 80 years.     
The lag-time for Stage 1 is 10 years between the early 1930s and early 1940s. This might 
have been longer but for the rise in demand which took place during WW2. The lag-time for 
Stages 1 and 2 is also 10 years between the early 1960s and early 1970s. It is reasonable to 
assume that during dry years, average annual demand will show higher than in a normal year 
provided constraints on demand are not introduced. 
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Figure 5.6 - Planned Life and Lag-Time for Elan Stages 1 and Stages 1+2 
 
Figure 5.7 - Elan reprise of 4.16 
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Whilst there is insufficient data here to develop all but the simplest mathematical 
relationships, the ratio of lag-time over planned life (in Section 5.6 called the Time Ratio) has 
been used in this study to normalise the risk averseness of scheme designs.  
Also in Section 5.6, a normalised Flow Ratio has been used to reflect the scale by which the 
headroom volume in the forecast demand has exceeded the actual demand.    
5.4 How risk-averse were the scheme designs? 
In the following tables that compare scheme design risk-averseness, Thirlmere has been 
considered as two different schemes using Bateman’s original design of 227 Ml/d, and the 
subsequent 164 Ml/d drought yield. 
Elan is also considered as two schemes. Stage 1 has a reservoir yield of 205 Ml/d. Stage 1 
plus Stage 2 of Mansergh’s original scheme has the drought yield to supply of 314 Ml/d. This 
was the yield anticipated by Mansergh for the completed scheme.  
Vyrnwy is one scheme with a drought yield to supply of 182 Ml/d.  
The risk averseness of scheme design is ranked in three ways: 
1) by normalizing time into a Time Ratio,  
2) by normalizing flows into a Flow Ratio,  
3) by absolute Planned Life.  
5.4.1 Time Ratio 
Time ratio is a new concept developed as part of the research reported in this thesis, and is 
calculated by lag-time divided by planned life. A relatively low time ratio indicates less risk 
aversion. Table 5.1 shows the comparisons, with Thirlmere 227 clearly the most risk averse 
design, and Elan 314 the least risk averse.  
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Table 5.1 - Time Ratios of schemes 
Scheme, Drought 
Yield in Ml/d 
(Start year for 
Planned Life) 
Planned Life 
(PL) 
in years 
Lag Time (LT) in years 
 
Time 
Ratio 
(LT/PL) 
Rank of Risk 
Averseness 
(Time Ratio) 
Thirlmere 227 
(1879) 
54 >50 c. 1 5. Most Averse =       
Less Risky 
Vyrnwy 182 
(1880) 
44 18  0.41 4 
Elan 205 
(1892) 
40 10  0.25 2 = 
Thirlmere 164 
(1879) 
40  
 
10  0.25 2 =  
Elan 314 
(1892) 
65 10  0.15 1. Least Averse = More 
Risky 
 
There is no surprise in seeing Bateman’s original design for Thirlmere as the most risk averse, 
and an outlier. Had the yield of 227 Ml/d remained, it would have been difficult for 
Manchester Corporation to make the case for their next water resource at Haweswater. The 
revised yield of 164 Ml/d brought the scheme exactly into line with Elan Stage 1, but this 
must be chance. 
5.4.2 Flow Ratio 
Flow ratio is also new and developed for the research reported in this thesis. To produce the 
flow ratio, the flows that make up the actual headroom (marked as F2 minus F1 in Figure 5.1) 
are used. The flows are read off the supply and demand diagrams, and the Flow Ratio is F1 
divided by F2. A relatively low flow ratio figure indicates less risk aversion. 
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To make the Flow Ratio calculation, the year at the end of the planned life is identified. In 
Figure 5.1, this year is called the headroom year. The headroom year is noted for each scheme 
in the first column of Table 5.2. 
The ranking of schemes for the flow ratio in Table 5.2 portrays a different picture to that 
shown in Table 5.1 for the time ratio. Elan 205 becomes the most risk averse, and Thirlmere 
164 the least risk averse. The explanation lies in where the economic cycle is when the 
headroom year occurs. In the case of Elan 205, this is in 1933 during the Great Depression, 
and the actual water demand is depressed. The Headroom Year for Thirlmere 164 is 1919, and 
therefore before the world economy was in recession. The actual headroom is shown in Table 
5.2. Thirlmere 227 has by far the largest actual headroom of 92 Ml/d.  
Table 5.2 - Flow Ratios of Schemes 
Scheme, drought 
yield Ml/d 
(Headroom 
Year) 
Flow (F1) in 
Ml/d 
Flow (F2) 
in Ml/d 
 
Actual 
Headroom 
(F1 – F2) 
Flow 
Ratio 
(F1/F2) 
Rank of Risk 
Averseness by Flow 
Ratio 
Thirlmere 227 
(1934) 
341  249   92 Ml/d 1.37 4 
Vyrnwy 182 
(1924) 
237  183  54 Ml/d 1.29 3 
Elan 205 (1933) 205  136  69 Ml/d  1.50 5. Most Averse = Less 
risky 
Thirlmere 164 
(1919) 
277  232  46 Ml/d 1.19 1. Least Averse = 
More Risky 
Elan 314 (1956) 314  254  60 Ml/d 1.24 2 
 
Up to now, the drought yields of Longdendale and Rivington have been included in the flow 
F1 for the Thirlmere schemes, and the Vyrnwy scheme, respectively. The F1 figures for the 
two Elan schemes contain only the Elan drought yields. A check was made to see if the 
ranking was altered by the removal of the Longdendale and Rivington schemes from the 
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calculation. Table 5.3 shows Thirlmere 227 returning to the most risk-averse scheme, and the 
full Stage 1 + Stage 2 Elan 314 is the least risk averse. 
Table 5.3 - Flow Ratios minus Longdendale and Rivington 
Scheme, 
drought yield 
Ml/d, 
(Headroom 
Year) 
Flow (F1) in 
Ml/d, minus 
Longdendale 
and Rivington 
Flow (F2) in 
Ml/d, minus 
Longdendale 
and Rivington 
Actual 
Headroom 
(F1 – F2) 
Flow 
Ratio 
(F1/F2) 
Rank of Risk 
Averseness (Flow 
Ratio) 
Thirlmere 227 
(1934) 
227 135  92 Ml/d 1.68 5. Most Averse 
Vyrnwy 182 
(1924) 
182 128 54 Ml/d 1.42 3 
Elan 205 (1933) 205  136  69 Ml/d  1.50 4 
Thirlmere 164 
(1919) 
164 118 46 Ml/d 1.39 2 
Elan 314 (1956) 314  254  60 Ml/d 1.24 1. Least Averse 
 
5.4.3 Overall Rank of Risk Averseness 
For an overall ranking of risk averseness, the planned life length has been introduced to Table 
5.4 to reflect the greater uncertainty of schemes with longer planned lives. Weights were 
considered for achieving the total rank score, but were difficult to justify. With equal 
weighting for all three parameters, Elan 314 and Thirlmere 164 schemes are clearly the least 
risk averse. 
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Table 5.4 - Rank of overall Risk Averseness including Longdendale and Rivington 
Scheme, Drought 
Yield Ml/d 
Rank Time 
Ratio  
Tab 5.1 
Rank Flow 
Ratio  
Tab 5.2  
Rank Planned 
Life  
Tab 5.1 
Total 
Rank 
score 
Rank of Overall 
Risk Averseness 
Thirlmere 227 5 4 2 11 4 = Most Averse    
Vyrnwy 182 4 3 3  10 3 
Elan 205 2 = 5 4 = 11 4 =   Most Averse 
Thirlmere 164 2 = 1 4 = 7 2 
Elan 314 1 2 1 4 1    Least Averse 
 
Table 5.5 uses the same ranks as Table 5.4 except the flow ratios from Table 5.3, which 
excludes the Longdendale and Rivington schemes. The total rank scores are similar, but the 
Thirlmere 227 scheme is not so much of an outlier as the scheme was in the time ratio results.  
Table 5.5 - Rank of overall Risk Averseness minus Longdendale and Rivington 
Scheme, Drought 
Yield Ml/d 
Rank Time 
Ratio  
Tab 5.1 
Rank Flow 
Ratio (minus 
Long & Riv)  
Tab 5.3  
Rank  
Planned 
Life  
Tab 5.1 
Total 
Rank 
score 
Rank of Overall 
Risk Averseness 
Thirlmere 227 5 5 2 12 5.   Most Averse    
Vyrnwy 182 4 3 3  10 3 = 
Elan 205 2 = 4 4 = 10 3 =  
Thirlmere 164 2 = 2 4 = 8 2 
Elan 314 1 1 1 3 1    Least Averse 
 
As will be suggested in Chapter 6, the principles of the lag time model method could be used 
to allow an “historical perspective check” on schemes.   
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5.5 Summary of risk averseness ranking exercise 
The purpose of the exercise was to quantify comparative risk averseness of the Victorian 
reservoir scheme designs. The objective is a better informed discussion about the perception 
that large Victorian reservoir schemes were grandiose.   
The clear least risk averse design was Mansergh’s full Elan scheme, and Bateman’s Thirlmere 
227 scheme was the most risk averse. Hawksley’s Vyrnwy scheme was never the least or 
most risk averse. 
Historically, Bateman’s Thirlmere scheme design predates Vyrnwy and Elan. Mansergh’s 
Elan scheme came after both of the other two. We also know that Mansergh’s demand 
forecast was developed with a better understanding of the water use behaviour, and this is 
possibly one of the reasons that the full Elan scheme design was the least risk-averse. Demand 
forecasters believe that the purpose of developing demand forecasts is to try to reduce 
uncertainty, and this exercise appears to sustain this view. 
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CHAPTER 6 MODERN APPROACH 
Chapter 6 lays the foundations for addressing the first part of Knowledge Gap C, and the third 
project objective, by first explaining the current public water supply planning process that is 
undertaken by water companies. The current statistically rigorous UKWIR methodology for 
calculating target headroom that represents uncertainty is introduced. The novel lag-time 
approach is regarded as complimentary to the UKWIR methodology rather than a 
replacement.  Thames Water’s revised Draft Water Resources Management Plan of 
September 2009, which contained a proposal for a new large reservoir of 100 Mm3 of new 
storage as part of the company’s preferred strategy for the next 25 years, was the subject of a 
Public Inquiry in 2010. 
6.1 Introduction 
The modern approach starts in 1996 with the publication of the “Agenda for Action” in which 
central government addressed all the major stakeholders in the water industry after the 
national drought in 1995. In response, significant actions included the overhaul of the water 
resources planning process used by the water companies, and a systematic approach to 
express uncertainty in headroom.  
The truest test of the technical and political issues occurs at a Public Inquiry. Evidence 
presented at the Public Inquiry into Thames Water’s revised Draft WRMP in summer 2010 is 
analysed, as are the reasons for the Planning Inspector to reject the company’s plan, and 
thereby, rejection of the proposed UTR scheme. Appendix D contains a chronology of the 
many documents that were produced by the Environment Agency, Defra and Thames Water 
leading up to the call for a Public Inquiry, and the aftermath.   
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Whilst the EA has done much work to improve its approach to forecasting water demands, 
their expertise is necessarily working at catchment level, and for a much wider range of water 
users than a water company’s customers. 
6.2   Water Resources Planning, and the “Agenda for Action” 
The final move away from a “predict and provide” planning approach, and its replacement by 
a “twin-track” approach to long term water resources planning in England and Wales, was 
triggered by the experience of water supply difficulties that were encountered in the summer 
drought of 1995. In October 1996, the Government (The Department of the Environment) 
took the lead by launching “Water Resources and Supply: Agenda for Action”. The then 
Secretary of State John Gummer said in the Foreword: 
“The drought of 1995, which affected large parts of England and Wales, and continued into 
1996 in many areas, focussed attention on water resources. The question also arose of whether 
this drought is a manifestation of climate change. This was the background to the 
commissioning of this paper on the arrangements for securing sufficient supplies in the longer 
term. The paper confirms that the framework for those arrangements is sound.” 
The arrangements were underpinned by Government, which would retain the responsibility 
for the legislative and policy framework within which the water companies and their 
regulators would operate. The objective was “to ensure that the water we need in the longer 
term is provided effectively, efficiently, and in an environmentally sustainable way.” To make 
this happen, Agenda for Action recommended actions to be undertaken by water companies, 
regulators, Government, manufacturers of water using appliances, and water consumers. The 
Secretary of State concluded with “sustainable development (of water resources) is a matter 
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for each and every one of us as individual members of the community. This Agenda for 
Action is for all of us.” 
The tables below list the actions with a summary of progress since 1996.  
Table 6.1 - Central Government 
Reference 
pp 42 
The Government will Actual Actions 
12.2 a Bring forward modifications to the legal 
framework if required. 
Water companies 5 yearly Water 
Resources Management Plans have been 
made statutory.  
12.2 b Continue to promote research into climate 
change. 
Through UKWIR (UK Water Industry 
Research). 
12.2 c Revise regulatory requirements in respect of 
water conservation 
Specifications set for enabling sustainable 
housing.  
12.2 d Assist in the promotion of efficient use of 
water. 
Support for Waterwise. 
12.2 e Review the process for Drought Order 
applications 
Water Companies Drought Plans made 
statutory. EA now made aware of the detail 
for a Drought Order much earlier in the 
process.  
12.2 f Consult on use of economic instruments in 
relation to water abstraction. 
“Water for Life” white paper of Dec 2011; 
consultation planned in 2013 about new 
water abstraction regime.  
12.2 g Introduce legislation as necessary for 
compensation arrangements for customers 
affected by supply interruptions or low 
pressure 
Water companies now operate Guaranteed 
Standards schemes to compensate 
customers.  
 
The Government (through DEFRA) has been active developing debate, and providing 
leadership for water resources and supplies planning. “Future Water” makes clear the 
Government’s approach should be primarily demand management. Targets are set for 
reducing domestic per capita demand from the current 140 to150 litres per person per day 
down to 120 or even 110 litres per person per day by 2035. 
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Table 6.2 - Environment Agency 
Reference The Environment Agency should: Actual Actions 
12.3 a Co-ordinate the fresh estimating of the 
reliable yields of water resource systems, 
and publish. 
Water companies undertook the work in 
1997 in calculating new “Deployable 
Output” for systems.  
12.3 b Lead the testing of these estimates against 
climate change scenarios. 
Water companies and EA input range of 
rainfalls into simulation models to arrive at 
range of Deployable Outputs for systems.  
12.3 c Revise as necessary its national and 
regional water resources strategies in 
consultation with the water companies 
EA produced national and regional 
strategies, and updates. 
12.3 d Be fully involved with water companies 
new resource development plans. 
Undertaken within the Water Resources 
Management Plan Annual Updates, and 5 
year review. 
 
The EA has many duties in national and regional water resources planning and operations. 
These duties include being Defra’s specialist advisor, particularly with regard to the 
assessment of water companies Water Resources Management Plans and Drought Plans. The 
EA operates the national raw water abstraction licensing system, determines abstraction 
licence applications, develops River Basin Management Plans, Catchment Abstraction 
Management plans, and is also the environmental regulator of the water companies. With 
responsibilities too for river water quality, pollution control and fisheries, the existence of EA 
and water company plans would be expected to reduce the risk of conflicts of interest, 
particularly during a drought. 
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Table 6.3 - The Office of Water Services 
Reference The Office of Water Services should Actual Actions 
12.4 a Monitor and as necessary enforce water 
companies’ performance of their duty to 
promote the efficient use of water by their 
customers. 
Legal duty on water companies to promote 
water conservation in the 1995 
Environment Act. All water companies 
have water saving initiatives, which are 
reinforced during droughts. 
12.4 b Monitor, report, and as necessary, take 
further action on leakage control. 
Incoming Government in 1997 empowered 
Ofwat to set water companies mandatory 
annual leakage targets. Severn Trent Water 
fined in 2008 after referral by Ofwat for 
deliberately misreporting leakage in 2002 
and 2003. 
12.4 c Be fully involved with water companies’ 
resource development plans 
Presentations by water companies leading 
up to Periodic Review 
12.4 d Consider the financial implications of new 
water resources and supply schemes as 
necessary in the course of its normal price 
regulation activities. 
The East Worcestershire Waterworks 
Company was taken over by Severn Trent 
as new water resource schemes were 
needed that would have produced 
unacceptably high charges to East Worcs 
customers.  
 
Ofwat’s primary role is to assess water companies 5 yearly Business Plans, and to set the 
level of water charges to customers in that 5 year period. Ofwat also ensure that the water 
companies fulfil their side of the “contract” with their customers. Even though the EA may 
determine an abstraction licence for a scheme in a water company’s favour, Ofwat are under 
no obligation to allow the funding to the water company involved. 
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Table 6.4 - Drinking Water Inspectorate 
Reference The Drinking Water Inspectorate will: Actual Actions 
12.5 a Check that all water supplies are monitored 
in accordance with and meet regulatory 
quality requirements 
Business as usual 
12.5 b Check that water treatment processes 
comply with regulatory requirements 
Target dates agreed with water companies 
for implementing water treatment 
improvement, and approval for water 
companies to be funded. 
12.5 c Take enforcement action if regulatory 
requirements not met. 
Business as usual 
 
The Drinking Water Inspectorate (DWI) has a clear role in monitoring and reporting on the 
companies’ compliance with treated water quality standards. Variable and deteriorating raw 
water quality (e.g. nitrates) can impact on the availability of water in water resources planning 
assumptions. The DWI is involved in evaluating risk, authorisation of the appropriate 
treatment solution, blending solution, and approving the timetable and costs for scheme 
delivery.  
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Table 6.5 - Water Companies 
Reference Water Companies should Actual Actions 
12.6 a Prepare fresh estimates of the reliable yields 
of water resources systems.  
Deployable Output for every system 
calculated for the first time in 1997 (a huge 
task). 
12.6 b Establish further detailed measurements of 
household water use. 
Severn Trent Water added a large sample 
of households paying by meter to an 
existing monitor of daily use in households 
paying unmeasured charges.  
12.6 c Conduct further studies on the implications 
of climate change on the demand for water 
UKWIR programme of climate change 
impact research. 
12.6 d Extend the penetration of metering Significantly extended in water stressed 
areas of South East England 
12.6 e Develop more sophisticated tariff structures. The technology is available, but industry 
standards difficult to agree.   
12.6 f Increase efforts to promote water 
conservation 
All water companies are proactive. Severn 
Trent has recently offered a water 
conservation kit for free.  
12.6 g Improve leakage measurement, control and 
reporting 
Huge improvement since 1996 investing in 
new meters, data capture, methods and 
analysis. 
12.6 h Enter into dialogue with customers about 
security of supply 
Consultation with customers is part of the 
statutory requirement for WRMP and 
Drought Plans. 
12.6 i Draw up plans for timely development of 
new water resources where demand cannot 
be managed to remain within existing 
resource capability. 
The 5 yearly WRMP planning process that 
looks forward 25 years ensures that supply 
demand balance deficiencies are identified, 
and that water companies develop a least 
cost plan to remedy the shortfall.    
 
Table 6.6 - Manufacturers of Water Using Equipment and Fittings 
Reference Manufacturers of water using equipment 
and fittings should 
Actual Actions 
12.7 a Continue to develop and market 
energetically more water-efficient products. 
White goods now carry information about 
water use 
12.7 b Continue innovation in the field of water 
recycling systems. 
Recycled water is used in non-households 
to cut costs. In households, technology 
exists for grey water recycling, but cost, 
practicality, and attitude are barriers that 
will take time to change.  
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Table 6.7 - Water Consumers 
Reference 
 
Water Consumers should Actual Actions 
12.8 a  Take full notice of information from water 
companies and other organisations on the 
need for water efficiency and how to 
achieve it. 
Huge efforts have, and are being made, to 
encourage water efficiency. Difficult to 
measure the impacts reliably in large 
samples. 
12.8 b Recognise the environmental significance 
of water conservation  
Education centres teach children about the 
link between water conservation and 
environmental improvement. 
12.8 c Take every opportunity to use water wisely. With the increasing penetration of 
household metering, water is becoming just 
another commodity. “Using water wisely” 
can get forgotten during droughts. 
 
6.3 The current water resources planning approach used by Water Companies 
The “twin-track” approach of demand management and capital schemes is now used by all 
water companies to update and develop their preferred programmes for the least cost mix of 
demand management initiatives and new schemes. Demand management can be more 
expensive than new small water resources schemes, but to encourage companies to do more, 
Ofwat now funds schemes that deliver measurable reductions of water demand. Water 
companies are also expected to align their draft WRMPs with the assumptions made in other 
parts of the company’s Business Plan that affect supply, demand and projected costs (e.g. 
metering policy and forecast of uptake). 
The process for the production by water companies of their 25 year horizon WRMPs is 
provided as Guidance from the EA. Water companies are expected to follow the Guidance, 
unless a deviation is clearly justified by the evidence. As will be shown later, a deviation by 
Thames Water that included for “long-term risk” beyond 25 years was deemed inadmissible 
by the Inspector at Public Inquiry for insufficient evidence and justification. A closer analysis 
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of the reasons given for this decision that are given in Section 6.5.5 is helpful to meeting the 
objectives of this study. 
6.3.1 EA’s Water Resources Management Plan Guidance introduces Headroom 
In its Introduction, the EA Guidance states what a Water Resources Management Plan is for, 
and the recommended approach to delivering a robust plan:  
“A water resources plan shows how a water company intends to maintain the balance between 
supply and demand for water over the next 25 years.”  
“Companies should set out a baseline forecast of demand for water for 25 years, assuming 
current demand policies. This should include Defra/Welsh Assembly Government policy and 
any forthcoming changes in legislation about demand management.”  
The first area of uncertainty mentioned by EA is about the uncertain impacts of climate 
change on supply and demand, and in the same paragraph, introduces the idea of “the required 
level of headroom”  
  “Companies should also consider the impact of climate change on demand. 
This should then be compared against a baseline forecast of available water supply, assuming 
current resources and future changes that are known about. Companies also should consider 
the impact of climate change on supply and forecast the required level of headroom to allow 
for uncertainty in the assessment.”  
The EA Guidance goes on to explain what is meant by headroom:    
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“Headroom is a buffer between supply and demand designed to cater for specified 
uncertainties. This gives a calculated surplus or deficit of water for each year. This is known 
as the baseline supply-demand balance and companies aim not to have a deficit. 
Where there is a deficit, companies should choose water management options (i.e. on both 
sides of the twin track) to meet the difference.” 
In practice, the deficit referred to above by EA is by how much the available headroom of 
supply over demand falls short of the target headroom.    
“A company’s water resources plan should consider the costs and benefits of a range of 
options and justify the preferred option set. The company should then prepare a final supply-
demand balance, taking into account its preferred options for water management, to 
demonstrate that the plan meets the forecast demand.” The message that the EA is 
communicating here is that it expects to see water company plans that just meet target 
headroom in 25 years time, and no more. The Agency’s guidance continues:-  
 “A company’s water resources management plan should be a stand-alone document that 
provides a realistic strategic plan for managing water resources. Companies should provide 
evidence in their plans in support of their preferred strategy and full details of the assumptions 
they have made.” 
The EA’s use of the word “realistic” is open to interpretation that depends on technical and 
regulatory judgement. “Companies should demonstrate a clear understanding of the 
performance of their systems, the main factors affecting their supply-demand balance, and 
how their preferred plan is both flexible and robust to the various risks and uncertainties, 
including the potential impacts of climate change.” 
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In chapter 9 of the EA’s Guidance, the EA explains that there are two methods of calculating 
the headroom requirement (i.e. the target headroom) to allow for uncertainty: 
1 “A Practical Method for Converting Uncertainty into Headroom (UKWIR, 1998), is a 
pragmatic approach that…does not provide sufficient evidence to justify the 
development of new resources to meet the calculated target headroom. This 
approach is most suitable for resource zones where there is a healthy supply demand 
balance for at least the next ten years.” 
2 “An Improved Methodology for Assessing Headroom (UKWIR, 2002) addresses the 
shortcomings of the 1998 methodology by taking a more rigorous approach to 
determining headroom uncertainty through probabilistic simulation. The 
uncertainties of each headroom component are defined as probability distributions, 
and combined using Monte Carlo simulation. Much more work is required to apply 
this approach but it is sufficiently rigorous to support the justification for developing 
new resources.”  
The headroom components included in the 2003 methodology are shown in Table 6.8. 
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Table 6.8 - Supply and Demand related components for Target Headroom calculations 
Ref. Supply related Ref Demand related 
S1 Vulnerable surface water licences D1 Accuracy of sub-component data 
S2 Vulnerable groundwater licences D2 Demand forecast variation 
S3 Time-limited licences D3 Uncertainty of impact on climate change on 
demand. 
S4 Bulk imports D4 Uncertain outcome from demand management 
measures. 
S5 Gradual pollution of sources causing a 
reduction in abstraction. 
  
S6 Accuracy of supply-side data   
S7 Single source dominance 
(dropped as included in Outage) 
  
S8 Uncertainty of impact of climate 
change on source yields. 
  
S9 Uncertain output from new resource 
developments 
  
 
Probability distributions are chosen for each of the parameters shown in Table 6.8 for a 
Monte-Carlo analysis. 
Not only is the 2003 approach preferred for its rigour, the model output is presented in a 
probabilistic way, as shown in Figure 6.1, that links to the confidence level of meeting a water 
company’s stated level of service. To be 100% certain of meeting the level of service (a 
hypothetical assumption), target headroom would be very large, and the plan would have to 
be made up from an undeliverable set of non-optimal and very expensive actions. 
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Figure 6.1 – Typical results from headroom analysis (UKWIR, 2002) 
The application of the novel lag-time model is not regarded as an alternative to this 
methodology, but as complimentary to it, by providing an “historic perspective check”. 
There is also danger of going too far in the other direction, perhaps to reduce expenditure. The 
EA recognise that there is a judgement to be made here as “water companies should not take 
unnecessary risks by applying too low target headroom.” This judgement involves selecting 
the level of risk (e.g. the frequency in years for applying a hosepipe ban) that a particular 
company has chosen for its customers, and explaining the cost versus risk issues in public 
consultation documents. However, whilst the UKWIR headroom assessment methodology 
enables a flexible approach to be taken, the range of judgements that are necessary for 
selecting the shape and range of the error functions used in the Monte-Carlo analysis, the 
range of choice of the degree and the timing of level of service failure probability, and 
uncertainties in the original assessment of the Deployable Output of supply systems, it is 
possible to force a given outcome for the target headroom calculation.        
There are different types of risk and their associated cost pressures which water companies 
have to manage. For example, there is regulatory risk in failing to meet reductions in 
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operating costs that have been previously agreed with Ofwat. This failure turns into a business 
risk when Ofwat factors such failings into the five-yearly price review. The balance of risks 
and costs in both water and wastewater sides of the business helps to determine the 
company’s priorities for expenditure. Capital expenditure on new water resources and 
supplies is normally a small part of a water company’s capital programme, and the five yearly 
price reviews do not encourage inter-generational expenditure. 
The EA’s components of the WRMP process, including headroom, is shown in Figure 6.2.   
 
Figure 6.2 - Components of a Water Resource Management Plan (from EA, 2007)      
 Chapter 6 Modern Approach 
 
 
161 
6.3.2 Target Headroom 
For each Resource Zone within a water company, a baseline supply and demand position is 
set first. Then the supply and demand forecasts are made along with the target headroom 
(TH), which is then used to plan the scale and timing for an optimal least cost set of water 
resources and demand management schemes. TH will be relatively small in the early years of 
the plan, but as the planning horizon extends, the target headroom of supply over demand will 
grow. However, as real time moves forward, the TH for a particular year in future is likely to 
decrease.  
To illustrate the declining target headroom for a given year as real time moves forward, 
Figure 6.3 is used as a hypothetical and a much simplified supply and demand balance 
diagram. It is an indicative example that shows: 
1. In Year 10, a new 10 Ml/d Scheme A is commissioned.  
2. Also in Year 10, Actual Headroom (simply supply minus demand, and excluding 
the X axis, the lowest line in Figure 6.2.) is boosted by 10 Ml/d to a total of 20 
Ml/d. At this point in year 10, available headroom is 10 Ml/d above target 
headroom. 
3. The small dotted lines show how the demand forecast + target headroom for year 
30 gradually reduces in real-time from 80 Ml/d to 50 Ml/d in 5 year intervals 
4. Target headroom is just met in year 15. By year 30, available headroom is zero  
5. As real-time reaches year 30, and without Scheme B, actual headroom and target 
headroom fall to zero.  There is now a significant risk of failing to meet levels of 
service as there is no allowance for uncertainty.  
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6. Scheme B might have been regarded in Year 0 as optimal for providing supplies 
for the next 40 to 50 years. Its deferral runs the risk of having to bring forward a 
sub-optimal scheme.  
Figure 6.3 - Indicative Supply and Demand Forecasts 
In Figure 6.3, the initial supply and demand forecasts are made in Plan Year 0. The “Water 
Available for Use” is the supply forecast. There are two demand forecasts, one includes target 
headroom (TH), and the other excludes TH. Using the Plan Year 0 demand forecast that 
includes target headroom, Scheme A is due in Plan Year 10, and provides an extra 10 Ml/d of 
Water Available for Use (from 40 to 50 Ml/d in Figure 6.2). The Plan Year 0 forecast to meet 
TH shows that Scheme B is due in Plan Year 15, but what should be the size and timing for 
this scheme?  
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In real time, by Plan Year 15, if the simplifying assumptions are made of rolling forward the 
same profile of TH, and also the assumption of steady linear demand growth, the 
interpretation of Figure 6.2 shows that Scheme B is now required between Plan Years 20 to 
25. Looking further forward to the production of the plan in Plan Year 30, the supply and 
demand forecasts intersect, which indicates that Scheme B (or something else) should not be 
deferred any further. Figure 6.2 shows that with Scheme A, but without Scheme B, the 
projected Actual Headroom (AH) in Plan Year 30 becomes zero. 
If Scheme B is a major resource for the long-term, the plan in Plan Year 0 ought to bring out 
the issues around the forecasts, alternative solutions, and the development of the scheme. 
However, the current approach to target headroom implies that the selection and timing of 
schemes that is optimal for meeting target headroom from Plan Year 0 becomes non-optimal 
in future years. Also, as the 25 year horizon approaches, and there is a constraint on the 
inclusion of a scheme that is optimal, for example from year 20 to year 40. This is precisely 
the situation that Thames Water had when developing their plan.        
The regulatory and public scrutiny of water company plans and proposals for new reservoir 
schemes is rightly challenging. The technical complexities are substantial, judgment of detail 
is still involved, and there is much more data now to be judged.  
6.3.3 Climate Change   
In the past 10 years, there has been questioning about whether rising temperatures due to 
climate change is really happening, and if it is, there are other factors than man that are the 
cause. Sceptics mistrust the science, and in response, The Royal Society (2010) produced an 
objective evidence based summary of the science. The Society concludes that there is a 
warming trend, and that man’s activities are the dominant cause, but because of the 
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uncertainties that will always be apparent, climate science must be the essential basis for 
planning. Hulme (2007) argues that climate scientists need to improve their communication 
with the public to explain the science, and that it is in fact healthy and expected in the 
scientific world for scientists to disagree. 
Over the past 15 years, much research work has been undertaken by UKWIR and EA that 
enables better quantification of the potential impacts of climate change on the deployable 
output of surface and groundwater sources. The results of this research have helped EA to 
formulate advice to the water companies when developing their WRMPs. This Section 6.3.3 
reports on early work to quantify the impacts, which was undertaken by Severn Trent Water 
and published by ICE (Crookall and Bradford, 2000). Aspects of the work done by Thames 
Water for their Draft WRMP (2009) are also described. 
Water resources system simulation models have played a central role in this quantification, 
and these models were employed by Severn Trent Water using rainfall factors produced from 
the UKCIP98 scenarios. For 2020 and 2050, all the surface sources tested showed a reduced 
deployable output. In 2050, the Elan catchment showed a relatively small range of reduction 
of between – 9 to -12 Ml/d for the “wet” and “dry” scenarios, whilst the sources dependent on 
the River Severn showed a larger range of -40 to -85 Ml/d.  
The conclusion in the paper was that the impact on surface water sources is highly dependent 
on the nature of the catchment, and on the volume of storage available. Groundwater source 
deployable outputs showed small increases, which to most people would be beneficial. 
Compared to the impact on surface water supplies, the impact of climate change on annual 
water demand is thought to be relatively small. 
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The south-east of England is the area where climate scientists believe the warming will be 
greatest in the UK, and Thames Water (2009) state that “by far the biggest uncertainty factor 
is the impact of climate change”. To demonstrate the range of rainfall uncertainty, the 
company made projections of monthly rainfall for the 2020s using six different climate 
models. The results are shown in the company’s Table E.3 (2009), and reproduced in this 
thesis as Figure 6.4. The evidence from the “wet”, “dry” and “mean” profiles clearly show the 
wetter winters and drier summers, and there is a gap between the average wet and dry 
scenarios that is approximately 25% for each of the 12 long term monthly averages.  
 
Figure 6.4 - Comparison of rainfall factors, from Thames Water (2009) Figure E.3 
The UKCIP09 (2011) regional findings for the 2080s, which use the Medium Emissions 
Scenario, show for London that the gap is wider at 42%.  The central summer mean rainfall 
estimate is -22% below the long term mean, and the central winter mean rainfall estimate is 
+20%. However, these figures conceal runs of years with below average rainfall (IH, 1994) 
that impact negatively on the yield of groundwater resources, and result in lower than average 
base flows to rivers. Future water resource plans for water companies in south-east England 
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that assume runs of years with low rainfall, would be very expensive to implement, and face 
major political difficulties.         
Thames Water also presents a comparative summary table from two climate models in the 
revised Draft WRMP (2009). The results in the company’s Table E.3 show the deployable 
output reductions that are entirely due to climate change. The company’s Table E.3 is shown 
as Table 6.9 for the London resource zone.  
Table 6.9 - Results of the latest UKWIR06 climate change modelling (WRMP) compared to WR06 - 
Thames Region, London from Thames Water (2009) Table E.3 
 
Table 6.9 demonstrates that there is still much uncertainty in the assessment of deployable 
output. The mid-point planning lines are 182 Ml/d apart (i.e. 281 – 99), which is equivalent to 
the deployable output of the UTR, and therefore the loss of a major resource. 
6.3.4 Ofwat Approach 
The twin track approach to water resources planning is accepted by water companies and the 
regulators. An Ofwat view of this approach was presented in 2010 by Dr Mike Keil (2010), 
Head of Climate Change Policy at Ofwat using a fictional indicative example as shown in 
Figure 6.5.  
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A fictional example
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Figure 6.5 – Ofwat view of the twin track planning approach 
An “S” curve shows the relationship of the cumulative probability of maintaining current 
levels of service on the Y axis, with the reduction of summer rainfall caused by climate 
change on the X axis. The diagram also shows that after the “coping range”, the first remedial 
measure is demand management.  
The impression given by Figure 6.4 is that a new reservoir is the least attractive option 
because the high cost raises the cumulative probability from 98 to 100%. “New reservoir” 
also comes last if the climate models project an extraordinarily large reduction in summer 
rainfall. There is no question that achieving 100% is going to be very expensive, but the 
optimal twin track programme of schemes might not produce the order of remedial action 
shown. 
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6.4 Thames Water revised Draft WRMP September 2009 
In terms of numbers of customers, Thames Water is the UK’s largest regulated water supply 
company. The operational area covered is around 8,000 square kilometres and stretches from 
the Cotswolds in the west to the East of London. Approximately 2,850 Ml/d of water are put 
into supply each day, supplying an estimated 8.56 million drinking water customers. Thames 
Water, as a statutory water undertaker, has a duty under the Water Industry Act 1991 (the 
WIA) to provide an effective and efficient water supply. Every five years Thames Water is 
required to produce a Water Resources Management Plan which sets out how the company 
intends to provide water to meet customers’ needs while protecting the environment over a 
25-year period. The Plan presents forecasts for water demand within Thames Water’s supply 
area for a 25-year period from 2010 to 2035. It sets out the company’s strategy, and the 
options available to manage demand for water and the schemes to provide water resources. 
Three of Thames Water’s tables listing the options in the company’s revised Draft WRMP of 
September 2009 are numbered 8.3, 8.4 and 8.6, and are shown in Appendix F. 
6.4.1 Thames Water preferred Plan 
In Thames Water’s Table 8.3, the company sets out alternative twin track programmes for 
nine scenarios the London resource zone. One scenario was least cost, three were optimal for 
environmental and social issues such as carbon emissions, and five provided for long term 
security of supply risk. All scenarios contained implementation of targeted compulsory 
domestic metering, and at least 1000 km of mains replacement to reduce leakage. The 
company’s preferred programme up to 2035 was for one of the long term risk scenarios that 
includes another 1000kms of mains replacement up to 2020, and a new UTR reservoir of 100 
Mm3. The preferred programme leaves 127 Ml/d of surplus resource in 2035, whilst the least 
cost scenario leaves 1 Ml/d. 
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The financial NPV costs given in the Thames Water Table 8.4 shows a range from £1,295m 
for the least cost scenario, to £2,480m for a long term risk scenario that relies on many small 
water resources schemes, and leaves a surplus of 130 Ml/d in 2035. The preferred programme 
cost is £1,769m, which is 3rd cheapest of the scenarios. With the addition of monetised 
environmental and social costs, the preferred programme becomes the second cheapest behind 
the least cost scenario. The difference in cost is largely explained by a lower mains 
replacement rate of 500 km up to 2020 in the least cost scenario. Thames Water emphasise 
that no costs are incurred in the preferred programme for a new reservoir until 2015.  
The Capex cost for a new UTR reservoir of 100Mm3 of £725m is shown in Thames Water’s 
Table 8.6. The extra deployable output that Thames Water calculates is 185 Ml/d, and thus the 
unit cost is approximately £4m per Ml/d. For comparison, the Elan reservoirs and aqueduct 
scheme cost £6m a century ago, which is approximately £600m today. The dry year 
deployable output for the first stage of the Elan development is approximately 200 Ml/d 
(CBWD, 1940), and thus the resulting unit cost is £3m per Ml/d. Using this coarse 
comparison, unit cost appears not to rule out immediately the possibility of future 
development of reservoir storage schemes in mid-Wales.         
6.4.2 Thames Water Sensitivity Testing of Scheme Dates 
In their revised Draft WRMP, Thames Water presented the results of sensitivity testing of 
scheme commissioning dates. Eight scenarios were used, covering a range of population 
growth, the degree of downward movement of domestic PCC demand, the demand saving by 
domestic metering, and the impact on demand of the economic downturn. The results are 
shown in Table 6.10.  
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Table 6.10 - Sensitivity Testing Results for the London Resource Zone 
Final Plan 
Programme 
London RZ 
Population - 
High 
Population - 
Low 
PCC 
Movement - 
High 
PCC 
Movement - 
Low 
Selective 
Metering 
Savings - 5% 
Selective 
Metering 
Savings - 
15% 
Economic 
Downturn - 
High 
Economic 
Downturn - 
Low 
Change in 
supp/demand 
2019 / 20 
(Ml/d) 
0 
 
54 
 
- 33 14 - 15 12 - 12 20 - 28 
Change in 
supp/demand 
2034 / 35 
(Ml/d) 
0 106 - 65 71 - 86 19 - 19 20 -29 
East London 
Resource 
Development 
(1 Ml/d) 
2020/21 2012/13 2033/34 2014/15  2018/19 2026/27 2012/13  
Northern New 
River 1 (1.8 
Ml/d) 
2020/21 2012/13 2033/34 2014/15  2018/19 2026/27 2013/14  
AR – SLARS 
(19.0 Ml/d) 
2021/22 2014/15  2020/21  2020/21  2019/20  
100Mm3 
Reservoir 
Abingdon 
(173 Ml/d)  
2026/27 2026/27 2033/34 2027/28  2026/27 2026/27 2026/27 2028/29 
Southwark 
(1.5 Ml/d) 
 2012/13  2018/19  2019/20  2013/14  
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Final Plan 
Programme 
London RZ 
Population - 
High 
Population - 
Low 
PCC 
Movement - 
High 
PCC 
Movement - 
Low 
Selective 
Metering 
Savings - 5% 
Selective 
Metering 
Savings - 
15% 
Economic 
Downturn - 
High 
Economic 
Downturn - 
Low 
ASR Darent 
Valley 2 
 2018/19  2024/25    2025/26  
ASR Darent 
Valley 3 
 2013/14  2019/20  2020/21  2014/15  
AR - 
Kidbrook 
 2013/14  2019/20  2019/20  2013/14  
East Croydon 
(1.5 Ml/d) 
 2013/14  2019/20  2019/20  2014/15  
Deephams 
STW Reuse 
 (25 Ml/d) 
 2018/19  2025/26      
Hogsmill B  2013/14        
NPV 
compared to 
Final Plan 
programme 
100% 119% 95% 104% 79% 102% 98% 104% 96% 
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Analysis of the results in Table 6.10 shows; 
1) The range of the change in Distribution Input from the first Draft WRMP for 2019/20 
was from +54 Ml/d to -33 Ml/d, which is 87 Ml/d. Fifteen years later in 2034/35, the 
range more than doubles to 181 Ml/d, from +106 Ml/d to -75 Ml/d. The forecast 
Distribution Input for London in 2034/35 is 1,900 Ml/d, so the total range is near 10% 
spread between +5.5% and -4.5%. These numbers are for identifying the range used 
for this particular sensitivity test, and not for estimating target headroom. 
2) A comparison of the sensitivity test flow range with target headroom is instructive. In 
2034/35, the target headroom shown in Figure 7.3 for the London Resource Zone is 
200 Ml/d. The forecast Distribution Input is 1,900 Ml/d, and the addition of the 200 
Ml/d target headroom increases the supply requirement to 2,100 Ml/d, which is also 
near 10% more. Thus the sensitivity test range, and the amount of target headroom is 
similar, and the positive deviation of the sensitivity test (+106 Ml/d) is well within the 
target headroom of 200 Ml/d. This finding demonstrates that the sensitivity test has 
used reasonable conservative values. 
3) The sensitivity test shows that the requirement and timing of schemes is more 
sensitive to the assumptions for population growth and domestic per capita demand, 
rather than metering savings and allowance for the economic downturn. Significant 
reductions in PCC is the primary item for attention in the Government’s policy, and 
the delivery demands a major shift in the attitude to water use in the home. Should 
these reductions not occur fast enough, much of the risk of supply failure is carried by 
the water companies and their customers.  
The proposed reservoir for 100 Mm3 (called Abingdon in Table 6.10 rather than Upper 
Thames Reservoir) is required in seven out of the eight scenarios. The date this scheme is 
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most often required is 2026/27 in five out of the eight scenarios. The extra 173 Ml/d 
deployable output from this scheme means that there is a large supply surplus over demand at 
the end of the planning period. A major issue here is the acceptability of such a surplus to the 
Regulators. The TW preferred plan in the company’s rDWRMP is shown below.  
The grey WAFU bars Figure 6.6 show the UTR coming into the plan in 2026. The Demand 
and the Demand + Target Headroom lines can be seen separately in Figure 7.3.  
  
Figure 6.6 – London Resource Zone Dry Year Average preferred plan (TW Figure 9.5 rDWRP September 
2009) 
6.4.3 Thames Water Approach to Uncertainty 
Throughout the development of the company’s plan, Thames Water used the EA’s WRMP 
Guideline and the recommended UKWIR 2002 methodology for converting supply and 
demand uncertainties into target headroom. However, in February 2009, after the public 
consultation on the Draft WRMP, the company indicated in its “Statement of Response” to 
Defra, that there was a need to plan for further than the 25 year planning horizon. The 
company called this “long-term risk” beyond 2035, and a judgement was made by the 
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company that a further 100 Ml/d should be added to target headroom for risk items that the 
company believed were not adequately covered in the EA Guidance.  
The most significant extra risk item was the potential loss of deployable output due to 
environmental sustainability reductions in abstraction, for compliance with the ecological 
standards required by European legislation, and for the EA’s programme of “Restoring 
Sustainable Abstractions”. The Guidance stated, and the advice was repeated in letters from 
the EA to Thames Water, that the company should not include any reductions in target 
headroom calculations that had not been confirmed by the EA. Confirmation by the EA about 
the scale and timing of these reductions will be made in 2013. For sensitivity testing only, the 
EA provided the company with a potential but unlikely upper limit of 600 Ml/d. This figure 
would have a very negative impact on Thames Water’s supply demand balance, being about 
30% of the company’s water resources assets.  
Whatever the actual SR figures turn out to be, the EA confirms that the company would be 
given sufficient time to deliver replacement water resources before implementing the 
reduction. The EA’s confidence in its ability to influence the timetable could be misplaced as 
the Agency does not grant planning permission, or approve the expenditure needed to develop 
the replacement sources.     
Thames Water’s addition of long-term risk to their Plan proved to be pivotal to subsequent 
events that impacted on Thames Water’s plan. Also it is of significance to this research as the 
inclusion of long-term risk to cover long-term uncertainty, and Thames Water’s justification 
for its inclusion, proved at Public Inquiry to be unacceptable to the Secretary of State. 
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6.5 Public Inquiry 
In a letter dated 3 August 2009 from Richard Wood (Head of Water Supply and Regulation 
Division at Defra) advised David Owens (CEO Thames Water Utilities Ltd) that the Secretary 
of State was minded to call for a Public Inquiry into the company’s Draft Water Resources 
Management Plan. 
The Inquiry took place in Oxford in the summer of 2010, and the Inspector, Wendy Burden, 
presented her report in December 2010. The Secretary of State accepted all 25 of the 
Inspector’s recommendations.     
6.5.1 Why was a Public Inquiry called? 
In the letter of 3 August, Mr Wood says that the reasons for calling an Inquiry were: 
“Your Statement of Response and additional information does not provide adequate 
justification for your preferred options or the decision process in reaching that preferred 
programme of options. You do not provide enough detail on some of the changes made in 
your plan, especially in relation to household demand. In addition, some directions and 
representations still remained unaddressed…concerned mainly with the options appraisal and 
your preferred programme.” 
Whilst arguments about the option appraisals and the decision processes occupied a 
significant part of the Inquiry, this project concentrates on the argument about long term risk, 
and the company’s selection of an Upper Thames Reservoir scheme.   
6.5.2 The case for Thames Water 
The evidence for the current and forecast supply demand balance, and the need to take a 
longer term view beyond 25 years was presented by Dr. Chris Lambert of Thames Water. The 
explanation of the company’s position with regard to potential future environmental 
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sustainability reductions, and the judgement for the inclusion of another 100 Ml/d to allow for 
longer term uncertainty was made by Yvette de Garis of Thames Water. Dr. Lambert said that 
the company was prioritising demand management in the first 15 years by the delivery of the 
extremely challenging programmes for further leakage reduction, and the substantial increase 
in household metering. These programmes were challenging not only in the relatively short 
time taken to implement them, but there was a significant risk that the planned reduced 
demand might not be achieved. There is uncertainty that the actual headroom would be 
sufficient, and Dr Lambert contended that the company should plan to include new water 
resources schemes that are optimal for the remaining 10 years and into the longer term.        
Ms de Garis’s evidence dealt with the uncertainty of sustainability reductions, and the 
delivery by the water company of the requirements of the Water Framework Directive. With 
regard to the inclusion by Thames Water of an allowance above target headroom of long term 
risk, Ms de Garis told the Inquiry that “an informal judgement was taken to make an 
allowance for an additional 100 Ml/d.” Informal was perhaps not the best word to use here.   
6.5.3 The case against UTR 
The EA took the lead for the opposition. The EA’s argument against the company’s decision 
to include for long-term risk was advanced by Ms Vicky Carpenter. 
Ms Carpenter’s argument was: 
1) The “long term risk” uncertainties identified by Thames Water are manageable 
risks. 
2) Thames Water’s approach is contrary to the water resources planning guideline. 
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3) The “long term risk” uncertainties identified by Thames Water do not, when 
critically assessed, provide any sound justification for the significant surplus 
planned for. 
4) These “long term risk” uncertainties should have been taken into account through 
sensitivity analysis. 
5) Thames Water has failed to properly justify or explain the change in its approach 
from that adopted initially in its draft WRMP to the revised draft WRMP (2009). 
The rebuttal from Dr Lambert dealt with each item, that from a water resources planning 
viewpoint for Thames Water, it would be “irresponsible” for the company to ignore long term 
risk, and that strict adherence to the existing EA’s guideline horizon of 25 years did not 
encourage optimal long-term planning for a large water company like Thames Water. A 
similar point was made in 1892 by Mansergh when he told the House of Commons Select 
Committee during the hearing for the Birmingham Corporation Bill that “the world does not 
end in 40 years”. The committee agreed, and as described in Chapter 4, Mansergh then 
extended his planning horizon to 63 years.  
Dr Owen Turpin for the Agency criticised Thames Water’s process for arriving at the optimal 
least cost programme without full appraisals of other solutions.  
Two well known and respected UK water engineers gave technical evidence on behalf of 
GARD, the Group Against Reservoir Development. John Lawson (ex Halcrow) provided 
information about alternative schemes, especially regional transfers, which he believed that 
Thames Water had not thoroughly appraised. Dr. Lambert explained that transfer schemes 
involving the lower River Severn would face significant environmental opposition as there 
many sites in the Severn Estuary that are protected under the EU’s Habitats Directive.   
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Chris Binnie (consultant water engineer) gave technical evidence for GARD about Thames 
Water’s demand forecast. Binnie’s principal point was that he believed that the company’s 
population forecast was inflated. Other detailed demand related issues were raised by the EA, 
but either because of the complexity, or the uncertainty, or the perception that upward and 
downward pressures on the numbers tended to cancel out, Thames Water’s demand forecast 
was not viewed by the Inspector as a key area of concern.    
6.5.4 The Inspector’s recommendations December 2010 
The recommendations reflect the arguments put forward by the EA.  
“The main deficiencies in the rdWRMP which I consider require change in order to secure a 
plan which is fit for purpose and legally compliant relate to the following key matters: 
i) The deletion of the premise of ‘long term risk’ 
ii) The deletion of all programmes which have the objective of meeting ‘long term risk’. 
iii) A wider range of feasible options. 
iv) Changes in the methodology for programme appraisal to bring it in line with good industry 
practice, with a clear description of the process set out in the plan. 
v) Sensitivity analysis to cover the potential for future sustainability reductions together with 
identification of a choice of options from the feasible options list to meet different levels of 
sustainability reductions. 
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6.5.5 The reasons for the rejection of Thames Water’s revised Draft WRMP 
Analysis of the dialog from the Inquiry helps to achieve an understanding of why the 
Inspector made her recommendations.   
The Inspector records below the company’s view of whether it is appropriate for Thames 
Water to plan for long-term risk, and to factor in potential future sustainability reductions. 
Para 2.4: 
Whether it is appropriate for Thames Water to plan for long-term risk, including indicative 
sustainability reductions, in the revised plan. Dr Lambert, who has more expertise and 
experience in water resource management planning than any other witness, explained on Day 
1 of the Inquiry, that “a Water Resource Management Plan is a strategic plan for the short, 
medium and long-term and it would be improper not to take account of long-term risk”. He 
observed that an element of subjective judgment was inevitable, although the Inspector is 
invited to conclude that Dr Lambert’s subjective judgment is not merely that but reinforced by 
his considerable experience in water resource management planning. He explained that 
where, as here, there is a degree of uncertainty about the long-term, Thames Water’s experts 
have had to face the task of making a judgment based on the best knowledge available at the 
time. This they have done in respect of potential sustainability reductions. There is nothing 
strange or startling about this. It is the very essence of planning. If all was certain there 
would be no scope and indeed no need for judgment. 
The Inspector then records the company’s contention that the results of sensitivity analysis 
will be ignored by the parties that reject the inclusion of long-term risk.  
Para 2.4.36: 
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…Thames Water submits that the adopted position of the main parties in rejecting the 
inclusion of long-term risk in the appraisal process but accepting the need to carry out a 
sophisticated sensitivity analysis of long-term risk elsewhere in the plan, which is then not 
planned for but ignored, is untenable….It cannot be appropriate to recognise that 
consideration needs to be given to assessing a risk but then to ignore the outcome of that 
consideration. 
The Inspector expresses disagreement with the company’s view of what would happen if 
sensitivity testing is undertaken. 
Para 2.4.4: 
With this process of review; with sensitivity analysis in the current plan; and with ongoing 
investigations of alternative options to meet different levels of Sustainability Reductions 
(SRs); I consider that the risk of harmful consequences to water consumers or the UK 
Government as feared by Thames Water would be avoided. 
The Inspector makes a judgement about which party’s assessment she believes about the 
amount of evidence. 
Para 3.3.32: 
Notwithstanding the very significant experience of Dr Lambert, I agree with the EA that there 
is a major deficit in the evidence available to justify planning for a specific level of SRs in the 
rdWRMP 
The Inspector takes a view on the integrity of the company’s position 
Para 3.3.15; 5.1.2; 5.3.12: 
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This causes me to have some sympathy with concerns expressed at the Inquiry that the 
rdWRMP has been produced in order to support the UTR project, with the 100 Ml/d 
allowance selected specifically to justify the UTR. 
The Inspector makes a clear statement about the short-coming of the company’s plan, and that 
the scheme would fail to justify a National Policy Statement. 
I find insufficient weight in the Company’s argument that unknown SRs must be planned for 
through the inclusion of a large scheme in the preferred programme, and prefer the approach 
put forward by the Environment Agency to deal with uncertainties arising from future 
unknown SRs through sensitivity analysis and the investigation of alternatives to meet 
different levels of SRs.  
Para 13.2.26 
Furthermore, I find inadequate evidence to support the assertion that an additional 100 Ml/d 
is required to deal with future unknown SRs, bulk supplies to other Water Companies and any 
shortcomings in water demand management measures. As a result, I find that the need for the 
UTR is not sufficiently demonstrated in the rdWRMP to justify the weight that would be given 
to that need.  
The Inspector made her position clear, which was that Thames Water did not make a strong 
enough case for her either of the merit of planning for long term risk, or of the additional 100 
Ml/d of long term risk. This was a difficult case to make, but without sufficient justification 
from Thames Water, it was understandable that the Inspector would regard the Agency’s 
WRMP guideline as equivalent to a legal document, and discount long term risk because it 
does not feature in the guideline. The Inspector’s view hardened as the Inquiry progressed that 
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she had “some sympathy” with those who felt that the 100 Ml/d long term risk was only there 
to justify the 100 Mm3 UTR scheme. 
The Inspector supported the EA’s technical evidence, but recognised that having no firm 
quantification of SRs made TW’s planning difficult. Thames Water will have to wait for the 
proposed sensitivity analysis and investigations into alternative sources to be completed 
before another strategic view of the long term can be taken. The Inspector recommended that 
further work for Thames Water should include an appraisal of a UTR scheme with 50 Mm3 
storage.  
6.6 Where do the risks lie?  
The modern twin track approach to water resources and supplies planning is conceptually 
sound, but perhaps the way the method is being implemented, and the Public Inquiry process 
has perhaps unnecessarily created uncertainty. The Government is clearly supportive of 
demand management by metering and building water efficient homes to drive down domestic 
PCC from 150 litres to l20 litres per head per day. The time this will take is unknown as so 
much depends on attitude to water, but it is to be hoped that today’s infants grow up in a 
world that understands the value of water. The challenge is there for Government, regulators 
and water companies and their customers.  
The role that refurbished and new physical assets play appears to be less well understood, but 
these will be needed more than ever should the planned demand management savings remain 
as an aspiration. The risk here is likely to be borne by water company customers as levels of 
service deteriorate, but hopefully not to see the return of intermittent supply. Hillier (2009) 
suggests that the reintroduction of intermittent supply in London ought to feature as an option 
to cope with the impact of climate change on water resource availability. Less dramatically, 
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Eden (2010) is of the view that a hosepipe ban is the price water customers have to pay for 
having inefficient water companies. Natural monopolies, like the water companies, are more 
likely to breed inefficiencies than where there is competition, and it is up to the companies 
and the regulators to deliver cost optimal investment efficiently. Economic competition does 
not replace the need for strong leadership to ensure that, along with all the best practice for 
reducing water demand, the right assets are built for the right reasons at an affordable cost.               
6.7 Summary of the Modern Approach 
Whilst every UK water company has to update its WRMP once every five years to the 
guideline set by the Environment Agency, it appears that larger companies that propose 
strategic reservoir developments that are optimal for horizons that exceed 25 years are likely 
to face legal challenge. The current planning process of 5 yearly review of prices by Ofwat 
forces a short term rather than a long term perspective to be taken by the UK water companies 
to water resources and supply planning. There appears to be no room in the current planning 
process for cost effective inter-generational expenditure, something that the Victorians 
planned for, and that led to the legacy of schemes we enjoy today. 
Whilst mindful of the constraints on decisions that can be made after a Public Inquiry, and 
whether or not the 100 Mm3 UTR is the right scheme, the Planning Inspector’s report about 
the Thames Water Inquiry shows that water engineering judgements are less valued now than 
the judgements of his Victorian forebears. It is believed that a better understanding by the 
public of historical context and comparative risk would raise the perception of water 
engineer’s value to society. 
This project now moves on in Chapter 7 to the application of the lag time model to London 
and the 100 Mm3 UTR scheme, and comparisons are made with the Victorian schemes. 
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CHAPTER 7 APPLICATION OF LAG-TIME MODEL TO THE 
LONDON RESOURCE ZONE AND 100 Mm3 UPPER THAMES 
RESERVOIR  
Chapter 7 addresses Knowledge Gap C and both the third and fourth project objectives. The 
shape of the supply and demand projections for Thames Water’s London resource zone are 
very different to those made before the Victorian schemes were built. Demand in London is 
set to continue falling as the mains replacement programme reduces leakage and domestic 
metering is extended. A view is formed that the UTR scheme is more likely to fall short of its 
design life (ie a shortfall rather than a lag-time) using the lag-time model with a range of 
demand forecasts in place of actual demands. 
7.1 Introduction 
Having developed a Lag-Time Model (LTM) to compare the relative risk averseness of the 
Victorian reservoirs designs, consideration was given as to whether this model might be used 
effectively to assess the risk averseness of Thames Water’s 100 Mm3 scheme. A range of 
extrapolated demand forecasts for London are used instead of observed data.  
Chapter 7 starts with background information about population growth, household size, and 
the company’s planned switching of domestic customers from unmeasured to measured 
charges in Thames Water’s revised Draft Plan of September 2009. 
7.2 Projections of Population and Housing Growth in the London Resource Zone 
Attention to the final planning projections of population and households provides insight into 
Thames Water’s thinking. 
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Figure 7.1 - Households and Population Projections for London, 2007 to 2035 (Source; Table WRP4 – FP, 
London Dry Year, Thames Water Draft WRMP Sept 2009) 
Figure 7.1 shows the Company’s final planning annual profiles for household population, and 
total numbers of households split between unmetered and metered properties. Table 7.1 below 
shows the changes from 2008 to the planning horizon in 2035, including actual and projected 
PCC. A cautionary note: the numbers shown in Table 7.1 have been superceded by TW’s 
updated DWRMP that was published in December 2011 for consultation in January 2012. The 
key Distribution and Target Headroom numbers are very close. The updated WRP4-FP Final 
Planning table of supply-demand components for London Dry Year Average can be directly 
accessed by a weblink given in the References. The table itself is on page 7 out of 15, and was 
successfully accessed on 1 April 2012. Distribution Input is on Line 11, and Headroom is 
Line 52. Both were used to construct Figure 7.3.  
With reference to Table 7.1, as unmetered 
households fall, PCC rises; as metered 
households rise, PCC falls. 
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Table 7.1 - Dry Year: Population, Households and PCC, London, 2008 and 2035 (Line numbers refer to 
Thames Water, Draft WRMP 2009, Table WRP4 –FP) 
 
2008 
(Baseline) 
2035 (Final 
Planning) 
Percentage of 
Total; 2008 
Percentage of 
Total; 2035 
Population living in households 
Unmetered (line 18) 5,100,967 1,704,480 81.5% 22.5% 
Metered (line 21) 1,156,287 5,871,194 18.5% 77.5% 
Total (million) 6.25 million 7.57 million  Growth 
+ 21% 
Numbers of households 
Unmetered (line 19) 1,975,639 625,005 80.0% 19.7% 
Metered (line 22) 493,833 2,542,635 20.0% 80.3% 
Total (million) 2.47 million 3.17 million  Growth  
+ 28% 
Household Per Capita Consumption; Litres / head / day 
Unmetered (line 36) 164.5  172.3  Growth + 4.7% 
Unmetered h/hold 
Occupancy Rate 
(line 20)  
2.58 2.77  Growth + 7.4% 
Metered (line 40) 155.2 133.8  Reduction: 
 -13.8% 
Metered household 
Occupancy Rate 
(line 23) 
2.34 2.08  Reduction: 
 - 11.1% 
London (line 40.1) 162.7 142.4  Overall;  
- 20.3 litres, or 
 – 12.5% 
 
Over the planning period, Table 7.1 shows there is a reversal of the proportions for unmetered 
and metered households and population between 2008 and 2035 from close to 80% and 20% 
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to near 20% and 80%. Figure 7.1 shows that the period when most of the switching takes 
place is before 2025, one year before the proposed UTR scheme is ready. 
Based only on comparisons of the average unmetered with the average metered PCCs, 
conclusions drawn about the amount of water saved by switching are not reliable. The reason 
is that the occupancy rates for both classes are different, as shown in Table 7.1. 
The lower occupancy rate for measured households has been influenced by self selected 
households that have opted to pay metered charges rather than unmetered charges. This group 
tends to have lower occupancy as the potential reduction in water charges is greatest. A 
reduction of 10% in average water use attributed to metering was measured over 25 years ago 
as part of the National Metering Trails in an experiment involving a large sample of 
households that were compulsorily metered in the Isle of Wight. There must be a risk that the 
Government’s aspiration for 20 to 30 litres reduction may not be delivered by 2035. The scale 
of these reductions at water company level, or for a resource zone, has never been attempted 
before.  
The impact of the metering programme, which includes new tariffs and changes in attitudes to 
water use, is projected by Thames Water to reduce the overall London domestic PCC by 20 
litres from 163 to 143 litres per head per day, as shown in Table 7.1. The annual profile of the 
reduction that appears in Figure 7.2 shows PCC continuing to fall after 2030, when the 
switching of unmetered to metered properties is small. 
 The step change reduction of about 5 litres in 2017 for PCC, as shown in Figure 7.2, is the 
company’s estimate of the effect of introducing varying volumetric tariffs that encourage 
reduced consumption. 
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Figure 7.2 – Projected Domestic Per Capita Consumption from 2007 to 2035 
Thames Water has factored the Government target of a 20 litres per person per day reduction 
into its final planning scenario. The company has not assumed an absolute PCC target figure 
of 130 litres as Thames Water’s domestic demands have consistently been reported to Ofwat 
at a higher level than the national average.  
The use of PCC for setting the target rather than using household consumption makes for 
difficulties of estimation, as the number of people living in each household is hard to obtain 
accurately. For the same reason, the conclusion to use household rather than PCC targets was 
also reached in Anna Walker’s independent review of charging for water services (2009). 
7.3 Supply Demand and Target Headroom for London to 2035 and 2050 
The fall in the forecast of distribution input from 2007 to 2019 is shown in Figure 7.3. This is 
explained by the anticipated reduction of leakage delivered by the company’s mains 
replacement strategy, and reductions in domestic PCC noted in Section 7.2. In Figure 7.3, 
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Thames Water shows an increasing absolute volume of target headroom from 2007 to 2020 
growing to 200 Ml/d. 
Beyond 2020 up to 2035, a judgement was made by the company to present target headroom 
as flat at 200 Ml/d thereafter. The reason given by Thames Water was that further increase in 
target headroom would eventually trigger another scheme because of uncertainties about the 
UTR scheme. Target headroom would normally continue expanding as the planning horizon 
lengthens into the future (see Figure 6.1), but in some cases, the numbers become very large 
and meaningless for planning and design. Target headroom continuing at 200 Ml/d is assumed 
in this project from 2035 to 2050, as shown in Figure 7.3. 
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Figure 7.3 – London: Supply Demand and Target Headroom, 2007 to 2050 
The Water Available for Use (WAFU) in Figure 7.3 shows that the recently commissioned 
desalination plant enabled the company to just meet target headroom in 2009. After 2009, 
WAFU falls due to the supply side impacts of climate change. Then in 2026, an increase of 
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178 Ml/d of WAFU is shown as the additional resource created by the Upper Thames 
Reservoir. After 2026, climate change is assumed to continue eroding WAFU. 
 By 2050, the downward linear extrapolation of WAFU is about to cross the upward linear 
extrapolation of distribution input plus the 200 Ml/d of target headroom. An example of a 
profile that shows the potential range TW’s target headroom is shown below in Figure 7.4. 
The company used 90% confidence up to 2015, falling to 70% by 2035. (TW, 2009)  
Figure 7.4 - An example of a final planning demand forecasting uncertainty profile for London 
Beyond 2035, using the linear extrapolation approach is arbitrary, but an argument for using 
another arbitrary approach is less important than having an understanding of the relative 
sensitivities of the forecast parameters. The assumption about the value of domestic PCC is 
clearly significant, as a fall of 10 litres rather than the projected 20 litres per head per day is 
equivalent to an increase in demand of 75 Ml/d in 2035. There are also uncertainties in the 
timing and scale of as yet unconfirmed abstraction licence reductions, and the impact of 
climate change on WAFU. As the extrapolated demand line is close to flat, the intersection of 
 Chapter 7 Application of Lag Time Model 
 
 
191 
the WAFU line with the distribution input plus target headroom line could be plus or minus 
20 years.  
7.4 Supply Demand Balance Points for Three Demand Scenarios 
Three demand scenarios have been chosen to enable comparisons to be made of planned lives 
and lag-times for the UTR scheme, and for comparisons with the Victorian schemes. The 
three demand scenarios are called “Baseline”, “Mid point” and “Final Planning”. The baseline 
and final planning demand scenarios to 2035 appear in TW’s Draft WRMP of September 
2009. The midpoint scenario is half way between the two, and are shown in Figure 7.5. These 
demands do not have target headroom added. The reason is that for comparison with the 
Victorian scheme designs, which do not have explicit allowances for uncertainty in the 
demand forecast.  
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Figure 7.5 – London, Three Demand Scenarios to 2085 
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In Figure 7.5 beyond 2035, all three demand scenarios have been linearly extrapolated up to 
the year 2085. Also shown in Figure 7.5 are “balance points” marked with the date when the 
projected WAFU and demand are in balance. The intersections occur for the baseline scenario 
in 2020, for the mid-point scenario in 2035, and the final planning scenario in 2055. 
The baseline scenario is the company’s pre-2009 forecast, and assumes the continuation of the 
existing demand management practices, and the existing rate of mains replacement. The final 
planning scenario is assumed to be the first choice that reflects the company’s preferred 
Business Plan. The mid-point scenario represents a partial delivery of the planned 
enhancement of demand management and leakage control savings. The range between the 
baseline and final planning projections shown in Figure 7.5 is approximately 250 Ml/d. 
 The WAFU does not contain the UTR, nor any assumption about the loss of abstraction 
licences to the environment. The impact of climate change is the cause of the falling profile of 
WAFU.  
In Figure 7.6, the introduction of the UTR moves the intersection dates back to 2045, 2065 
and 2085. The end of planned life for the UTR is 2085.  
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Figure 7.6 – Three Demand Scenarios and the Upper Thames Reservoir 
The start date for calculating the planned life has been assumed in this research as the time 
when the powers are obtained to construct a scheme. The UTR start of planned life is assumed 
to be 2015, and so the planned life of the UTR scheme is 70 years.  
Instead of using observed actual demands, the three demand scenarios can be used as 
surrogates to give an idea of the range of lag-times for the UTR scheme. The notion of lag-
time used in Chapter 5 represents a period of time that a scheme has been able to last beyond 
its planned life, but here the representation also includes a scheme that fails to reach the end 
of its planned life.  
To show lag-times in the UTR example, two further indicative demand scenarios, called flat 
demand and falling demand, have been added to the existing three below the final planning 
scenario, as shown in Table 7.2 As the demand profiles for the mid-point and baseline 
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scenarios are above the final planning scenario, there is a shortfall in years rather than a lag-
time. A further assumption is made on the supply side that the profile of the projected WAFU 
remains the same whatever demand scenario is used. 
Table 7.2 – Planned Life, Lag-Times and Shortfalls for five scenarios 
Demand 
Scenario 
Planned 
Life 
WITH 
New 
Reservoir 
Assumed range 
of Actual Life in 
years WITH New 
Reservoir 
Shortfall (SH)  
Lag-time (LT) in 
years WITH New 
Reservoir 
Time Ratio (-SH/PL) or 
(LT/PL), and relative risk of 
UTR design with range of 
demand scenarios. 
Baseline N/A 30 years  
(2015 – 2045) 
40 years (SH)  
(2045 – 2085) 
- 40 / 70 = - 0.57 
More inefficient design 
Midpoint N/A 50 years  
(2015 – 2065) 
20 years (SH) 
(2065 – 2085) 
- 20 / 70 = - 0.28 
Inefficient design. 
Final 
Planning 
70 years 70 years  
(2015 to 2085) 
Zero Exactly lasts for the planned 
life; a well designed scheme. 
E.g. Flat 
Demand 
N/A 90 years 
(2015 to 2105) 
20 years (LT) 
(2085 to 2105) 
+ 20 / 70 = + 0.28 
Risk averse 
E.g. Falling 
Demand 
N/A 110 years 
(2015 to 2125) 
40 years (LT) 
(2085 to 2125)  
+ 40 / 70 = + 0.57 
More risk averse 
 
 The interpretation of Table 7.2 is that as the time ratio becomes increasingly positive, the 
more the scheme becomes risk averse; this was the situation in Chapter 5 with the Thirlmere 
scheme. The opposite situation occurs when the shortfall becomes greater, and the time ratio 
becomes increasingly negative. If water demands are allowed to rise to the baseline profile, 
the greater is the risk that another scheme will be needed before the planned life is reached.  
The results show that if the 100 Mm3 UTR scheme came on stream in 2025, and the final 
planning demand profile was to occur, the UTR scheme would last for about 70 years, and 
would have a time ratio close to the full Elan scheme. If water demands were above the final 
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planning profile, and the time ratio is used, the UTR scheme becomes more riskily inefficient 
than any of the Victorian schemes. 
An attempt can be made in this project to assess the impact of Thames Water’s “long-term 
risk” of 100 Ml/d. A transparent way to do this is to subtract 100 Ml/d from the UTR WAFU 
of 178 Ml/d. The immediate impact would be to reduce the planned life of the scheme from 
70 years to 50 years. The planned life would end in 2070, and the shortfall to the baseline 
demand scenario would be near 40 years. The time ratio for the baseline scenario would be - 
40 /50 = - 0.8, which is understandably more risky than the – 0.57 calculated for the baseline 
scenario without the 100 Ml/d of long-term risk. However, if the continuation of the baseline 
demand scenario was the company’s preferred planning scenario, a larger UTR scheme and/or 
other schemes to boost WAFU would need to be appraised. 
7.5 Comparison of Headroom for Birmingham and London  
An additional comparative method has been used to help form a view of the relative risk 
averseness of the UTR design. It involves normalising flows by expressing headroom as a 
percentage of Distribution Input, and plotting this percentage over a timescale of years that 
starts at the beginning of the planned life of a scheme. For Birmingham, the percentages have 
been worked out using an annual assessment of actual headroom from 1892 when the powers 
to build Elan were obtained.  
In Figure 7.7, the profile of percentages for Birmingham uses an estimate of actual headroom 
from year 1 in 1892 to year 28 in 1920, and the annual average distribution input for 
Birmingham.  The range of the percentages is from a low at 10% (the First World War) up to 
35% (in the first decade of the 20th century when the new Elan scheme had just been 
commissioned). For London, the constraint of 200 Ml/d of target headroom assumed in the 
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draft WRMP (see Figure 7.3), and a distribution input of around 2000 Ml/d, produces a flat 
10% from Year 12 onwards.  
The finding is that using the Elan example, minimum headroom of 10% looks justifiable 
when considering designs for the long-term. The Birmingham numbers have been calculated 
up to 1984, and Figure 7.8 shows the percentage of headroom falls to near 10% again in the 
early 1980s. 
 
Figure 7.7 – Birmingham Implied Headroom from 1892 to 1920 using Mansergh’s forecast versus London 
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Figure 7.8 - Birmingham Implied Headroom from 1892 to 1984 using Mansergh's 1892 Demand Forecast 
7.6 Summary 
Chapter 7 has shown that new ways of interpreting supply demand balance diagrams can help 
water resource planners and engineers to draw comparisons of supply and demand related 
risks between historic schemes and modern scheme proposals. In this increasingly data 
hungry area of endeavour, new models are developed to improve our understanding, and 
thereby reduce uncertainty, in the quantification of detail. This is important work, but the 
novel approach reported in this thesis provides a counter-balance that adds historical context 
and value to strategic planning.  
It is believed that Thames Water’s argument for more storage would, on balance, be 
strengthened with the knowledge that all three major Victorian reservoir scheme designs 
studied here appear to be significantly more risk averse than the 100 Mm3 UTR. None of the 
three Victorian schemes could now be called grandiose. 
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CHAPTER 8 DISCUSSION 
This discussion synthesizes the critical analysis and observations made in this project. The 
research aim was to learn how the planning and design for long-term water resources and 
supplies schemes were undertaken in Victorian times, and whether new knowledge might help 
with the processes, methods and institutions of today. An “historic perspective check” of 
modern schemes based on the results from the novel lag time model is suggested.  
8.1 Victorian engineers, target headroom and long term risk 
The supply and demand diagrams in Chapter 6 that were used to estimate the planned life, and 
instead of a lag time, the shortfall of the 100 Mm3 UTR design, deliberately used demand 
forecasts without the addition of target headroom. The premise for this approach is that the 
Victorians did not use any special device to account for uncertainty, and their judgement was 
accepted by their client Corporations. From the publications available, we can only assume 
that an allowance for forecasting uncertainty was not explicitly added. 
We have already noted how similar the profiles of rising demand in the three Victorian Cities 
match the profiles of the observed data in the first half of the 20th century. We can see too that 
in all three cases, the deviation is consistently on the risk averse side of the supply demand 
balance, rather than the shortfall side. We have also commented that there was no way the 
Victorian engineers could have predicted the impact and timing on their water demand 
forecasts of events like the world wars or economic recession. Perhaps the current position of 
Thames Water is perhaps not so different in that the company does not know the scale and 
timing of an event that could have a significant impact on their WRMP. 
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Might the Victorian engineers have implicitly included for something like Thames Water’s 
“long term risk” in their demand forecasts? It is tempting to be drawn towards such a 
conclusion, but there are only three historic examples that have been evaluated in this thesis. 
Perhaps a reference list of schemes assessed using the principles of the lag-time model would 
allow “historic perspective checks” to be carried out as a standard part of any water resources 
scheme appraisal. 
Had the comparisons of risk averseness and efficiency shortfall from this project been 
available to the Thames Water Public Inquiry, this “historical perspective check” on the 100 
Mm3 design size of the UTR would have prompted an interesting debate about inter-
generational investment. Such a check is not for overturning all the good work that has and is 
being done to improve the science of understanding uncertainty, but to view proposals from a 
different angle. If you understand more about how water engineering history happened, the 
suggestion is that better, and hopefully more timely decisions can be made from knowing why 
things changed in the past. Now that all those have gone who lived at the end of Queen 
Victoria’s reign, there is a growing nostalgia for all things Victorian, but the objective for the 
water engineer should be to understand and communicate to the outside world which were the 
good and the bad practices and processes that the Victorians used. In this time of 
environmental restlessness, there is an opportunity to replace some of the inevitable emotion 
with considered judgement. Mike Hulme’s point about the need for scientists to become better 
communicators with the public of how climate change science moves forward is similar.  
The work presented in this thesis answers Professor Robert Sellin’s initial reflection: that 
from the schemes studied in this thesis, it does look that “Birmingham did get it right”, but all 
three schemes at the time got it reasonably right. The Inspector’s decision to reject the UTR 
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might look less secure if the dry weather of the past year continues. Drought does change 
things, and Section 8.5 expands on this contention.   
8.2 Quantifying uncertainty     
With so much Victorian water infrastructure still operating, at the outset of this project, the 
question was asked about how and why Victorian water resources and supply assets had 
happened in the sizes they did. Whilst answering this question, it was thought that it would be 
insightful to find out for what timescales did the Victorian water engineers expect their 
schemes to last. The issue for this project was not the length of time that the physical assets 
might last, but when the reservoir yield was expected, by the Victorians, to be completely 
accounted for by rising water demand. 
In spite of the amount of Elan and Birmingham literature, very little was found that could be 
isolated and called quantifying uncertainty. The exchange at the House of Commons Select 
Committee (HoCSC,1892) noted in Chapter 2 when James Mansergh, who understood all the 
detail he was presenting, was asked by how much he might have over- or under-estimated 
rainfall from the crucial 20 year rainfall record at the Elan site. Mansergh answered with his 
judgment, which he accepted might not be right. A different engineer might have refused.  
We know how much contempt was held by those who objected to the Thirlmere scheme for 
Bateman, as indeed Bateman had for them and the Thirlmere Defence Association. Bateman 
did not debate his numbers, and arrogantly dismissed any challenges. From Russell’s (1981) 
biographical paper about Bateman, we understand that it was easier to find derogatory 
comments rather than praise. 
Bateman’s behaviour when challenged says much about the way those engineers did, or rather 
did not, address uncertainty. Bateman’s stance was that if you do not like my numbers, then 
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you are the wrong type of client for me.  However, this cannot have happened frequently as 
Bateman was a phenomenally busy man who designed and constructed a large number of 
earth dams on the sides of the Pennines.  
The principal conclusion that can be reached about the Victorian water engineers’ approach to 
quantifying uncertainty was that it did not happen explicitly. The job of Victorian consulting 
engineers was to suggest to the client what type of scheme was needed, and to produce a 
design, which would probably have factored in the engineer’s own implicit uncertainty (no 
working papers for Bateman or Mansergh exist in the ICE’s archive).  It was their experience 
and empirically based judgments that the clients needed and valued.  
The modern approach is almost diametrically opposite to that of the Victorians. The method 
developed by the engineering consultant Mott Macdonald in 2002 for UKWIR entitled “An 
improved methodology for assessing headroom” was a substantial improvement, particularly 
for the larger water companies.  One particular problem with the method which was raised in 
Chapter 5 of this thesis is that the target headroom for a particular year in future is reduced as 
the base year of the plan moves forward. The implication is that the optimal programme of 
schemes for the long term, which need to be planned now, becomes sub-optimal as the years 
advance. Target headroom decreases, and a more short term plan becomes optimal. 
As was raised at the Public Inquiry, there are big uncertainties in the amount of water needed 
in the environmental area. Such is the uncertainty that the EA’s WRMP guideline forbids 
water companies to acknowledge this uncertainty in the calculations for target headroom, 
unless the reduction has been confirmed by EA. The maximum impact on Thames Water’s 
water resources was suggested by the EA to be potentially 600 Ml/d. Whilst the mood at the 
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Public Inquiry seemed to view this as unlikely, the company would need three more Upper 
Thames Reservoirs to fill the gap. 
There are many site specific environmental problems, such as with the EA’s Restoring 
Sustainable Abstractions programme that need careful and expensive data collection and 
analysis. The EA also needs to factor in these results into its development of the River Basin 
Management plans, which undoubtedly will involve dealing with many other uncertainties. 
There will always be uncertainty in making demand forecasts, and research is aimed at 
reducing the level. In the opening remarks to “Future Water” by Hilary Benn, then the 
Minister for the Environment, he says that he is looking for “good” (quotation mark added) 
water demand forecasting. The right interpretation of this remark is that uncertainty should be 
addressed with good science, but the Victorian engineers’ response would be that experienced 
judgment has been applied, and the numbers provided should be accepted. 
8.3 The 1892 water demand forecast for Birmingham 
In the 1890s, a 50-year planning horizon for water resources and supplies was considered by 
engineers to be appropriate for London and Birmingham. The current planning horizon set for 
water companies by the Environment Agency is 25 years. To advance the case for the full 
Elan scheme, Mansergh extended the 50 year horizon by a further 15 years when he told the 
HoCSC that the world would not end in 1940. This was a foresighted move, and a key 
moment for achieving Birmingham Corporation’s ambition in the 1892 Act.  
There was massive uncertainty in taking such a long-term view; Mansergh could not, for 
instance, have foreseen two World Wars, or assessed their impact on water demand, but his 
forecast was bold and founded on experience. In developing a demand forecast that showed 
growth continuing throughout the 63 years, Mansergh demonstrated that he shared 
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Birmingham Corporation’s confidence to deliver long-term economic growth, driven by its 
expanding manufacturing base, and the improvement in public health.    
The relatively poor resourcing for opposing interests allowed Mansergh to make his case 
without serious technical challenge. Perhaps this contributed to the portrayal of the 
Corporation’s attitude by Sheail (1986) as being greedy for land, and for generating 
resentment. However, in spite of their arrogance, there was not complete unanimity in the 
Corporation about the scheme, as evidenced in a letter written to a councillor in April 1892 by 
Birmingham politician Joseph Chamberlain. Cited by Ward (2005), Chamberlain wrote, “Pray 
remember that with the exhaustion of the Staffordshire Coalfields the prosperity and the 
further extension of Birmingham will be seriously checked”. The Corporation’s Water 
Committee had the confidence to reject this pessimistic informal demand forecast, and 
fortunately for the Corporation, the HoCSC were persuaded that this issue was not material.  
It is interesting and constructive to consider the downward step applied by Mansergh to the 
growth factor in the Decremental Ratio of Increase forecasting model. For example, an 
arbitrary 0.5% step produces a lower forecast profile than for 0.25%. Both are shown in 
Figure 4.18 together with the straight-line projection based on the 15 years of actual data from 
1876 to 1891. 
The comparison of the three projections in Figure 4.13 for the 20 years up to 1912 shows that 
there is little difference between them. Thereafter, an increasing gap develops between the 
0.25% and 0.5% profiles, especially after 1942 when the 0.5% profile flattens as it approaches 
its maximum at 190 Ml/d. The 0.25% profile at this time is growing at its maximum rate of 
near 5 Ml/d per annum, which is the same as the growth rate of actual demand through to 
1955. Judgement was needed to select the appropriate numbers for use in the DRoI model.  
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Although Mansergh used a statistical device to derive and present his 63-year water demand 
forecast, he also demonstrated a good understanding of the main components and drivers of 
demand growth. However, there were two exceptions to this. The first was waste, where 
increases were not considered; and the second was his speculative (and not confident) 
population forecast for 1955 of 1.62 million, which turned out a significant over-estimate.  
Even though Mansergh had advised the HoCSC that there was no preventable waste in 
Birmingham, this was not the case. Neither he nor the HoCSC would have known of the 
success that the increased water fittings testing and house-to-house waste inspection by 
Birmingham Corporation was to have in suppressing demand growth up to 1904. Had the 
amount of preventable waste been known in 1892, the argument for the full scheme would 
have been weakened. The population over-estimate turned out to be not as critical because by, 
1955, the shortfall in unmeasured demand was compensated by the very significant increase 
in measured demand. 
The usual response by a water undertaker at that time to the prospect of growth outstripping 
supply was to develop new supplies, but there were few suitable local opportunities in 
Birmingham, and the expenditure would have been abortive. Waste minimisation continued in 
Birmingham Corporation after the first phase of the Elan scheme was commissioned in 1904, 
and without this, the surge in demand to meet the WW1 war effort would have presented a 
more serious supply problem. 
Elan was controversial for its size, but the passage of time has revealed that Mansergh’s 
scheme was neither too big, nor unaffordable, nor is it likely that the scheme will become 
obsolete in future. Whilst there are still arguments about whether Birmingham should have 
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been allowed to build such a large scheme, Elan is a valuable legacy that met Birmingham 
Corporation’s vision of a long-term sustainable water supply. 
8.4 Attitude to leakage is a driver for change 
For the water distribution engineer, finding and fixing leaks from water mains is a never 
ending process, but is an essential part of maintaining public water supplies. The amount of 
money and expertise that is allocated to leakage control is influenced by the cost effectiveness 
of the water saved, and thereby influences the scale of an excess or shortfall in the supply and 
demand balance for the district of interest. 
A drought in 1865 showed that Liverpool Corporation had insufficient water resources, and 
could only provide an intermittent supply. Public health was threatened, and Liverpool was at 
a competitive disadvantage to Manchester, where there was a constant supply. The engineers 
knew that there was no prospect of providing a new water resources and supplies scheme for 
many years, and that leakage from water mains in Liverpool was substantial.  
Necessity became the mother of invention as George Deacon, who became chief engineer at 
Liverpool Corporation, understood that the current method for finding leaks was slow and 
inefficient, and that flow measurement over time in water mains would make a big difference. 
By his innovative design in 1873 for a meter that could continuously and reliably record flows 
in a distribution main, Deacon was responsible for creating a step change improvement in leak 
location.  
The application of Deacon’s meter brought immediate results in more efficient use of 
manpower resources by identifying the right areas to look for leaks, and the reduction of 
water demand led to the restoration of constant supplies in Liverpool in 1875.        
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Today, Thames Water has a significant mains replacement programme that is aimed at 
reducing the intrinsic leakage from ageing and underperforming assets. This policy is being 
driven internally by the need to address the growing supply demand imbalance and thereby to 
reduce the risk of the company failing to deliver the company’s level of service to its 
customers. The situation for London is less dramatic than that in Liverpool 140 years ago, but 
it is the same driver. 
Thames Water’s policy is also being driven externally by the EA, which is aware of the 
pressure on water resources for meeting the demand for public water supplies, and the 
increasing likelihood of damage to the natural environment in SE England. There was no 
equivalent concern for the environment in 19th century Liverpool.  
Today, Thames Water recognises that without a major mains replacement programme to 
reduce leakage in London, there would be little chance of EA seriously entertaining any 
proposals made by the company for new reservoir storage. A similar situation occurred in 
1892, when Mansergh was probably aware that a debate in Parliament about waste and 
leakage could damage the case for the Elan scheme. Mansergh asserted that “there is no 
preventable waste in Birmingham”, and successfully stopped further debate on the topic. 
There is political sensitivity about leakage levels from water mains and customers’ supply 
pipes in Government and throughout the water industry. A common perception by individuals 
is that because domestic pipework does not leak, so neither should the pipes maintained by 
the water companies. The Government responded with mandatory annual leakage targets for 
water companies, which are now set by and enforced by Ofwat. Mansergh’s assertion to 
Parliament would not go unchallenged today. 
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The powers to construct the Elan scheme were obtained, but time was to prove that in the last 
five years of the 19th century, there was a significant amount of preventable leakage and waste 
in Birmingham. Before the Elan scheme came on stream, there was a necessity to tackle 
leakage in Birmingham because of a deteriorating supply demand balance, just as there is now 
in London.  
The difference in the two situations is that Birmingham Corporation knew in the 1890s that 
their new reservoir scheme was on its way, but for London, there is much uncertainty about 
how to secure the capital’s water supply the future. Over the past 150 years, proposals to 
solve London’s precarious water supply situation with remote storage schemes have been 
made and then been rejected with a frequency of about once in every 20 to 30 years.   
8.5 Experience of drought is a driver for change 
The impact of droughts that are considered in this project occurred in the years between 1890 
and 2006. The discussion starts with an observation that over the past 120 years, there has 
been a remarkable turnaround in water suppliers’ expectations of their consumers’ attitude to 
water use. In the last years of the 19th century, consumers were being encouraged by suppliers 
to use more water, whilst over the past 20 years, the reverse has been true. To what extent has 
the experience of drought driven this change?  
In the last ten years of the 19th century, there were several dry summers when water shortages 
in London provoked strong consumer complaint, and raised awareness of the link between a 
constant clean water supply and improved public health. Forward thinking water suppliers in 
Britain developed new schemes to provide reliable high quality supplies that could support 
greater legitimate water use. Taylor et al (2009) calls this the “civilising contract” made 
between suppliers and their consumers.   
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In Victorian times, the word “drought” described what a water consumer experienced when a 
constant water supply failed, whatever the cause. When droughts occurred, suppliers blamed 
consumers for their amount of waste, and consumers blamed suppliers for having inadequate 
supplies and poor infrastructure. During the dry summers of the 1890s, the East London 
Water Company simply stopped the constant supply, and forced their consumers to endure 
rota cuts and intermittent supplies for only a few hours per day. Taylor et al (2009) suggest 
that these particular shortages “reinvigorated consumer politics, and contributed to the 
pressure for municipalisation” that eventually occurred in 1902.   
Municipal suppliers were more accountable to their consumers, and more likely to maintain 
constant water supplies, but municipal ownership did not guarantee a constant supply. As 
noted in Chapter 4, inaction by Liverpool Corporation meant that anxious consumers had to 
endure an intermittent supply for seven years. Birmingham Corporation was not immune from 
trouble; as during the First World War, an unforeseeable surge of industrial water demand to 
provide the vehicles and weapons of war very nearly caused a major water supply crisis. 
(Bradford et al. 2010).     
Whilst there were notable droughts in 1921 and 1933/4, the principle of a “civilising contract” 
appears not to have been seriously challenged until the UK wide drought of 1959, when 
Taylor suggests that some suppliers believed that their difficulties were exacerbated by a 
“wasteful civilisation” (Taylor et al, 2009). This view was symptomatic of a perception by 
consumers that water supplies were cheap and infinite.  
With the increasing pace of post-war population and industrial growth, the 1959 drought 
experience not only reflected a change of the suppliers’ mood, but also exposed a concern 
about the absence of water resources management and planning at both local and strategic 
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levels. To facilitate the management of competing interests in raw water abstractions from 
agriculture, industry and public water supply, the Government’s response was the landmark 
Water Resources Act of 1963. This Act empowered new catchment based River Authorities to 
implement abstraction licensing schemes, and also created a new Water Resources Board with 
the responsibility for national water resources planning. Both of these responsibilities are now 
vested with the EA.  
Since the 1959 drought, a high proportion of the ever increasing numbers of water consumers 
in the UK have had the luxury of being able to take for granted their safe, constant, and 
relatively inexpensive constant water supply. Forecasts of burgeoning demand, and the 
experience of past droughts, led to the development of several schemes that enhanced water 
supply availability. Notable surface water schemes included the naturally filled Clywedog 
reservoir scheme in mid-Wales, which was completed in 1969 to support abstractions along 
the River Severn. New pumped storage reservoirs at Rutland Water (1976), Foremark (1977) 
and Carsington (1992) increased the resources available for supplies to East Anglia, and the 
East Midlands.  
In spite of the new schemes, water use restrictions were required in the summer droughts of 
1976 (widespread regional hosepipe bans, non-essential uses banned, and some localised use 
of standpipes and rota cuts), and in 1995 (regional hosepipe bans in the Midlands and 
Northern England that extended into 1996). In 2006, after three dry winters, there were 
regional hosepipe bans in SE England and again in 2012 from 5 April. Modern drought 
management relies on reductions in consumer demand, and it remains to be seen if a change 
in this approach will be generated by the increasing perception of water as a commodity. 
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Taylor (2009) confirms that consumers responded positively to the requests to save water in 
1976 at the time when the providers were the nationalised Water Authorities. However, in 
1995, consumers were less responsive when many consumers were still angered by the recent 
privatisation of water companies. Since then, improvements in river water quality through 
water company investment have been recognised. In the 2006 drought, consumers of Thames 
Water heeded media campaigns to use less water, as the focus of communication was on 
limiting environmental damage rather than the threat of running out of water. There appears 
now to be a new form of contract being forged water companies and their customers with the 
needs of the water environment at its heart.  
After ownership of the industry was returned to private hands in 1990, (which was politically 
driven rather than a drought driven change), Government and regulators were aligned in 
wanting to see water company policies that encouraged consumers to reduce water 
consumption. The objectives were environmental (reduce abstractions), social (raise 
awareness that resources are not infinite), and fiscal (deferral of capital expenditure). Water 
companies began to offer water efficiency surveys to non-domestic consumers, and optional 
water metering to domestic consumers. The pressure on water companies was increased by a 
statutory requirement to promote water conservation in the 1995 Environment Act, and its 
importance was underlined by the supply difficulties that many water companies experienced 
in the drought of 1995. 
With the criticism of the industry’s patchy performance in the 1995 drought still in mind, the 
incoming Labour Government was ready in 1997 to publish an “Agenda for Action” for the 
industry and its regulators. Amongst a broad range of actions, water companies were required 
to increase the number of domestic consumers paying metered water charges, and to achieve 
leakage targets. These were fundamental elements of an updated “twin-track” supply and 
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demand approach to water resources planning, which was developed by the Environment 
Agency for implementation by the water companies.  
The touchstone today for consumer and media interest in a developing drought is when a 
water company announces that unless there is significant rainfall, there is likely to be a ban on 
the use of hosepipes. The current powers are contained in the Water Industry Act of 1991. A 
minimum period of 14 days elapses from when advertisements appear in the areas affected, 
and any material objections are dealt with, up to implementation.  The objective of a hosepipe 
ban is not to fill the courts with the company’s own consumers, but is a serious signal from 
the supplier for all water users to show restraint that will avoid, or delay, the time when more 
draconian restrictions may be needed. The ban about to be implemented on 5 April 2012 is at 
this stage more about reducing water use in order that more stays in the environment.            
Modern water supply networks have been made more resilient to drought by the 
interconnection of sources. When high demand and diminishing water in storage are 
coincident during drought, arriving at a prognosis for future supplies is a complex process that 
involves many supply and demand factors. The following definition of drought by the EA 
starts from the premise that “Droughts are natural events” of low precipitation:-  
“Droughts are natural events. A drought happens when a period of low rainfall creates a 
shortage of water for people, the environment, agriculture, or industry. Some droughts are 
short and intense, for example, a hot, dry summer, while others are long and take some time to 
develop.  Dry winters can have the biggest impact on water resources.  We rely on winter rain 
to top up groundwater and reservoir levels while summer rain helps to maintain reservoir 
levels and keep rivers flowing.” (EA, 2008) 
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The EA definition avoids the complexity that would occur if it were widened to include man-
made influences. The same was true nearly 50 years ago, when a drought was defined very 
generally in the 1963 Water Resources Act as “an exceptional shortage of rainfall”. This latter 
definition implicitly recognises that it is wise not to prescribe a quantified shortage of rainfall 
for all areas of England and Wales that reflects the risk for a particular restriction in water use 
like a hosepipe ban, or possible environmental damage.  
The explanation is contained in the water companies’ statutory Drought Plans that are agreed 
with the EA. Many water companies have told their consumers that their level of service for 
hosepipe bans remains no more frequent than around 1 year in 20 to 30 years. Past investment 
in raw water storage and treated water inter-connections means that the critical time period for 
the shortage of rainfall is usually much longer than the three months of spring. In SE England 
in general, public supplies rely on abstractions from groundwater and the base flows of rivers, 
and successive dry winters are the critical events, as mentioned in the EA definition.  
Further north and west, there is increasing reliance on surface storage, and a dry spring 
followed by a dry summer leads to an increased likelihood of supply restrictions. Hosepipe 
bans were widespread in 1995, and supply failure was only avoided in western parts of 
Yorkshire Water by a major tankering exercise. There are many factors to consider when the 
critical period is being identified for the likely start date and the length of time when a 
hosepipe ban needs to be in place. As shown in Chapter 5, these factors are complex and 
inter-related; they include the location, the time of year, and the degree of rainfall shortage, 
the mix of water resources, abstraction licence and raw water quality constraints on 
abstractions, the capacities of treatment works, trunk mains, and the flexibility of the 
deployment of treated water. 
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 For vulnerabilities that lead to the loss of supply, a recent spectacular example was a 
“drought” caused by the River Severn flooding of Severn Trent Water’s Mythe water 
treatment works at Tewkesbury in July 2007, which left most of the 400,000 water consumers 
of Gloucestershire without a piped supply for two weeks. There are now better flood 
defences, and new pumps and pipes that link the Mythe works to the rest of Severn Trent 
Water’s treated water grid system.  Ironically, an event caused by too much rainfall generated 
a response by Severn Trent Water that increases water supply resilience in future droughts. 
8.5.1 “Drought is Normal” 
The summer drought of 1976 was exceptionally dry and warm, and followed a series of drier 
than average winters. It provided a supreme test of drought management for the newly created 
Water Authorities, and in many parts of the UK it was a challenge that has been unequalled 
since then. Hydrologically, 1976 was not normal. However, this drought features significantly 
in Taylor et al. (2009) “Drought is normal”, so what does their title infer? The researcher’s 
interpretation is that it is a salutary reminder to the reader that it is normal from time to time 
to expect droughts. An interpretation can also be made at an operational planning level. This 
comes from the confidence that water companies and EA have in their Drought Plans being 
underpinned by the reliability of the water resources and supply assets provided by the 
Victorians. These assets help significantly to make today’s drought management a “normal” 
part of business as usual.          
The EA have identified most of SE England as an area of water stress, and wish to see the 
water companies significantly enhance programmes of domestic metering to reduce demand, 
which would require less abstraction, and thereby reduce the risk of environmental damage.  
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It is an easy decision for the EA to apply pressure on the water companies to enhance their 
demand management activities. The main reason is that the costs are borne by the water 
companies. Lower abstractions for public water supplies by the water companies would 
probably mean lower enforced licence reductions in future for environmental improvement. 
The EA said at the UTR Public Inquiry, that where there is an enforced reduction, sufficient 
time would be allowed by the EA for the water company to replace the resource. With no 
responsibility for determining planning applications, the EA’s stance is at best aspirational. 
There is also the question of whether the cost of the new resource would be adequately funded 
by Ofwat. Ofwat has publically stated that even if a scheme had been approved by the EA, 
and there was a new abstraction licence in place, this does not mean that funding for the 
scheme was automatic (Kiel, 2010). This comment was made with UTR in mind because 
Ofwat may not agree that the scheme is cost effective for a long term commitment to higher 
water bills for Thames Water’s customers. There appears to be no room for inter-generational 
expenditure.  
The role of water management today in maintaining good public health often overlooked. The 
press sees hosepipe bans as the main threat when drought strikes. Drought may be “normal”, 
but the priority for doing something about alleviating its consequences usually has to wait 
until there is a problem.        
8.6 Risk averseness of schemes  
The similarity in the planned lives and lag-times of the revised Thirlmere scheme and the 
Vyrnwy and Elan schemes prompts the question; were there any common themes in their 
approach to planning and design which caused this similarity, or did this just happen? 
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 There was similarity of approach at that time in the use of rainfall data to calculate the 
quantity of water available in a catchment. The approach was called the “three dry years”. 
Binnie (1981) reminds us that the concept of three dry years was understood by Parliament 
and laymen as the “reliable yield” of a catchment, and remained so until the 1960s. The 
calculation of the reliable yield of the Elan system (including the compensation water) at 464 
Ml/d was derived in this way. 
On the demand side, there was similarity in the over-estimation of forecasts of population, 
compensated by underestimating the growth in forecasts of per capita water use. For example, 
Hawksley’s population served with water by Liverpool Corporation was projected to double 
from 0.75m in 1880 up to 1.5m by 1916, but actual growth was to near 1.0m. Total demand 
expressed as per capita was 100 litres per day (22 gallons) in 1880, and forecast to be 133 
litres (29 gallons) in1916. The 1916 actual total demand was 160 litres per head per day (35 
gallons), which compares with approximately 280 litres today, of which 150 litres is the 
average domestic PCC. 
 The tone of the bold approach to scheme design was set by Bateman. He had shown in the 
1840s with the Katrine scheme for Glasgow that affordable large remote upland reservoir and 
gravity supply schemes could be successfully engineered. Bateman researched the potential of 
various sites in Wales for reservoirs with gravity supplies for supplying London for the 
Richmond Commission, and was aware of the possibilities of using existing lakes in the Lake 
District for supplying either or both Manchester and Liverpool. Such schemes today would 
very likely be called grandiose, and the environmental damage in the short term would be 
seen to outweigh any long term benefit.    
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There was at the time similarity in outlook and ambition reflected by the Corporations long 
term approach to water resources planning. The availability of money, and the acceptance of 
debt, allowed these ambitions to be fulfilled. Thus the Corporations were able to sustain a 
competitive role in economic development at a time when other cities in North America and 
Europe were developing quickly. 
 Summarising, the common explanatory factors are: 
1) A shared belief held at that time by the three Corporations for 
providing for the long term. 
2) Population forecasts were over-estimated, and per capita use was 
underestimated in the forecasts.  
3) Bateman, Hawksley and Mansergh were revered for their experience, 
competence and leadership in water engineering.  
4) A common approach was taken that used the 3 dry years rule for 
estimating catchment runoff. 
Whilst the work done to assess the risk averseness of the scheme designs identifies the most 
and least risky schemes, all the schemes were “safe” as they experienced longer planned lives 
than intended when designed. Were they so safe that the over-forecasting produced grandiose 
schemes? 
1) Thirlmere would have had to have been a substantially larger scheme to produce 
Bateman’s planned drought yield of 227 Ml/d. A larger scheme would have been 
labelled as grandiose (and a Lag Time of perhaps 50 years plus), and possibly less 
likely to have obtained Parliamentary approval. With better rainfall data, the drought 
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yield was revised down around 1910, and this produces Thirlmere with a Lag Time of 
about 10 years. 
2) At 15 to 20 years, Vyrnwy has a larger Lag Time than Elan. However, what might 
have been perceived as a grandiose scheme at the time has turned out not to be the 
case as Liverpool Corporation went on to develop additional river and reservoir 
sources in North Wales. 
3) Elan is nearly double the capacity of Vyrnwy, and has a Lag Time of 10 years. The 
size of Elan was robustly challenged in 1892, but Mansergh’s staged design prevailed. 
The full scheme was sized correctly to meet Birmingham’s demands in the first three- 
quarters of the 20th century. 
It would be interesting to look at other water resources and supply schemes that are clustered 
temporally or spatially, or by size or type, where there is sufficient data to gauge their relative 
risk averseness. Engineering historians might gain further insight to the degree of influence 
that common social, economic, political, and environmental factors had, or had not, on water 
engineers’ planning and design of water schemes. 
In the past two centuries in the UK, the principal drivers for water resources investment were 
rising demand due to the increased population served, and to support greater industrial 
activity. Now in the 21st century, future water demand growth in many areas of the UK is 
expected to be relatively flat. However it is the potential reductions in supply availability at 
existing sources, due primarily to environmental concerns, and the forecast impacts of rising 
temperatures due to climate change, which have become increasingly significant.  
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The lag time model applied to the forecast and actual long term supply and demand diagram 
has proved to be a useful concept as a guide to assess retrospectively the relative effectiveness 
of water resource scheme designs intended to last for at least 30 years.  
8.7 Would the Elan scheme be built today? 
If he was to present the case for Elan today, would Mansergh prevail? The potential 
environmental damage, or some might say the destruction, of a beautiful part of Mid-Wales 
would be likely to end any argument for the scheme, regardless of the need. There exists some 
deep longstanding resentment in Wales about the attitude taken by the Corporations of 
Birmingham and Liverpool in forcing through reservoir schemes. The politics have changed; 
the devolved Welsh Assembly might react emotionally and say no, or maybe the proposal 
might be seen as a commercial opportunity.  
A new Elan scheme could be viewed as an example that fits the EA’s vision to see more 
sharing of water resources as options for the future. Whilst it is the EA’s responsibility to be 
the government’s environmental regulator, and the champion for a sustainable environment, it 
is difficult to see how an objective decision could be made by the Agency. It is not 
unreasonable to conclude that the Planning Inspector’s recommendation to reject Thames 
Water’s UTR proposal might have been influenced in a small way by the impossibility of the 
EA’s position.  
8.8 The Implications of this thesis to future water resources planning. 
The implications of this thesis are in the processes of comparing schemes, and assessing 
comparative uncertainty. They can be summarised as follows: 
1. It is clear that the current planning approach coupled with the 
current regulatory requirements accentuates water resources 
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planning by the UK water companies for the short-term rather 
than the long term.  The Victorian approach, which based 
scheme designs on longer forecast horizons than are used today, 
demonstrates explicitly that Victorian investment was being 
made for future generations. 
2. An “historic perspective check” using the lag time model could 
help decisions to be made by water companies in scheme 
optimization and the priority of future schemes.   
3. The existing target headroom methodology could be developed 
to include an historical parameter that reflected the degree of 
intergenerational investment. The feasibility for such an 
addition would require further research work. 
4. Finding enough data and information concerning the original 
demand forecasts that were developed to justify a scheme is a 
key challenge. Singling out the impact a particular source 
within in a group of sources is a further significant challenge. 
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CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSIONS 
9.1 Quantifying uncertainty in the forecast for water supply and demand 
• Victorian water engineers did not have an explicit approach to the quantification of 
uncertainty when making their forecasts for future water supply and demand. Their 
approach was deterministic, and they were expected by their client Corporations to 
make empirically based judgements. 
• Whilst today’s water engineers have more data and knowledge, and can take a more 
detailed statistical approach, they have less freedom in strategic decision making than 
their Victorian predecessors.  
• The current UKWIR methodology for quantifying uncertainty as target headroom is 
conceptually and statistically sound, but does not work well when large long term 
reservoir schemes are being considered. The method also requires many judgements to 
be made, and a given outcome can be forced. 
• The 21st century call for environmental improvement has replaced the call made in the 
19th century for the improvement of public health. There are substantial spatial and 
temporal uncertainties, including the impact of climate change. These are difficult to 
quantify and achieve reliable estimates of the amounts of water needed to deliver and 
maintain environmental improvements, which in themselves are difficult to specify. 
9.2 Inter-generational investment  
• Planning for inter-generational investment is ignored in the regulatory planning 
guidelines. The Victorians have taught us that a 25 year planning horizon is too short, 
and the 5 yearly cycle of reviewing prices prioritises a short term approach to be taken 
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by water companies. Perhaps a more mature debate might have been had at the 2010 
Public Inquiry if Thames Water had presented a plan that identified inter-generational 
investment, rather than being perceived as a company that wanted a particular large 
scheme to meet it’s own somewhat arbitrary  evaluation of “long term risk”.   
• The current regulatory guidelines make the probability of building a new reservoir in 
future in the UK extremely remote as water companies are not allowed to plan for 
surplus headroom after 25 years. Building dams in stages to meet the 25 year criterion 
is often not possible, or would be prohibitively expensive.   
• The Environment Agency and Ofwat have much power to influence plans and the 
choice of schemes, but little responsibility for the outcome. The Government’s 
approach has perhaps allowed too much of the risk of future failure to fall on the water 
companies and their customers.   
9.3 The 1892 water demand forecast for Birmingham 
• In spite of huge uncertainty, the profile of Mansergh’s 63-year water demand forecast 
made in 1892 for the Birmingham Corporation supply area is remarkably close to the 
profile of actual water demands up to the forecast horizon in 1955. 
• In 1892, Mansergh understood the components of demand, and this informed his 
judgement when making reasonable assumptions about possible future demand 
growth. With his use of the statistical device called the decremental ratio of increase, 
which accommodates the concept of a limit to growth, he demonstrated the skills to 
develop and present successfully to Parliament a long-term water demand forecast. 
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• During the 12-year construction period of the Elan scheme, the waste control 
initiatives introduced by Birmingham Corporation were crucial to maintaining the 
headroom of supply over demand that ensured continuous supplies in Birmingham. 
Since then, a continuing culture for waste control helped to maintain headroom. 
However, during the First World War, its relaxation coupled with surging demand to 
support the war effort, very nearly created a major water supply crisis. 
• Mansergh and Birmingham Corporation were far-sighted, and they have proved using 
a much longer time horizon than is used now for water resources planning to have 
produced the valuable legacy of a sustainable water resource and supply scheme at 
Elan. The 1892 water demand forecast was a quantitative expression of Birmingham 
Corporation’s confidence and belief in the long-term future of the city. 
• The Victorian Corporations of provincial England raised sufficient funds, and used an 
ownership and accountability model that worked. 
9.4 Attitude to leakage control brings about change 
• An intermittent supply in Liverpool that had lasted for years during the 1860s was the 
catalyst of significant change in the approach to leakage control. It was the stimulus 
for Deacon’s invention of a water meter that recorded continuous flow in distribution 
mains, and the measurements made using the new technology enabled a more efficient 
and very successful new approach to be taken to locating leaks.     
• Mansergh’s assertion to Parliament in 1892 that “there is no controllable leakage and 
waste in Birmingham” would not go unchallenged today. 
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• The current Government approach involves the setting of mandatory leakage targets 
for water companies, and demonstrates that it is serious about leakage control for 
political reasons, and for maintaining water supplies.    
9.5 Experience of drought brings about change 
• The experience of drought has been both a driver (the force), and a catalyst (the 
timing), for the changes to the responsibility for public water supplies, for the pressure 
to develop new schemes, and for prompting Government intervention leading to the 
updating of the approach to strategic water resources and supplies planning. 
• The experience of drought, together with societal changes over the past 120 years, has 
redefined the original “civilising contract” between suppliers and consumers, which 
encouraged water use and delivered improved public health; today there is a wider 
contract with the environment, which is exemplified by the emphasis Government has 
put on all major stakeholders for efficient water use, and on water conservation. 
9.6 Measuring risk averseness and efficiency in terms of supply and demand 
• The relative risk averseness of the Victorian scheme designs is successfully quantified 
using a novel lag-time model with data derived from supply and demand balance 
diagrams. The least risk-averse design appears to be the full Elan scheme, and most 
risk averse was the original Thirlmere scheme. Vyrnwy is between Elan and 
Thirlmere. Thames Water’s proposed 100 Mm3 Upper Thames Reservoir has a 
shortfall from the intended planned life, and it could be argued that this scheme is 
more risky than the Victorian schemes because additional investment will be needed 
sooner rather than later. Caution is advised in making risk comparisons for the UTR 
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scheme as, in this study, both the long term supply and demand profiles are relatively 
flat.   
• Thames Water has set itself a very ambitious challenge by making the assumption of a 
20 litres per head per day reduction by 2035 in the domestic PCC forecast for London. 
The sensitivity of this forecast and the implications are substantial. If 10 litres is 
saved, the forecast demand for 2035 increases by 78 Ml/d. Together with the 
company’s estimate presented at the 2010 Public Inquiry of 100 Ml/d for “long term 
risk”, the deployable output of 178 Ml/d for the 100 million cubic metres UTR design 
would appear to be completely taken up. 
• The rejection by the Planning Inspector and the Secretary of State of Thames Water’s 
plan means there is still much uncertainty about how to secure water long term public 
water supplies, and deliver environmental improvement in London and the SE. 
• Novel concepts have been successfully developed that address the Knowledge Gap, 
including a new lag time model that compares the risk averseness of schemes, and 
opening the possibility of a new parameter of an “historic perspective check” to be 
included in the processes of a water company’s production of a preferred plan.   
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CHAPTER 10 FURTHER RESEARCH 
There are other types of Victorian water and sewerage assets that could be candidates for 
study that use the principles reported in this thesis. For example in water supply, there are  
many Victorian wells and boreholes that are still operational, and unveiling the reasons for the 
decisions taken when they were planned may show up other common features that were 
environmentally, technically, socially or politically significant.  
Setting up a register of schemes with an “historic perspective check” could be considered as 
an extra piece of information in future planning. Research would be needed to establish the 
feasibility of a register.  
A related area of study where research by engineering historians could improve our 
understanding is by taking a more holistic view of the Victorian legacy to demonstrate what 
this is worth. Today’s replacement cost for each asset in financial and environmental terms is 
an obvious option, but the answer would be too high to be meaningful, and the programme 
would take a long time to deliver. The novel lag-time method revolves knowing the period of 
time that the engineer originally planned for an asset to last, and estimation of the lag time for 
that asset could be a route to valuing the legacy with more finesse.  
Postscript 
James Watt’s three word answer to his young son’s question about what makes a good 
engineer was “Reflection and judgment” (source, National Museum of Scotland). Today’s 
water engineers would be likely to agree. The Victorian water engineers would be impressed 
with the modern armoury of computing power, good science, modelling tools, and copious 
data, but they would be horrified at the amount of time taken up in paralysis by analysis. 
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APPENDIX A – GLOSSARY OF TERMS (EA,2008) 
Abstraction The removal of water from any source, either permanently or 
temporarily. 
Abstraction licence The authorisation granted by the Environment Agency to allow the 
removal of water from a source. 
ACORN A Classification Of Residential Neighbourhoods is a socio-
demographic classification of neighbourhoods published by CACI 
Ltd. The system is based on the assumption that people who live in 
similar neighbourhoods are likely to have similar behavioural and 
consumption habits. 
Allowable outage The outage (calculated from legitimate unplanned and planned 
events) which affects the water available for use. An outage 
allowance may be made for such outages. 
Annual average The total demand in a year, divided by the number of days in the 
year. 
Available headroom The difference (in Ml/d or percent) between water available for use 
(including imported water) and demand at any given point in time. 
Average day 
demand in peak 
week 
One seventh of total demand in the peak week in any 12 month 
accounting period. 
Average incremental 
social costs 
The ratio of present social costs over present net value of additional 
water delivered or reduced demand 
Baseline forecast A demand forecast which reflects a company’s current demand 
management policy but which should assume the swiftest possible 
achievement of the current agreed target for leakage during the 
forecast duration, as well as implementation of the company water 
efficiency plan, irrespective of any supply surplus. 
Consumption 
monitor 
A sample of properties whose consumption is monitored in order to 
provide information on the consumption and behaviour of 
properties served by a company. 
Demand 
management 
The implementation of policies or measures which serve to control 
or influence the consumption or waste of water (this definition can 
be applied at any point along the chain of supply). 
Deployable output The output of a commissioned source or group of sources or of 
bulk supply as constrained by: environment 
• Licence, if applicable 
• Pumping plant and/or well/aquifer properties 
• raw water mains and/or aquifers 
• transfer and/or output main 
• treatment 
• water quality 
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Distribution input The amount of water entering the distribution system at the point of 
production. 
Distribution losses Made up of losses on trunk mains, service reservoirs, distribution 
mains and communication pipes. Distribution losses are 
distribution input less water taken. 
Distribution system 
operation use 
(DSOU) 
Water knowingly used by a company to meet its statutory 
obligations particularly those relating to water quality. Examples 
include mains flushing and air scouring. 
Drought order An authorisation granted by the Secretary of State under drought 
conditions, which imposes restrictions upon the use of water and/or 
allows for abstraction/impoundment outside the schedule of 
existing licences on a temporary basis. 
Drought permit An authorisation granted by the Environment Agency under 
drought conditions, which allows for abstraction/impoundment 
outside the schedule of existing licences on a temporary basis. 
Dry year annual 
average unrestricted 
daily demand 
The level of demand, which is just equal to the maximum annual 
average, which can be met at any time during the year without the 
introduction of demand restrictions. This should be based on a 
continuation of current demand management policies. The dry year 
demand should be expressed as the total demand in the year 
divided by the number of days in the year. 
Final planning 
demand forecast 
A demand forecast, which reflects a company’s preferred policy 
for managing demand and resources through the planning period, 
after taking account of all options through full economic analysis. 
Final planning 
scenario 
The scenario of water available for use and final planning demand 
forecast which constitute the company’s best estimate for planning 
purposes, and which is consistent with information provided to 
Ofwat for the Periodic Review. 
Forecast/plan 
horizon 
The end date of demand forecast or water resources plan. 
Maximum 
Likelihood 
Estimation (MLE) 
A statistical technique where a reconciliation item is distributed to 
the largest and least certain components of an estimate of the 
magnitude of a variable. The technique can be applied to the 
reconciliation of a water balance. 
Meter optants Properties in which a meter is voluntarily installed at the request of 
its occupants. 
Meter programme Properties, which are to be metered according to current company 
metering policy. 
Micro-component 
analysis 
The process of deriving estimates of future consumption based on 
expected changes in the individual components of customer use. 
Net Present Value The difference between the discounted sum of all of the benefits 
arising from a project and the discounted sum of all the costs 
arising from the project. 
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Non-households Properties receiving potable supplies that are not occupied as 
domestic premises, for example, factories, offices and commercial 
premises. 
Normal year annual 
average daily 
demand 
The total demand in a year with normal or average weather 
patterns, divided by the number of days in the year. 
Outage A temporary loss of deployable output. (Note that an outage is 
temporary in the sense that it is retrievable, and therefore 
deployable output can be recovered. The period of time for 
recovery is subject to audit and agreement. If an outage lasts longer 
than 3 months, analysis of the cause of the problem would be 
required in order to satisfy the regulating authority of the 
legitimacy of the outage). 
Point of abstraction The top of a borehole for borehole abstraction; the river intake for 
a river abstraction to direct supply or bank side storage; the draw-
off tower for a direct supply reservoir. 
Point of 
consumption 
The point where the supply pipe rises above ground level within 
the property, usually the inside stopcock or an internal meter. 
Point of delivery The point at which water is transferred from mains or pipes, which 
are vested in the water supplier into, pipes which are the 
responsibility of the customer. In practice this is usually the outside 
stopcock, boundary box or external meter. 
Point of production The point where treated water enters the distribution system. 
Potable water 
produced 
Raw water treatment less treatment works operational use and 
treatment work losses. 
Potable water 
exported 
Potable water exports from within a defined geographical area to 
an area outside the defined geographical area. 
Potable water 
imported 
Potable water imports from outside a defined geographical area to 
the defined geographical area. 
Raw water 
abstracted 
Raw water abstracted at the point where abstraction charges are 
levied. It is made up of raw water retained and raw water exported. 
Raw water collected Raw water retained plus raw water imported. 
Raw water exported Raw water exported from a specific geographical area. 
Raw water imported Raw water imported from outside of a specified Imported 
geographical area. 
Raw water losses The net loss of water to the resource system comprised of 
mains/aqueduct (pressure system) losses, open channel/very low 
pressure system losses, and losses from break-pressure tanks and 
small reservoirs. 
Raw water 
operational use 
Regular washing-out of mains due to sediment build-up and poor 
quality of source water. 
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Reconciliation item The difference between the estimates of the magnitude of a 
variable and the sum of the estimates of the individual components 
of that variable. 
Resource zone The largest possible zone in which all resources, including external 
transfers, can be shared and hence the zone in which all customers 
experience the same risk of supply failure from a resource shortfall. 
Risk A measure of the probability and magnitude of an event and the 
consequences of its occurrence. 
Source A named input to a resource zone. A multiple well/spring source is 
a named place where water is abstracted from more than one 
operational well/spring. 
Supply-demand 
balance 
The difference between water available for use (including imported 
water) and demand at any given point in time (c.f. available 
headroom). 
Supply pipe losses The sum of underground supply pipe losses and above ground 
supply pipe losses. 
Sustainability 
reduction 
Reductions in deployable output required by the Environment 
Agency to meet statutory and/or environmental requirements. 
Target headroom The threshold of minimum acceptable headroom, which would 
trigger the need for water management options to increase water 
available for use or decrease demand. 
Total leakage The sum of distribution losses arid underground supply pipe losses. 
Total water 
management 
All water management activities from source to end use (i.e. 
resource management, production management, distribution 
management and customer-side management). 
Treatment work 
losses 
The sum of structural water loss and both continuous and 
intermittent over-flows. 
Treatment work 
operational use 
Treatment process water i.e. net loss, which excludes water 
returned to source water. 
Underground supply 
pipe losses 
Losses between the point of delivery and the point of consumption. 
Unrestricted 
demand 
The demand for water when there are no restrictions in place (this 
definition can be applied at any point along the chain of supply). 
Void property A property connected to the distribution network but not charged 
because it has no occupants. 
WRP tables Water resources plan tables used for presenting key quantitative 
data associated with a water resources plan. 
Water available for 
use 
The value calculated by deducting allowable outages and planning 
allowances from deployable output in a resource zone. 
Water delivered Water delivered to the point of delivery. 
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Water delivered 
billed 
Water delivered less water taken unbilled. It can be split into 
unmeasured household, measured household, unmeasured non-
household and measured non-households water delivered. 
Water taken Distribution input minus distribution losses. 
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APPENDIX B - CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IMPACTING ON WATER SUPPLIES FOR BIRMINGHAM 
AND LONDON FROM 1800 TO THE EARLY 1900S 
Year Birmingham Year London Reference 
PERIOD 1: 1800 to 1850 - BIRMINGHAM 
WATERWORKS COMPANY (BWCo) FORMED 
Period 1: 1800 to 1850 - THAMES WASTEWATER 
CRISIS STARTS 
 
 
 
1800/05 Five new water supply companies formed. Parry, J. (1881) 
 
 
1805 150k cesspits served 1m people. Thames Water website. (2007) 
1808 70k people in 12k houses supplied from 
"ordinary" wells and carts. 
  
Mathews, C.E. (1886)  
1811 Parliament rejects a Bill to grant powers to form 
a company. 
  
History of CBWD. (1973) 
1812 Streets Commissioners become 1st public 
health authority. 
  
Macmorran, J. (1973) 
  1815 Connections allowed of house drains and cesspits 
to surface drains. Halliday, S. (1999) 
  1815 River Thames quality deteriorating 
"dangerously". Hardy, A. (1984)  
  1821 Anti-Water-Monopoly-Association; Bill to make 
dispute referees fails. Parry, J. (1881) 
1826 First Act to form BWCo, with powers to 
abstract from River Tame. 
  
Short History of BWCo. (1875)  
1827 Bankside reservoir storage of 30Mg started.   Short History of BWCo. (1875)  
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Year Birmingham Year London Reference 
(Second reservoir of 21Mg added in 1869). 
  1827 Attack on quality of Westminster supplier, Grand 
Junction Water Co. Hardy, A. (1984)  
  1828 Royal Commission appointed to look at quantity, 
quality, new sources. Hardy, A. (1984)  
  1828 9 companies, 164k tenants, 1.5m people, 200k 
houses. Hardy, A. (1984)  
  1830s General development of the Public Health idea; 
WCs used widely. Hardy, A. (1984)  
1831 River Tame water abstracted at Aston for 
supply for the first time. 
  
Short History of BWCo. (1875)  
1831 Pumped from raw bankside reservoir at Aston 
to Monument Lane SR. 
  
Short History of BWCo. (1875)  
  1831 First Cholera outbreak, 6.5k died. Halliday, S. (1999) 
1837 Victoria becomes Queen. 1837 Victoria becomes Queen.  
  1838 Poor Law Board emphasises importance of 
adequate water supplies. Hardy, A. (1984)  
1842 Streets Commissioners under John Pigott-Smith 
embark on much needed sewerage and drainage 
schemes - great political apathy. 
1842 Edwin Chadwick's Sanitary Report raises middle 
class awareness. 
Ward, R. (2005) 
  1844 Royal Commission on Health of Towns; more 
serious than imagined. Hardy, A. (1984)  
  1844 Of 900,000 people resident in New River Co 
district, 300,000 were "unsupplied". Parry, J. (1881) 
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Year Birmingham Year London Reference 
  1847 Waterworks Clauses Act, powers for Cos to 
provide constant supplies. Hardy, A. (1984)  
1848 Robert Rawlinson appointed inspector of 
Central Board of Health. 
  
Ward, R.  (2005) 
  1848 General Board of Health appointed. Recommends  
moving intakes for water supply away from R 
Thames. Hardy, A. (1984)  
  1848 Metropolitan Sewers Commission; connections to 
sewer required.  Halliday, S. (1999) 
  1848/9 Second Cholera outbreak, 14.1k died; Snow not 
believed. Halliday, S. (1999) 
1849 Intermittent supplies; Cholera fears; 
Corporation requests BWCo to clean streets. 
  
Mathews, C.E. (1886) 
PERIOD 2: 1850 to 1870 - NEW APPROACH TO 
SUPPLY TAKEN BY BWCo. 
PERIOD 2: 1850 to 1870 - NEW PHASE IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT. 
 
1851 Birmingham Improvement Act; gave 
Corporation the powers to purchase BWCo 
  
Mathews, C.E. (1886)  
1851 New Public Works Committee (PWC) takes 
over work of Streets Commissioners 
  
Macmorran, J. (1973) 
  1852 Metropolis Water Supply Act; Companies 
confirmed in their monopoly position Hardy, A. (1984)  
  1852 Act also recommended moving intakes above 
Teddington Hardy, A. (1984)  
1853 Supplies "ample and non-intermittent" in area 
with Parliamentary powers 
  
Mathews, C.E. (1886)  
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Year Birmingham Year London Reference 
  1853/4 Third Cholera outbreak, 10.7k died, link to 
polluted drinking water dramatically confirmed. Halliday, S. (1999) 
1854 2nd BWCo Act allowed £30k more borrowing; 
Corporation approved new works. 
  
Mathews, C.E. (1886)  
1854 Joseph Chamberlain first arrives in Birmingham 
from London aged 18. 
  
Ward, R. (2005) 
1854 Willenhall liquor spill into River Tame; 
domestic supplies cut; water carts used. 
  
Mathews, C.E. (1886)  
1854 Pigott-Smith takes horrified PWC members on 
inspection of River Tame catchment. 
  
Macmorran, J. (1973) 
1854 Rawlinson's "Proposed source of Water Supply" 
recommends River Blythe east of Birmingham. 
  
Rawlinson, R. (1854) 
1855 3rd BWCo Act; powers to use local sources at 
Hawthorn Brook, Perry Brook, R Blythe. 
  
Mathews, C.E. (1886)  
1855 General Purposes Committee recommend 
BWCo buyout - rejected by Council. 
  
Ward, R. (2005) 
1855 Upwards of 250k people resident in B’ham.   Mathews, C.E. (1886)  
  1855 Metropolis Land Management Act; establishes 
Metropolitan Board of Works. Hardy, A. (1984)  
  1855 New parish based administrative network 
regulated drainage arrangements. Hardy, A. (1984)  
  1856 Metropolitan Board of Works takes office, 
Bazalgette made Chief Engineer. Halliday, S. (1999) 
  1856 London medical officers of Health serve each Hardy, A. (1984)  
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Year Birmingham Year London Reference 
parish. 
  1858 The Great Stink. Halliday, S. (1999) 
1858 BWCo has "heated" correspondence with 
Walsall over sewage in River Tame. 
  
Mathews, C.E. (1886)  
  1860s Monthly water reports; no supplies on Sundays 
until 1870s. Hardy, A. (1984)  
1861 New Edgbaston Service Reservoir built 70 feet 
above Monument Lane SR. 
  
Mathews, C.E. (1886)  
1862 Thomas Avery joins Council from business, and 
made chair of Finance Committee. 
  
Macmorran, J. (1973) 
1862 James Mansergh's first "assessment" of Elan 
site in Mid-Wales (initially for London?). 
  
Mansergh, J. (1894) 
1864 Thomas Hawksley report recommends 
groundwater and larger supply area. 
  
Mathews, C.E. (1886)  
  1865 Bazalgette's Southern system in operation. Halliday, S. (1999) 
  1865 Increasing concern for agricultural pollution of 
the River Thames from Oxford + Reading. Hardy, A. (1984)  
  1866 Fourth Cholera outbreak in East End confirms 
water-borne theory. Halliday, S. (1999) 
  1866/72 The Water Question and The Sewage Question, 
letters to Earl of Derby. Bailey Denton, J. (1866) 
1866 4th BWCo Act, authorises Plant's Brook 
abstraction, new wells, extended supply area. 
  
Mathews, C.E. (1886)  
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Year Birmingham Year London Reference 
1866 Act limited Aston abstraction from River Tame, 
and prohibited altogether from 1 Jan 1872.  
  
Mathews, C.E. (1886)  
  1868 Abbey Mills pumping station opened; Northern 
system in operation. Halliday, S. (1999) 
1869/72 Wells constructed at Witton (2 Mgd), Perry (2 
Mgd), Kingsvale (0.5 Mgd). 
  
Mathews, C.E. (1886)  
  1869 Royal Commission on Sanitary Reform 
recommends public ownership of water supply. Hardy, A. (1984) 
  1869 Royal Commission about future supplies rejects 
Bateman’s plan for remote storage in Mid-Wales. Walters, R.C.S. (1936) 
1869 Alderman Avery's resolution about public 
health and private enterprise. 
  
Avery, T. (1869) 
1870 5th (last) BWCo Act; authorised rivers Blythe 
and Bourne abstraction, Whitacre and Shustoke 
reservoirs. 
  
Mathews, C.E. (1886)  
1870 Council empowered to appoint Inspector to test 
quality. 
  
Mathews, C.E. (1886)  
1870 Richard Hassard recommends new remote 
storage west of Birmingham on River Teme.  
  
Hassard, R. (1871) 
1870 Sewage Enquiry Committee 300 page report.   Briggs, A. (1968) 
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Year Birmingham Year London Reference 
PERIOD 3: 1870 to 1890 – CORPORATION TAKES 
OVER RESPONSIBILITY FOR WATER SUPPLY 
 PERIOD 3: 1870 to 1890 - WATER SUPPLY 
BECOMES A POLITICAL ISSUE 
 
 
1871 Metropolis Water Act; secures appointment of 
Metropolitan Water Examiner. Hardy, A. (1984)  
 
1871 Operation of Companies subject, in public 
interest, to Parliamentary supervision. Hardy, A. (1984)  
1871 Robert Rawlinson report to Corporation on 
Mid-Wales as future source of supply. 
  
Mathews, C.E. (1886)  
1871 Whitacre reservoir completed; River Blythe 
now used in supply for the first time. 
  
Hassard, R. (1871) 
1871 Demand 7.3 Mgd.   Mathews, C.E. (1886)  
1872 Abstractions cease from River Tame for 
domestic use.  
  
History of CBWD. (1973) 
  1874 Royal Commission on Rivers Pollution; 
multitudes still at risk. Hardy, A. (1984)  
1874 Joseph Chamberlain as Mayor "knew what he 
had to do, and did it" by municipalising private 
Gas and Water companies. 
  
Mathews, C.E. (1886)  
1875 Bill became law for the Corporation to take 
over BWCo on 1 Jan 1876. 
  
Mathews, C.E. (1886)  
1875 Alderman Avery and George Heaton (for 
BWCo) brokered financial deal. 
  
Mathews, C.E. (1886)  
1875 Avery becomes first chair of new Water 
Committee. 
  
Ward, R., (2005) 
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Year Birmingham Year London Reference 
1875 A Short History of the Birmingham Waterworks 
Company published. 
  
Short History of BWCo.(1875)  
1875 Death rate of 25 per thousand higher than 1849, 
and 3 greater than national average. 
  
Ward, R. (2005) 
1875 First Health Committee formed following large 
scale sanitary survey. 
  
Ward, R. (2005) 
1875 Public Health Act; local authorities could 
combine where advantageous. 
  
Birmingham Weekly Post, (1952) 
1877 Birmingham Tame and Rea District Drainage 
Board formed serving 0.5m. 
  
Birmingham Weekly Post, (1952) 
  1880s Scientific uncertainty; divergence of analytical 
techniques for quality. Hardy, A. (1984)  
  1881  Parry's book that opens with "We live in an age 
of sanitary restlessness" is published. Parry, J.  (1881) 
1883 Corporation makes a profit on water supply; 
rates reduced for small houses. 
  
Mathews, C.E. (1886)  
1883 Consolidation Act adds Coleshill, Elmdon and 
Solihull to the supply area. 
  
Mathews, C.E. (1886) History of CBWD. 
(1973) 
1885 Demand 12Mgd; Supply 16.5Mgd; 0.5m 
supplied (out of 0.6m). 
  
Mathews, C.E. (1886)  
1886 Mathews believes that "It would appear that we 
have no anxiety for the future". 
  
Mathews, C.E. (1886)  
  1887 Discharge of sewage to the Thames ceases. Halliday, S. (1999) 
     
 Appendix B  Chronology of events impacting on water supplies for Birmingham and London from 1800 to the early 1900s 
 
 
252 
Year Birmingham Year London Reference 
PERIOD 4: 1890 to 1900 - BIRMINGHAM 
CORPORATION PLANS AND BUILDS FOR THE 
LONG TERM 
 PERIOD 4: 1890 to 1900 - CONSTANT 
SUPPLIES, AND A STRING OF DROUGHTS 
 
1891 A Lecture – “The Future water supply of 
Birmingham” reveals Corporation’s plans. 
  
Barclay, T. (1891) 
1891 James Mansergh recommends purchase of Elan 
and Claerwen catchments 
  
Mansergh, J. (1894) 
  1891 Storage capacity is insufficient to maintain 
supplies in turbid times. Hardy, A. (1984)  
  1891 New LCC pushes on to extend constant water 
supplies e.g. Camberwell. Hardy, A. (1984)  
1892 Objectors pamphlet "Why the Welsh water 
scheme is not the one for the City of 
Birmingham". 
  
Double Service Committee, (1892) 
  1892 Cholera on the continent gives "sanitary anxiety". Hardy, A. (1984)  
1892 First five sections of Barclay's The Future 
Water Supply of Birmingham is published.  
  
Barclay, T. (1892) 
1892 Royal Assent for Birmingham Corporation 
Water Act for Elan scheme. 
  
Barclay, T. (1892) 
1893 Chamberlain warns that the Elan scheme will 
over-extend City finances - advice ignored! 
  
Ward, R., (2005) 
1893 Plans for six dams and six pipelines for delivery 
over 60 years. 
  
Barclay, T. (1898) 
1893 Importance of keeping waste to a minimum 
until Elan delivered. 
  
Barclay, T. (1898) 
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  1894 Sir Alexander Binnie proposes new storage in 
Mid-Wales, and again rejected. Walters, R.C.S. (1936) 
  1894/5 Severe winter and dry summer. Hardy, A. (1984)  
  1896 Summer drought. Hardy, A. (1984)  
  1898 Drought "unparalleled for 86 years". Hardy, A. (1984)  
1898 Second five sections of Barclay's book "revised 
and enlarged". 
  
Barclay, T., (1898) 
  
1899 
Constant supplies achieved in London some 40 
years after the target set. Hardy, A. (1984)  
PERIOD 5: EARLY 1900s - FIRST 3 ELAN DAMS, 2 
PIPELINES, + FRANKLEY WORKS DELIVERED. 
PERIOD 5: EARLY 1900s - METROPOLITAN WATER 
BOARD (MWB) FORMED.  
1901 Queen Victoria dies. 1901 Queen Victoria dies.  
1904 King Edward VII inaugurates Elan scheme.   Mansergh, E.& W. (1912) 
  1904 MWB takes over water companies. Hardy, A. (1984)  
1912 Earnest and Walter Mansergh’s ICE paper 
describes the Elan scheme. 
  
Mansergh, E.& W. (1912) 
  1921 Supply considered safe enough to abolish post of 
Metropolitan Water Examiner. Hardy, A. (1984)  
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APPENDIX C – PARAMETERS OF WATER DEMAND FORECASTS – COMPARISON BETWEEN 1892 
AND 2008 
1892 2008 
Comment 
Parameters used for the forecast (M = 
Mansergh forecaster for 1955; see Table 
4.9) Parameters used for forecast Example of units 
Unmeasured or 
measured 
Household   Household     
Census data Population total 
Population total + forecast 
growth Millions + thousands per year   
Birmingham evidenced growth 
trend data from 1871 to 1891 
(M's 'not unreasonable' forecast of 1.62 
million not explicitly used) Number of new houses Thousands/year   
    Number of meter optants Thousands/year   
House counts for billing Number of inhabited houses 
Unmeasured households and 
population Millions   
Birmingham evidenced growth 
trend data from 1871 to 1891 
(M's implied unmeasured per capita demand 
forecast of 97 litres/day includes household, 
waste and leakage) 
Measured households and 
population Millions   
    Metering savings assumed 
Litres/person or litres/household 
per day   
Comparison with other cities; 
London experience 
Average daily domestic use in houses with 
and without WCs (M. assumed future 
growth of WCs, hot water systems, 
prosperity) Water efficiency assumptions 
Litres/person or litres/household 
per day   
    
Per capita micro component 
domestic use per day:     
    Unmetered households 
Litres/person or litres/household 
per day Unmeasured 
    Metered households 
Litres/person or litres/household 
per day Measured 
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1892 2008 
Non-household   Non-household     
Accelerated growth in 
manufacturing with soft water; 
Glasgow experience 
Measured non-household use per day (M. 
assumed 91 litres/head per day) Number of new non-households Thousands/year   
  
Agreements with small industrial users (M. 
assumed as part of non-household)       
    Non-household population Thousands/year   
Significant use to improve 
public health 
Street cleaning, fountains, etc. (M. assumed 
as part of non-household) Measured non-household use megalitres/day Measured 
    Unmeasured non-household use megalitres/day Unmeasured 
    
Unbilled use and operational 
use megalitres/day Unmeasured 
Leakage   Leakage     
Fittings tested 
Minimise waste (M. implied steady; part of 
household) 
Distribution losses (based on 
economic level of leakage 
(ELoL) and mains replacement 
programme) megalitres/day Unmeasured 
Household inspections 
Minimise waste (M. implied steady; part of 
household) Customer supply pipe losses:     
    Unmetered properties Litres/property per day Unmeasured 
    
Metered properties (also part of 
ELoL) Litres/property per day Measured 
Starting with a 3% per annum growth rate observed in the 1880s, Mansergh 
used the DRoI method to produce a forecast up to 1955 (see Table 4.6) 
Components added to produce 
forecast: Ml/day     
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APPENDIX D - EA, DEFRA, AND THAMES WATER REPORTS, 1994 
TO 2011 
Year From Government From Thames Water Comment 
1994 Water, Nature’s Precious 
Resource, published by National 
Rivers Authority 
 
Environmentally 
Sustainable Water 
Resources Development 
Strategy for England and 
+Wales. 
1996 Water Resources and Supply – 
Agenda for Action; report 
published by DoE 
 
Post 1995 Drought Actions 
for Govt, EA, Ofwat, 
Water Cos and consumers 
1998 Economically based mandatory 
leakage targets for Water Cos set 
by Ofwat 
 
Leakage rates politically 
sensitive. Targets needed to 
deliver reductions.  
1999 
and 
2004 
 
Water Companies produce 
WRMP’s to EA’s 
specification. to align with 
Business Plans. 
EA report to Govt that not 
all companies have 
sustainable plans. 
2007 Parliamentary WRMP and 
Drought Plan Directions 
 
Water company Draft and 
Final WRMP are made 
Statutory, and have public 
consultation 
2007 EA issues Water Resources 
Planning Guideline report, and 
updates. 
 
Guideline revised to 
include latest advice on 
Climate Change 
Late 
2007 
 
Strategic Direction Statement 
report published  
Marks the start of  the 2009 
Business Plan process for 
Water Cos.  
Feb 
2008 
“Future Water” report, and Govt 
Factsheets issued by Defra. 
 
Govt policy to reduce 
domestic water demand. 
Feb 
2008 
Consultation on “Draft Statutory 
Social and Environmental 
Guidance” issued by Defra. 
 
Govt test of policy advice 
to be given to Ofwat. 
Mar 
2008 
EA public consultation on 
“Water for People and the 
Environment” 
 
EA tests policy for their 
National Water Resources 
strategy. 
Mar 
2008 
Managing Drought in E+W 
report issued by EA. 
  
May 
2008 
 
Draft WRM Plan made 
available for public 
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Year From Government From Thames Water Comment 
consultation 
June 
2008 
EA’s Climate Change Adaption 
Strategy issued. 
  
Aug 
2008 
“Statutory Social and 
Environmental Guidance” issued 
by Defra to Ofwat. 
  
Sept 
2008 
Demand for Water in the 2050s 
report (EA) 
 
One of 8  EA Module 
reports that support the 
WRMP Guideline  
Nov 
2008 
WRM Planning Guideline 
revised (EA) 
  
Mar 
2009 
Water for the People and the 
Environment, Summary and 
Final Report (EA) 
 
Water Scarcity.  Restoring 
Sustainable Abstractions. 
Mar 
2009 
Water is Precious, Summary and 
Final Report (EA Wales) 
  
Feb 
2009 
 
Statement of consultation 
Responses report to Defra 
 
Feb 
2009 
 
Consultants for TW report on  
Public Consultation 
 
April 
2009 
Water Resources Strategy – 
External briefing (EA) 
  
April 
2009 
 
Final Business Plan submitted 
to Ofwat 
 
May 
2009 
EA Advice report to Defra about 
TW’s Statement of Responses.   
 
Pivotal report that indicated 
the need for a Public 
Inquiry. 
June 
2009 
Supplementary EA Advice to 
Defra. Final Advice not 
changed. 
  
3 Aug 
2009 
Defra letter to TW announcing 
Public Inquiry 
  
Aug 
2009 
 
TW letter to EA asking for 
clarification of Advice reports. 
 
Sep 
2009 
EA letter to TW identifies 21 
“Outstanding Issues” 
  
Sept 
2009 
 
TW releases “Revised” Draft 
WRM Plan 
TW introduces long term 
risk. 
Dec Independent Review of 
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Year From Government From Thames Water Comment 
2009 Charging (the Anna Walker 
report) published 
Dec 
2009 
EA issue River Basin 
Management Plan, Thames 
  
Jan 
2010 
 
TW and EA publish 
“Statement of Common 
Ground” 
Register of 49 Issues, 10 of 
which are unlikely to be 
agreed before PI 
Jan 
2010 
 
Revised submission of 
Business Plan sections of B5 
Maintaining Supply Demand 
Balance, and C4 Supply 
Demand Appraisal. 
 
Feb 
2010 
 
TW publishes “Statement of 
Case” 
Many of the 49 issues 
resolved. 
Mar 
2010 
EA Strategy; Water Resources 
Action Plan for England and 
Wales published 
  
Mar 
2010 
EA publish Discussion 
Document, Managing water 
resources in SE England 
  
Mar 
2010 
 
TW and Ofwat publish 
Statement of Common 
Ground. 
 
Mar 
2010 
Defra briefing issued for the PI 
Inspector. 
  
April 
2010 
Parliamentary Briefing 
organised by GARD, the largest 
NGO opponent. 
 
Objected to the reservoir 
solution. 
May+ 
June 
2010 
 
Two supplementary TW and 
EA SOCG reports published.  
 
June 
2010 
Entec Options Report delivered 
to EA. 
  
 15 
June to 
18 Aug 
2010 
Public Inquiry into TW’s Draft 
Water Resources Management 
Plan. List of Core Documents 
(Defra); EA Proofs of Evidence 
and Rebuttals. 
TW’s Proofs of Evidence and 
Rebuttals of EA and other 
objectors. 
 
13Dec 
2010 
PI Inspector’s (Wendy Burden) 
report.  
 
TW not fully compliant 
with Directions; no 
100Mm3 Upper Thames 
Reservoir. 
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Year From Government From Thames Water Comment 
Dec 
2010 
EA release Water Resources 
Action Plans by EA Region. 
  
1 Mar 
2011 
Decision Letter from Defra to 
TW; The SoS has accepted the 
Inspector’s Conclusions and 
Recommendations. 
 
A programme of work that 
covers 25 Inspector’s 
recommendations in a 
further letter of 13 May 
2011. 
    
 
Thesis ends here; later entries 
are for information. 
  
    
Apr 
2011 
EA revises Water Resources 
Management Plan Guideline 
  
May 
2011 
Letter from Defra to TW; 
Timetable of work. 
  
Dec 
2011 
 
New Draft Final WRMP 
issued for public consultation 
(to 28 Jan 12) 
No UTR 
Jan 
2012 
EA publishes “The Case for 
Change – Current and Future 
Water Availability” 
  
Jan 
2012 
EA and Ofwat jointly publish 
“The Case for Change – 
Reforming Water Abstraction 
Management in England” 
  
Jan 
2012 
“Water for Life” Defra White 
Paper 
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APPENDIX E - LIVERPOOL LOSSES IN THE 19TH CENTURY – 
ANALYSIS OF PARRY DATA 
From analysis of data published by Parry, leakage reduction in Liverpool is confirmed to have 
happened between 1873 and 1876. 
 Data used:  
Parry (1881) referenced P1, and (1899) referenced P2; 1873 data from Beloe (1875). Vision 
of Britain website for population data: c 10k / year average growth 1861 - 1881. 
Dates selected, and estimated Losses as percentages of Total Demand from analysis: 
1864 - constant supply from 1858 to drought of 1865, and then an intermittent supply to 1873; 
losses estimated at 60% of total supply. 
1873 - intermittent supply, introduction of special measures to reduce waste, losses estimated 
at 55% of total supply. 
1876 - constant supply resumes; losses estimated at 45% of total supply 
1898 - waste water meter district measurement since 1876, losses estimated at 25% of total 
supply. 
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Table of the analysis; numbers shown in bold are directly from references, non-bold numbers are 
interpolated from bold numbers. 
Year 
Population 
Total Demand 
Mgd                g/h/d 
Losses 
Mgd               g/h/d 
Useful Demand 
Mgd               g/h/d 
    
1864 
0.52m  
15.8                 30.4 
                         P1  
9.3                 17.9 6.5                  12.5 
1873 
614,000  Beloe 
17.5                 28.5 
Beloe             Beloe 
9.9                 16.0 7.6                  12.5 
1876 
0.66m  
14.8                 22.5 
                         P1 
6.6                  10.0 
   P2 
8.2                  12.5 
1880 
703,000  P1 
   
1889  
                  Min 7.0 
                         P2 
 
1895  
               Max 11.8 
                         P2 
 
1898 
808,000  P2 
23.2                 28.8 
 P2                    P2 
6.0                   7.4 
  P2 
17.2                 21.4 
 
Mgd – million gallons per day. 
g/h/d – gallons per head per day. 
Total Demand - = Losses + Useful Demand. 
Appendix F  Tables 8.3, 8.4 and 8.6 from Thames Water’s Revised Draft 
Water Resources Management Plan, September 2009 
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APPENDIX F – TABLES 8.3, 8.4 AND 8.6 FROM THAMES WATER’S 
REVISED DRAFT WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT PLAN, 
SEPTEMBER 2009 
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Appendix G  A review of the 1982 water demand forecast for Birmingham 
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APPENDIX G – A REVIEW OF THE 1982 WATER DEMAND 
FORECAST FOR BIRMINGHAM 
Please see paper enclosed in back pocket of thesis. 
 
